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Introductory 
A GREAT leader d i d  On h m b e r  1, 1934, Se& Kirov, a member of the Political Bureau of the C o m d  
Party of the Soviet Union, was waylaid in hingrad  and b t  
dead. On December 21 the Soviet Government announced tbat 
the asmuam, Nikolaiev, waa a membar of &a m 4 I d  UZRnin- 
g a d  Center" of counter-revolntionists, a terrorist group bent 
on a t w h t h g  the highest o f h k l s  of the Soviet. 
Said the o&ial c d q e :  
m e  *tigation ha0 &lidled &at the motns for tb 
l a g  of Kiroy wss a p h  of thin o n d e q m d  .ntiM~ 
group to d i s o m  the I s a h h i p  of h Gowrnmmt 
b y m a a n s o f t e r r o r i n t a c b d i r d ~ i ~ ~ ~ d  
t b d y  &set a in policy doag ths l b ~  of tha BO- 
d s d  Zimdm-T* plstform. . . . Tham aae #n rdditionel 
d o  for the killing of Kirw bccanw K f r o ~  had rmarhad 
h n h g d  p u p  of fforrnar Z i n h  qBpoaitionkm bods iamb 
logically and pol iay . ' '  
A few day8 later, Ziaoviev, Kamenav and 17 membws of 
another counter-revolutionary group, the so-called '%mow 
Center", were arrested and broaght to trial. At ths hearinp, 
Zinoviev, apparently realizing ha b o p e l w a ~ ~ ~  of his dtua- 
tion, declared: 
"Thi o u m a e  murda t h e w  nach an ominow light upon ths 
whole p r m h ~  antirPartg tbrt I tb Puty f 
h l n t e l y  right in mpaaLing of dm polirical m a p d i l i t y  of tho 
former anti-Party Zinwiev group for Lhs m d a  mmmitred" 
Metubem of the Moscow Center, in their ecwfesaima, ex- 
plained the nature of the dqeneratiw that led to tIm murder, 
Said Yevdokimov: 
"We were eeparrrted from tbe actual life of the country and 
we stewed in our own juice. Our counter-rtvoldonary (UI~~CC- 
tions were strengthened in ue. Blinded by the wrath towardo rhs 
leadership of the Party, we did not see what waa occurring ia the 
t o m  and villages. W e  did not nee the ~010ssnl g n c m  of 
Sociaht comtntction. The d o u a  hietwical p- of 
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our cotinmy, influencing the internationd working-dm move 
mmt, went by na Wo appraiwd the dificultien arising in the 
p m  of gtowth ia the countrim aa enemies, mdcioudy rejoic- 
ing at failures, and aocuning the Pam Isademhip of rhsw failurea 
"We did not see what m u y  rankand-file m e m k  saw. We did 
wk norice the growth in ths condousneee of strength, of the unity 
of tha Party. We W e d  SbaIln with malic6om counter-rcvc- 
Iutionarg ineinuationa We  ths Party leadep8hip that i t  
did not aecspt MUrH to d* the kmmatiwal working- 
claw mo99mant. We dandmnoly suerted that the Centrnl 
Conmittas handicappud the development of thin moycmcntm 
Another member of the group, B&v, ddared: " N h  
laievt shot rearuIted from the fact that he recei~ed his educa- 
tion in muter-revolution in the Trotaky-Zinoviev organ- 
i%atioa" 
Chtce more the name of Trotsky cropped up in connection 
with an attack on the Bolshevik Revolution. Olsce more Zino- 
vim (ad his dd h a t e ,  Kamenev) appeared as coIlabrat- 
ing with T r e e  This t h e  it was no mere word barrage. A 
great hero was destroyed. New Ruwia was mbM of a talented, 
comqeous and universally beloved workingelaas builder of 
the Socialist aptam. The blow was aimed at the very heart 
of the Revolution. 
'The drege of the Trotsky-Zinovitey opposition." . . . This 
. is how the S o d  ma- termed the band of ~lotters. And 
once more a *tic surge of hatred r m  among the million* 
of friends of the Soviet Union the world over for this man, 
Trotsky. 
Who is he? What is Trotskyim? What are its social roots? 
What is the international role of the Trotsky group? 
Ths following is to be a brief answer to these questions: 
Trotsky'e Career 
ROTSKY -11s b l f  "the true Bolshevik-Leninist". So Td id the Social-Democfati~ hang~len of the G e m  ~ W O -  
lution, Noske, Scheidemann, Severing, call themeelves ''true 
M&". Troteky l o w  to porn as the last of the p a t  revolu- 
tionary figurea that carries forward the tradition of Lenin. 
There are people, especially among the younger generation, 
who tbink of him as an "old Bolshevik". For wam't he Ieader 
of the Revolution in 19171 Wam't he st the head of the Red 
h y  between 1918 and 1921? 
Thew are the facts: 
1 Trmky started his political car= around the turn of the century. In 1903, when the great division between the Men- sheviks and the Bol&eviks took definite form, Trotsky allied himseIf with the Menshevik In one way or another he fought 
Bolshevism wntil late ia the summer of 1927. Time and again 
he agreed with tbis or that point of the Bolshevik program, 
but soon he would join the Mensheviks to fight the BoIshevik6 
-and Lenin. He renewed his open hostility to BoLshevism in 
1923 and has been fighting it ever since. 
How did he become a revolutionary figure? He never was 
in the thick of tho workers' life as builder of their organh 
tions. He never sumeeded in winning to hia particular side 
any considerable. numbers of workem He alwaya was, and 
always remained, a writer and speaker only, enjoying great 
popularity among the petty-bourgeois intellectuels. When the 
I revolutionary labor movement in R u l a  was young, a man with a dmp pen and an oratorical talent such as Trotsky could I easily become noted It is for thme ptl i t im that he became 
a member of the First Soviet of Workers' Deputies organid 
during the Revolution in 1905. The Soviet of that time, accord- 
ing to  Lenin, was a "broad fighting union of Sacialists and 
revolutionary democrats--lacking definite f om". The first 
chairman of the Soviet, Chrustalev-Nosar, was not even a 
Socialist. After the latter's arrest Trotsky became chairman. 
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Of hb role during thm crucial days of tb 1905 Revolution 
we have the a -' y of a great acbolar, ths historian 
Pehv+r--- 
" J h i ~  tba .Rtwla of activit~, the Peteduq Soviet 
~ ~ i ~ r h d ~ r o r p . i n M U i ~ t d c l c p . e t ~ a n s d s p t  
in ths art d combining b h e r i k  subsreom with mltttioaarg 
phr- Tbn rvme of tlm h u h d  WM T d y .  He war a 
ganninq f d * b h n  l k d d k  w h ~  Id  no d& whatmet Bar 
i m d n  and wm alwwher a m  to ths 
molutien to ite campl- f s ,  to Lbs o*duow of T b U  
(M. N. P o b d y ,  Brie) Hhm of B w k ,  V d  I& p. a). 
After 1906 he forma a Iittle m r  in Vierma, A m  whum 
he p a b l h  a non-perid-1 paper of his own. In thii paper 
he Wts B o w  although in varying degr#k In 1912 
he j o b  na anti-Bolhvbt coalition known aa the Angnat 
B l a  Him am& on B o I s b i m  become mom h t  and 
ummpuloraa With the outbreak of the World War he m- 
pisn a Cen- position. In words he o p ~  the Social- 
Democrate who joined their capitalist govemmata to help 
one. group of imperialiat robbem, as h i n  called them, against 
the other1 h fact he doee not break with them and in l ia 
argntuenb ha often defends them. He is against tbe WM, ht 
be h also against Leuin. The M s t  program called for work ' 
to defeat own" government during the war; it called for 
hadormin$-in each mmtry-tha imperialist war into dvil 
war, ie.* a ravoIdon against dm bonrpieie; it called for the 
formation of a m w  international opukt ion  of rtll r d y  
rapolntionary Trotsty is agaimt thm slogans. 
When Isnia says: it b g d  for tha mlution that "our own" , 
govantment should bs defeated in war, Trotsky caUa "a 
mmaaion to tha p a w  mdhod. of aoc*l.patri~nn 1 
When ths mlt t t i omq  Smidh gatherad in 1915 io i hmm-  ; 
wald, SwitdBlld, to organize for the -la @w& tbs i 
impmiah war, Tm&y belonged, not to tha h i d a t  left 
wing, but to the center. 
So much were hie idem at v a r h m  with tha of Lenin that I 
eve31 after tIm February revolutirm of 1917, Lenin did not am- , 
sider TMtaLy a Bolshevik. In a letter to Kollontai, dated March I 
17,1917, LQIjn write: I 
"In my opinion, oar Irl.in task b to gaard &mt mn- 
w e d  in f o o ~  attempto at 'unity' with (or, 
* t i o a t i U ~ d ~ l & m t b t h c ~ ~ H b . . .  
TrooslcyradCo.) &to watiollsthsmxkof wv--in 
a d t a n d y  i d -  npW4 (V. L Lmiq Tha 
tioR af 1927, VoI. l, En* adirion, p 2L) 
I n  the -middle of May, 1917, in preparing for a w n f e r ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  
h i n  writm a synopsis for a report, in which he p o w  out 
the necessity of "heing hard as stone in pursuing the prole- 
tarian line against the p~bourgeois  vacillatim$"' and adds 
the following significant line: 
"The racilhtiom of the petty-bouipie: TroldLg . . ." (V. L 
Lenin, Cdecaod Vorks, Vd. XIM, R h  aditb, p. 331.) 
Trodiy, on arriving from abroad after the February revo- 
lution, joined the Social-Democraiic group in Petrograd known 
as uiaterboroughites". This p u p  held a b t r b t  position and 
for many years fought the Bol&evik organization in P e h  
grad. Even after the Febrtlary revolution they favored the 
unification of al l  the groupings of the Russian !%&d-Demo* 
cratic Labor Party, iacluding the social-patriot& Gradually, 
however, b y  abandoned the'idea of unity with &e social- 
patriote, leaning more and mom toward acceptmm of ihe 
Bolshevik policies. 
Late in the summer of 1917 &a "jnterborough" 'group joined 
the Bolshevik Party, on tha eve of tha Sixth Coqjrm of ths 
Party held in th% I q h i n g  of August. r%sy were repmmmted 
in the Congrem delegation, and the new b a l  C- 
elecbd by the Congress incIudsd among its 22 membere t h T ~  
former %terboroughites", Trotsky, Uritsky and Yoffa 
Having declared bia a c q m  of .the Bolshevik policim, 
Trow was given full opporhdv by the Central C c m d t k  
to work in tbb inkre& of the Party and the working dam. 
An efItxtive orator, and former chairman of he h t  SWiES 
in 1905, Trot~ky, late in 1917, became chairman d the Petro- 
grad Soviet. He held thia position in the decisive days of 
October, working under tb4 direct guidaua of the Central 
I Committee of the 3olshevik Party. During the mtnre of power by the Bolsheviks in November, 1917, Trotslcy played an important m1e as a memker of the 
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MiIitary Revolutionary Committee. But i t  would be absurd to 
say that he was the l d e r  of the uprising. 
"I am far fmm denying thc undoubtedly important ivle of 
Comrade Trotsky in tbc uprising [says Stalin In hiri October 
Read* p. 711. But I m w  atate hat  Comrade Trotsky (lid 
not and c o d  aot have phytd any special role in he October 
up-; that, baing the pmident of the Petmgrad Soviet. he 
only carried into &wt the will of &a papective Pnny authorities 
which guided wsrg ~tep  of Comrade Trotsky." (Article publinhed 
November 26, 1924.1 
Among the five members appointed by the Central Com- 
mittee of the Commdst Party on October 16 to serve as a 
center in charge of organixing the uprising, Trotsky's name 
does not a p p r .  
Thus [ ~ y s  StaliaJ something 'terrible' took place at this 
n w h g  of the CentraI Commitm Lc., 'in some mysterious way' 
the 'inapird, the 'principd Egwe*, he 'on!y leader* o f  the up- 
rising, Comrada Trotsky, did mt get on the practical canter, which 
W ~ Y  d e d  upon to lead tire uprising* How can this IH reconciled 
with the current notion abut Comrade Trotsky's apecia1 role?" 
(Ibis. pp. 71-72) 
He who knows the ways of the Bolshevik Party will easily 
anderstand why Trotsky was not among the leadera appointed 
by the Central Committee to direct the uprising. He was a new 
man. He had never helped build the Bolshevik Party. He 
had been in disagmment with the B o l a h d  up to a very 
short time before. In reality he was not of the Bolshevik 
mold He was a man of influence ~~d in Russia, but his 
influence extended primarily to the petty bourgeoisie. He was 
something like a connecting link between the Bolshevik Party 
and the petty-bourgeais ma- which the Party wished to Iead. 
Trotsky's dimgreemat with Lenin sprang up immediatdy 
after the seirmre of power. It was necessary to aign the Brest- 
L i t o d  treaty with Germany in order that the proletarian 
revolution might have a breathhg spell to consolidate itself. 
Troteky, then Commissar for Foreign Affairs, refused to sign 
the treaty. Lenin's stupendous will power, Lenin's lashing casti- 
gation, were required to force Trotsky to abandon his untenable 
poae, and to mquiace in a step that spelled the saving of the 
mIution.  
Time passed. Trotdsy worked with the Bolsheviks. To all 
I 
I 
appearances b became one of them. But he was a stranger 
in the BoIshevilr Party. The civil war came and Trotsky was 
given a high poet. He was, so to speak, propWmdbt-in-chief 
of the Red Army. He was Military Coxurnisgar but he was 
not a military man. He knew nothing about the orghation 
of an army, he had wrong idea about revolutionary war 
strategy. The work of organizing the Red Army was done by 
the eatire country, by millions of the proletariat under the 
leadership of the Communist Party. T%e actual W g  was
done under the supenision of military experts oontrolled by 
tho Central Committee under the watchful leaderehip of Lenh. 
Trotsky traveled up and down the front, issuing crisp orders 
that can be quoted aa examples of militarg style; he went into 
the trenches to talk to the Red Army men; he made great pub- 
lic oratimebut he never led the civil war. He may have been 
deluded into beliedug that he was the whole moving spirit 
of that tremendous historic combat. Re may believe so to 
the present day. The actual facts are juat the reverse.* The 
facts are that S d i n  and Voroshilov were the great fighters on 
the variow battle fronts-leaders with clear revolutionary 
vision and *ategists of the first order. 
Before the thunder of the last battles of the civil war had 
, died down Trotaky developed an open, violent opposition to 
the policy of Lenin in respect to the tasks of the trade mions. 
I He wanted the unions to be, not organizations representing the 
workers in tbe factories and the shops, in the industxi-, but 
administrative units appended to the State and carrying out 
functions. He organized, in opposition to Lenin, 
I a small faction that threatened to disnrpt the activities of the 
I 
As a matter of fact, his Ideas &out tbe strategy of he civil war 
wem rn wrong that, bad they beem carried out, the a n d  would haw 
triumphed. S&ca it to xecd that in the smmm of 1919, at tho very 
cmciaI moment of h e  fight against the White GeosraI Kolcbak, Trotaky 
pmpoecd to move part of tho M fmm from &a Eastern front to the 
South, leaving the Ural region with its fact& and railways in the 
, hands of Kolchak. The Central Committee of the Communiet Pam 
! decided against Trotsky. It orded an advance against Kolchak to 
drive him out of the Ural. That wan the beginning of the end of 
Kolchak. But that was also the end of Troisky's playing any role on 
tho Eastern front %on he c e a d  playing any d e  also on the $Outhem 
front @net tbt White General Demkia. He do= not tell thie in hie 
&tory of the revolution. Tm#ky's veracity . . . 
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C o m m d  Party at a time when d t y  was a queetion of life 
and death, h i m  branded this factianalhm ae a disruptive 
aet. H e d :  
"Ew if tha 'new ta&m and h o d s '  hhd bssll pointed out 
~ T ~ j m t m W f d y r p I n d t ~ r t h s g h m b w n  
poiad out i t w m d y  fkroutghout, . . , by a d  an approach 
&I# T W  mdd have a d  h j q j n r g  both to himwlf, to the 
Putp, to the rmiolr nmmmmi, to &a aducation of d h a m  of 
madma of the labor uoioq aad to the Republic." IV. I. Win, 
Corte#sa F a  Vol XXYL, Findm edition, p. 116.) 
Trot+ waa defeated. h d  his Uplatin &ed, that would 
baveplrreEkedibeatireSovietsyatem. 
Xn 19a3 he again rasumes his opposition to the Bolshei.ik 
Party. Thie lime it M no more a &gle quation. ft is tha 
whde Communist Party, ita &u&m, its aetivitiea, its entire 
h e  that irk him. At fir& he was done among the outstand- 
ing leaders. In 1926 he wao joined by Zinoviev and Kamenev 
who, in November, 1917, had &hguded tbemseIvw by 
being o p p d  to the uprising and to the aeiaure of power by 
the Bolshevik Party and were branded by Lenb aa "strike- 
breakers". They had idma differing from Trotaky's in many 
r m p t s ,  but thy  accepted his leaderehip and the fundamen- 
tals of his opposition. 
A legend is peddled around to the effect that Trotaky and 
hia h a t e a  were "not given a chanoe" to present their view- 
point to the rank-and-file f arty membership. Ae a matter of 
fact, the debate between the opposition and the Party leader- 
ship wae continued from 1924 till 1927. In numerous &ons 
of the central bodies, in numberless meeting6 of the lower 
bodice of the Party, the program of the opposition was threshed 
out. S c o w  of booka, hundreds of pamphlets dealing with 
Beae @om were published and widely distributed The 
opposition d v e d  a hearing even to the point of exhausting 
the patience of the Party merubem 
When the diacuasion was over these leaders with their group 
of associates were thoroaghly discredited, despised by the 
m m s  of the Party and of the proletariat and exposed a s  
p1otters. 
We are perleefly aware of the gravity of such an accum- 
tion. But how else can you term the activitim of e l y  
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reeponaible Party nmtdxr~ do, because the uvcrwh- 
major* of the mdxmbip with them and damands 
heir submieaion, organ& a little clique within the Party, 
with its own clique tihipline and clique centers, make an 
I alliance with non-Party pa#y-bompis elements to carry out 
I anti-Party plans, start printing underhand literature against the 
Party leadership and broadcasting it among the ma- and 
I thue take the initial &ep toward clisrapting and breaking the 
very backbone of the Revolution, the Communist Party? 
This is exactly what Trotsky-En&-Kamene~ did in 1927. 
The Party was forced to expel the dique. Some of them later 
recanted, aa they did even before 1927, only to reanrme their 
destructive activities. Trotsky did not recaat. He waa ordered 
to leave the capital and was traderred to the city of Alma- 
Ata in Central A&. Later he was expeIled from the country. 
Since then he keeps on supplying the world bourgeoisie with 
ammunition against the Soviet Union. His powder is wet Hie 
cannon roar without actually h h g .  But the bourgeaisie pre- 
tends to e e  in him a red source of genuine information. He 
conduck bis counter-revolutionary activity on the More of hav- 
ing been a leader in the Revolution. In his innumerable writ- 
inge he mates the unwary believe that it was he and not Lenin 
who led the Revolution. 
Such is, briefly, the csrser of the man. Was he ever a Bol- 
shevik? Out of a period d thirty& years he wae m m d  
with the Bolshdm for only six yeam Even during that tima 
I he had a p a t  number of violent diaagreermenta wirh them. In fact, there waa hardly a Leninist policy to which he whole- heartedly a p e d .  He never became an integral part of the BoIshevik orgmhtion. He seems to have been an dim body within the organism of the Bol~hePik Party, even when he was a m& of its Political B m u .  Bolehevika need not mention the non-Bolshevik past of a man 
who has sincerely and genuinely merged himaeIf with their 
Party. If we mention Trotsky's paat it is becatw, as we shall 
see mom clearly anon, it never became his paat. It atiIl ia his 
present. He is now just as violently opposed to the Bolshevik 
Party under S t a b  as he was oppmd twenty years ago to the 
BoIshevik Party under h i n ;  he slanders Stalin just as 
riciously as he slandered k i n a d  for the same reasons. 
1s 
"How auld it kmppen [aaya Stah] that Comrade T d y ,  
who WM  mch an lmplsaaaat burden [of h a d  for rho 
B o l h v h ]  an hb b a a  nonetheha turaed up in the mh of the 
W u v h  during the October mwement? Tbia happened be- 
caw Comtrda Tm&y * d (mdy threw off) hjs bur& 
at that Plms, codd it fir hia cupboard. But for ti& ' o m -  
tion* no &ow  ration with Comr& Troteky would have 
hm wenibla.. . 
"Could Cormrds Tm*, in ruch a mttr of atTain Iwhm the 
i m ~ o f u 5 t h ~ ~ 1 r y ~ p r w c o b y a c t d t x p e t i m r c s l  
do mything e h  bat ormccal hie burden in bis cupboard and fol- 
h t h e ~ h a ~ d i d n o t h a v a a n y m m o r h & w  
gxoap bekind him, who ~ams to tbs Bokhe~ika ss a onbmlm 
polilid o ~ t i o n  M t  of 1La army? Of Ewras he wtlld not. 
". . . The fact ir L s t  the old burdm of Trotakyiaw conasatsd 
S r r & e ~ I n r h c d a y s o f t h s O c a ~ b e r ~ t , b m w  
once more hauled into the light of day in ths hope of fin* a 
tll.rlrsr for itP [Jossph StaIin, T h  October R W n ,  pp. 
89.90.) 
When Trot& concealed his "lmpleasant burden" in hie 
cupboard he w& s one-man orgttni&tioa. When ha took it 
out @ he b e W . b a  had a tremendous m y  b& of him. 
He was mhken. The rd-and-file membefebip of the Corn- 
m d s t  Party and every honeet & in die-Sovist Union 
d u d  to follow the man with the unzrhasant burdm Now 
he is trying to form mch an army oi a world scale. Quito 
The Social Baais of Trotskyism 
W" have related in some detail the hiatory of T r o w s  political life, but Trotskyism is not a oneman affair. It 
is not a peculiarity of an individual. Trotskyism ie a d a l  
phenomenon. The fact that Trotsky happened to lm in the 
revolution adds a certain prestige to hia utterances in &a eyes 
of the unwary. In this, as in many other instances, the -4 
element cannot be ignored. But even if Trotaky did not exist, 
the brand of opposition to the revolution which he reprmmts 
would find its expressioa Trotskyism is being reborn on every 
stage of the revolutionary movement becauae it is the ex- 
p k o n  of the attitude of a certain clam, namely, the petty 
bonrgeohie. 
Of this claas Karl Marx once said that it ie "a transitional 
class in which the interash of two cla- are aimdtaneously 
blunted". The petty bourgeoisie h d s  its& between the prole- 
tariat and the large-scale bourgeoisie. It h v e s  to rim to the 
position of the large-scale bourgeoisie, but the latter, using the 
power of concentrated and centraked capital, continuously 
drives it down to the position of the proletariat. The petty 
bourgeoiq subjectively, wiahes to h o m e  rich, to attain to the 
heits of capitalist economic power; objectively, however, his 
interests lie with the struggle against capitalism becauae capi- 
talism removes the $round from under his feet and because only 
under a Socialid system will the petty bourgeois of today be- 
come a free member of society, unafraid of the future, sin- un- 
der Socialiem he will be transformed into one engaged in useful 
productive labor. The petty bourgeoisie as a class, therefom, is 
wmering. The interests of two classes, said Ma- are "simulb 
taneoualy blunted*' in it. That means that the petty bourgeoisie 
cannot be as consistently counter-revolutionary as the bw boar. 
geoisie, but it cannot Jx as consistently with the revolution, as 
is the proletariat. The petty bourgeoisie is afraid of the big 
bourgeoiaie but it is also afraid of the revolution. Some mtions 
of thk petty bourgeoisie are attracted to the revolution which 
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rep-ta their juiure interests, but they shrink before tbs + line of the revolutionary struggle. FuadamentalIy thgr 
would like to have clam pemx, b u s e  nothiag is more dear 
to the heart of the petty bourgeoisie than m i a l  psce. How- 
m r ,  they fed that social peace means tfieir own doom. There- 
fore, when tbe proletariat develops a strong revolutionary 
movement, many petty-bourgeois elements are i neWb1y  
drawn to the revolutionary camp, only in turn to denounce ite 
"'~xI~~uEs'', and to don "extreme h f t "  m a s k s  itaeIf. %y 
finding fanlt with the existing capitalist ~ystem, but they are 
also finding fanlt with tbe Revolution and ita leadws. Not k- 
ing truly revolntionary, being able only to be led by tbe Rev* 
Itition, they often develop an immenae conceit They think of 
themselves as the "only" and "real" rsvolutionists. Thay de 
nomm the red revolntioniat as "degmatic'' and %mow''. 
Tr-s approach to the revolution ie that of the petty 
bdurgeoisie. 
The fact that he is neither a shopkeeper nor a petty artisan 
muat not deter those unfamiliar witb the Marxian interpretation 
of d movumenta It mnst not be supposed, aaye Marx, that 
t h a  who n p m t  the p- bonrgmieie "are all shopkeepers, 
or enthwhtic champions of tbe small9hopkeeper class". 
T o l t d l y  and by idhidual atatua hey may be ths polar 
oppmiw of members of the sbopkeping h W h t  ho made 
tbam bscoms ths polhieat r s p m t a t i ~  of the ptty bourgeoisie 
ia tbh I n t c d l ~ y  they have failed to trmwcnd the Ihitationa 
which srt. d y .  hpd upon he petty bourgtoim by the 
wnditiom of pmy-hwgeob existence. fhaqnent ly  tbsy ara, in 
the theontical field, impelled towards the same aspiratiom and 
aolations M thOgt towards which, in practical life, the petty bur- 
g & ~  are impallad by m a W  interests and by their d poeition. 
Spealdag &cner*ny, mu& b alwnye the relationhip bsrwcm the 
politid and littrary repmentativae of a dana and the dw thsy 
npmt.* (Karl Mar& The Eighteenth Bramaire oj buki Bom- 
purte, Englinh Edition, pp. 58-59.) 1 
What has been the iduence of the petty bourgeoisie in the: 
Russian Revolution? 
I As d y  as 1908, Lenin, speaking about the rmiswnisnr of , 
Marxiam, explained its danger in the following way: 
"In cvery capitalist ooun~ry there always SIM& side bp aide with 
the proletariat. broad strata of rho petty bourgeoisie, small owners. 
IS 
. . .It h perfectly natural ths! the pekty-bourgtob & 
should break through, me and opm a g h ,  3n the mnh of the 
b d  wohm' partic& It ia peSreetly n a n d  that it &dl bs ao, 
and it always will be rn even up to tha vicidtuda d dm prole 
tarisn m l u t i w ,  for it wodd be a deep error to think th*t a 
'full' proletarianization of the majority of &a popaIaiim h I- 
swy for tbe rdizatmn of such a mvolution. What we am aow 
eorperiencing oftan o d y  in the realm of id-: a q g u m m ~ ~ a g a i ~  
rhe tbeorttieal amendmemw to Marx,-what now brsal;a rbmagb 
in preaico only as regards *rate particular q m h  of the 
labor movement, like rhe tactics1 diwmcnts with tht reviaion- 
h a  and the split with them on thin mtim 1Porlcing 
clam fl yet ham to erperienoo in in- grWa p m  
portiose dm the p r o h a h ~  d u t i o n  wlll d m p ~  all *wuol 
d a l  qudoae, oonoentrnts AU d i i b  on points hvhg 
thsmwt directharing upon *g t h s d n c t o f  tha maMq 
faroe, in the bmt of atrug& to ecparnls tlos from tho 
f* to t h w  aat tha bad allim ia order to deal tha s l l~ay  
d e c i h  b I m n  (V. I. Lanin, CoIleucd Wwks, Vol. XI& Rnunian 
Edidon, p, m.1 
With the clear-sightebaa of a genius, lslnin foresaw tke 
coming smggIe of the proletarian revolution with ite "bad 
allies" hailing from the petjy boarpime. 
What i the role of such bad alliea? Twenty yarn later 
Stalin explained this: 
"Since the proletariat d m  not Eve in a vacuum, but in actual 
and real life itself with dl its A*, the bomgdn dements 
which are reborn on the basis of petty pduction 'aurronnd the 
proletariat on every side by a p~~-botm&a dtmn4 pcmmta 
the pmhriat with it, dm& it with it, esIl forth m h d y  
i d d c  of the proletariat mxmenoes of petty--is lack of 
characta, scatbdnesg indiridudam, t r a & h  fmm eothusi- 
mm to melancholy' (La&, Vol. XXV, p. I901 and &na bring into 
the proletariat and its Party certain vacillations, oertain wa- 
Wring& 
"Am is the root and the fouudation of mary kind of v a c i b  
tiona and deviations from the Leuhiat line m tho FanLs of onr 
Party." (3. Stalin, Problems oj L-m, Tenth Russian Edition, 
P. 234.3 
More specificaliy, Stalin explains this in bis Foundhbttd 
o/ Lmiidrn.  
'.4ll these pe~ty-bourgeois Ernups somehow or other penetrate 
into the Party into which they introduce an element of hesitancy 
and apponunism, of disintegration and lack of self-confidence. 
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Factionalism aad splits, disoqganhtion and the undembhg of 
the Pany from within are principally due to tbma Fig- im- 
perialiem with uuch W b '  in one%- rear is adi bad am king caught 
bet- two f i q  coming both from the front and rwr. There 
fore, no quarter ahollld be given in fighting such eltmanta. and 
their relentless  pubi ion from the Party i a  r cundition precedent 
lor h a  a u c d u l  s!rupsls againat imperialism." (Joseph Stalin, 
li'owdations 01 Leninism, EngIiih dtion,  p. 121.) 
The understmdq of Trotskyism as representing the in- 
fluence of the petty bourgeoisie on certain elements of the pro- 
letariat and of the Communist Party was repeatedly expremd 
in the rewlutione of the Congreasea of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union. Thus the Thirtemth Congress (1924) de- 
dared: 
m ~nc pcm of rht ~ ~ c w a t  'oppition* w r~ not O ~ I T  M 
attempt to reviw Bddmiiom, not only a direct mcwing away from 
b h k m ,  but alao a clsarIy -4 patty-hulgaois deviation. 
Them i 6  not the aligfiteet doubt that this 'oppdtion' objtctireIy 
m k t s  t h ~  p m s m  of tho pc~ty hugm& on the podtiom of 
the Party of h a  proletariat and im policim" 
Again in 1927, at the Fifteenth Congress, the communid 
Party of the Soviet Union thus characfferized the Trotaky- 
Zinoviev-Kamenev opposition: 
"The denial of the pmdbility of a Pictorioua building of Social- 
fsm in tho U.S.S.R. and comqutntly the denid of the k idh  
&meter of our revolution; the denial of the Socialist character 
of state induetry; the denial of the Socialist d d n  of dswlopmmt 
in the sage under eonditiom of tbs proIetarian dietatomhip 
and of the policy of union of tbe proletariat with the fundamental 
m a ~ f ~ e  of the pamantry on the baeIa of SDcialiat construction; 
fmally, the act& dmiaI of the proletarian dictatodip in the 
U3.S.R. ('Tbermidur') and &a attitude of capitulation and d e  
featism connected with i b 4 l  this idaoIogica1 orientation has 
transfomed th% Trotaky opposition into an i ~ t n m e n t  of petty. 
b& dmmcmq within the IJSS.R. and into an auxiliary 
troop of intematimal SociaI-Dwnocracy outside of ita frontiere." 
Trotaky as an individual b only a representative of a certain 
social class. He is a petty-bourgeois intellectual. He started 
with opposition to the Revolution and the Communist Party, 
and he has finished with heading the counter-revolution. True 
to type, he was drawn to the revolutionary movement of the 
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working class but he never believed in the ability of the revo- 
lationary forces to carry through the Revolution to a sucoe* 
ful conclusion and he always hated the very easence of a prole- 
tarian party. He hates the tedious day-by-day activities of 
building and perfecting a workers' organization. He hates 
discipline when applied to himself. But he loves discipline 
when he applies it to othera When he was War Commissar, he 
was ruthleas towards subordinates. When he was out-voted a 
thousand to one in the Bolshevik Party, he refused to submit. 
During the most revolutionary period of his life he was 
always full of misgivings. Whenever the Revolution was eon- 
fronted with a d=culty, he fell into a panic. When patience 
and endurane were required, he demanded spectacular action. 
When temporary retreat was the order of the day, he advocated 
enseIesa bravado which would have wrecked the Revolution. 
When the Revolution was gathering momentum far a new 
advance, he lamented tbe "ColIapse" of the Revolution. When 
a new victory was achieved, he decried it as a defeat. 
In this, as i n  his mwillingnesdl to admit errors, to apply 
*If-criticism to himself, he only expressed his class. 
What cbaracterkd his opposition when be still was a mere 
oppositionist was a lack of understanding of the moving form 
of the Revolution and a purely rational approach to the solu- 
tion of problems, an approach that had no relation whatever 
to the realities of life. What characterizes him now when 
he is leadins the vanguard of counter-revolution is his delib- 
erate invention of ways and means to damage the Revolution, 
the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
the Comrnlniist movement throughout the world. This has 
become his sole aim, the only reason for his existence. 
He had a dream once in his life. He beIieved himself to be 
able to take the place of k i n  in the b s h e v i k  Party. L,enmv~ 
Party could not have been lad by a man who never was a Bol- 
~hevik and always fought Leain. But he failed to umder- 
- stand this obvious truth. Because he had dramatiwd himklf 
into beIieving that he was the driving force of the Revolution 
he did not dean it possible for him to take a minor post. Be- 
cause he was a petty-bourgeois intellectual he could not place 
the interests of the Party above his own personal ambition., He 
therefore had to dramatize himseIf into the great irmun.sBealat. 
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Fmm this pdtiun he slid down to the hideous gutter in which 
he fiodc himrralf today. 
Tfsa history of hL last ten yeam i~ tbe history of wntinuous 
h d a l l .  From a mamber of dm Politid Bureau of the 
Commmiat Party down to an apposition within fhe Comrmmiat 
Party, down to a damager v l b d  from &a C o m m d  Party, 
down to an enemy expelled from the Soviet Union, down to 
one supplying the world bourgeoisie with lies about the Soviet 
Union, down to one who organim the forces of disruption 
against the C o m m d  Party and the Commuuist International, 
down to one who h m e s  tbe inspirer of plots aiming at the 
assassination of the leadere of the Revolution--aiming at the 
very heart of the RevoIution. 
Verily, no man  ha^ ever fallen so low. 
He had a dream once, He ban a dream now. To aee the 
Soviet Union m k e d ,  to aee the Bolshevik Party detroyd, 
to aree the leadera of Bolshevism assassinated, to BW tha world 
Communist movement crushed, to wx  the Communist Interna- 
tional w i d  off the eartb,-how that would gladden  hi^ heart! 
How he gloatlr over this viaion! Of course, he doee not say 
so oatright. He cannot expoes b I f  More the world. It is 
his aocarsed tad to win recmib to counter-revolution by means 
of radical phrasea. He ia a master phrme-counterfeiter. But 
it k to make his dream come tma that he dhata  a11 hls actions. 
Zn this be is a broth-in-arms to Matthew Woll and Ran- 
dolph Hemst, to Abramovich and Hamilton Fish. Birds of a 
feather. 
T ia Trotskyism? 
More than ten years ago, when T r o w  d l  enjoyed tba I W" 
privilege of medm&ip in Lbe Commdst Party of the 
U.S.S,R, Stalin fomd in T r e h  'Lthres m i d m  which 
place it in irreconcilable contradiction to hhhd"' 
Before we proceed we must my s word abut the metbod 
applied hem in discussing Trotskyhi. The @OD is treated 
from &a point of view of --hminb- I t  ia d
that L e h h  hae proved itself correct both an ths t h r y  and 
ae the pr& of the revolution. It in therefore taken for 
grand  that opposition to M i e m  i~ incorrect. 
Now, we are fully aware of tha fact that many a ma& may 
disagree with the LRniniw point of view. Ha may be oppoeed 
to tha proletarian revolntion, to the h d p  of th pro- 
letariat, to tha socialist sy- Such a reader m y  6nd solam 
in Trotsky's am& upon Lmhimm But than lm mwt admit 
that b & in Trotdry not a confirmadon but a mpudiation 
of the M t  solution of the &I problem. With a man 
of this kind, who dram from the muddy scrstlm of Trotkfe 
denrm&tiom convenient at- against So* and 
again& h e  Communim of hie county, we have no arg~msnt 
ontbesspagea TheodythiDgapemnofthbakipebm- 
questedtodo is to a n l m o o w 1 ~ t b . t h a  - t h e m  am. 
munition agkmt everythiug that Mar% en gel^ and lamin a t d  
for aud against everything Stalin, together with the Com- 
m& International, atand for d y .  
Quite different it ie with &om who profem to bs in favor 
of the proletarian revelation, who admit tha  me^^+ of 
orgmiing the working class for the struggle for the overthrow 
of capitalimn and the wtabliabment of a Swiet ~ C D ,  and
who r e m p b  in Leaia the master-builder of the B o M  
Party and the world-btoric leader of the proIdarian ~ I u -  
tion, The fol1owing argument aime to &OW that you camot 
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b for the proletarian revolution and fox Trotskyism; that if 
you a w p t  Trotekp's arguments you depart from Lenin; that 
Trotsky'e profesaions of Leniaism are only a smoke screen be- 
hind which hie disbelief in the proletariat and his mistrust of 
the Communist (Bolshwik) Party and its methods of struggle 
are hidden; that Trotakyilml ia in reaIity a weapon ugaitut the 
proIetarian revolution,-but one that is painted red in order to 
delude workers with a radical trend. 
We may assume that thow who are in earnest about the over- 
throw of capitalism and the eatab1ishment-m the principles 
laid down by the R u ~ a n  Revolutio~~--of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat in the now capitalist countries, including the United 
St&, agree to the following fundamental propositions: 
(a) That a b l & d  (Communist) Party is the first pre- 
r q h i t e  for a a u c d u l  revolution; 
(b) That here can be only one Bolshevik Party and not 
many in mry country, and that the unity of such a party, its 
des ion  and therefore its striking power are of surpahg  
importance; 
(c) That the backbone of the socialist revolution is the 
urban proletariat ; 
(d) That the Communist Party can accomplish tbe prole- 
tarian revolution only when it leads the entire working class, I 
or at lea& a lnajority of it, in an armed upri* against the 
cepitaliat State; 
(el That the mccm af the revalution depends to a Imp ex- 
tent upon the ability of the Party end the proletariat to ally I 
themselves with great masses of the other exploited and op- 
p d  groups and classes of the population, in the firet place 
the exploited farmera, the lower middle class of the cities, the 
opp-d intellectuals, etc. ; 
(f) That confidence between Psrty leadership and Party 
membership h one of the major aonditions for eucceas and 
that mbtruat of Bolshevik leadership, when unfounded, is un- 
dermining the revolution. 
(g) That thwe can be only one Communist International 
which leads the Communist Parties of the world. 
(h) mat one cannot k a real xevolutioniat and fight the 
Soviet Union, since the Soviet Union is the greatest achieve- 
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ment of the world proletariat and the example of building 
Socialism. 
But to return to Stalin's dehition. It must be remembered 
that Stalin made it at the time when Trotskyism was just begin- 
ning to raise its head. The tract, T r o t s w m  or Lenikm, in 
which the definition is contained, w a ~  p&Iiahed in November, 
1924 L is amaaing how clearly Stalh saw both the meaning 
and the future development of Trotskyism 'at a time when 
Trotsky atdl loomed aa one of the great heroes of the revolu- 
tion. 
The "puliarities" of Trotskyism, accmding to Stalin, are: 
Firbb, Trotskyism is a theory of the so-called "permanent 
revolution", which is but a n o h  name for the theory that it 
is impoesible to b d d  socialism in the Soviet Union. 
Second, Trotskyism means lack of confidence in the Bol- 
h v i k  Party allegiatlca, in its d t y ,  in its hostility towards 
opp~rtuniat elemente, which leads to the theory of the "co. 
habitation of revolutionaries and opportunists, of their groups 
and grouplets within the fold of a single party". 
Third, Trotskyism mema distrust in the leaders of Bobhe- 
v i m ,  an attempt at discrediting them, at besmirching them. 
With a prophetic understanding Stalin points out the dan- 
gers of Trotskyism. 
&Wherein liea the daager of the new Trotskyism? la that 
Trotskyism, according to its entire inner content. baa every chm 
of becoming the center and the rallying point of non-pmletarian 
elements which are trying to weaken. to dieintegrate the dictator- 
#hip of the proletariat. 
"Trotskyism now comes forward in order to uncmrm Bolshe- 
vim., to undarmina its foundations." (The Ocrobar Rwlntion, 
P. 9A) 
Redefining Trotskyism six years later (June, 1930), Stalin 
had only to elaborate on the "peculiarities" just mentioned. 
The activities of the Trotskyites fitted well Stalin's original 
characterization. What he foresaw in 1924 as a possibility 
and a trend, bad become an estabbhed pr8ctioe. 
"What is the e n c e  of Trotskyism?" Stalin ash in 1930, 
and he finds it consisting in the following: 
The  w e  of Trotskyism oonsirrb, first of all, in tha denial 
of the w d i t y  of bniIding Socielisrn in Lhc U.SS.R with the . 
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f m  of tha wakiag dam and the -try ob olrt coum. 
~ h . t d o 9 ~ - ? h m t h a t i f , i n t h c n u r f ~ g b s I ~  
h me c a m  in the form of a victoriouo world d d n ,  wa 
s b r l l b P v a ~ c a p i ; & t e f ~ t b e b o ~ a a d  c l a a r t h m r h f ~ r  * \  
a k~~wgmidanomati~ mpubbc. C-4. rra h*s h tho 
b b - n p u d i a t i o n  of he p o d b i l i ~  of b d w  SmGahm in 
our mutry masked by 'mlutionarg' p u m  about ths 
viatory of the world raroluttoa. 
The sseence of Trotskyhn oonaiw smndly, in dmyhg the 
powibility of drawing the bmic masm of tha -m into 
!h idint  cclmmlction in the corn-& What k thb -? 
It ms~ns that the working clam is not am- enough to lcsd tbs 
-try dter it in the tusk of &untiag Lha idhidud w t  
f a ~ m r o n m o o l l t c t i m ~ a n d t h a ~ i f h t h s n s l r h m t h s  
victory of the wmld mIut ion  dam ~t come to tho aid of ib 
w* dam, the pawantry will mtom the old bourgsoir 
~ t l y , p ~ ~ b a * a h m t h o ~ g w i e d a a i r l o f t h e ~  
~ O P  " of ths prolutarian dietatorehip for ths 
mw=h C O V C ~  rib the mat of .rsmluli~~$ 
about &a victory of the world d u t i o n .  
'Tho -ce of Tmtdybm conebte, M y ,  in the U a l  of the 
m i t y  of 3ron U p l i n e  in the Party, in tbe xecagnicion af tb 
i&m of factimal groupings in the Party, in the -tion of 
tha h t y  of condtuting A Trotakyiet partf. For T w  
the -t Party of the %iet Union muet be not a unitd 
d dimt Party, but a e o l l d n  of pupa and fadom, 
d with im own centad p e n ,  press and so forth. And 
what dom mun? It m t n ~  tht  following the frcadom of 
political group* in the Party must come dm frssdom of politid 
prtk in ths wmtry, La, bourgeois d-. Cbnssquently, na 
hw hers ths e r i o n  of tbs f d o m  of f d o d  pupingo im 
t h s P u t p , ~ ~ y t o t h s ~ t i o a o f p o l i d d ~ m i a  
ths  omt try of ths-dictatmhip of &a pdstariat, and all 
up with phrasB8 ubotlt ' h t d  P8rty demmacy' a d  "impmin# 
rhs mjd w i r b  the Puty." (Josapb Stab, LbAinim, VOL II, 
lidition, pp. 39149%) 
The deniaI of tlw poasibiIity of buiId i i  SociaIim ia the 
U.SSR can only discourage the Soviet workem, dmtroy thsir 
coafidence, d a m p  their enthusiasm. The denial of ibe p w  
sibility of building Socialism in tha countrysida can only 
d h u r a g e  the poor and middle pmants, weaken their &uggIe 
agaW tHs hbb, undermine their confidence in the urban 
proletarht and its Party as 1eaaEers of .the rwoltrtion and 
buiIders of S m i a l i m ~  Tbe denial of the a d t y  of iron 
ditzciplim in the Party can only encourage breaches of dis- 
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cipline and thus weaken the strongw! weapon of the dictator* 
ship of the proletariat. It is for thia reason that Stalin b t d  
it (in 1930) as "an anti-proletarian, anti-Soviet, counter- 
rtYoItltionary group, which - p l d e a l y -  irrfam h- bur-  
+ of tbe a h h i  of our Party'?. (Ibid., p, 391.) 
Today Trotdyim no more c o n k  itserf to "informing" 
the kurgeojsie. Today Trotskyism b tha center and the rally- 
ing point for the d e s  of the Soviet Union, of the prole- 
Eariau revolution in capitalist c~mtrkt, of &. Communi~t 
XoternationaI. Trotskyism is trying not only to disintegrate 
th~ dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union, but also 
to &&pate the f o m  fhat make for the dictatorship of 
the proletariat the world over. 
Our expodtion will follow the "psealiarities" of T-im 
in the order enumerated by Stalin. We shalI have to add a 
mnhr of chapters dealing with the recent exploits of the 
Trotakyib both in the United Statwr and abroad. 
Socialism in One Country 
THE denial of the of Socialism in'one c o u w  
k the baais of all the ideas and policies of Trotakyiem. 
This denial, in turn, is w m p d  of two major premises. 
1. The denial of the possibility of a victorious proletarian 
revolution in w e  wuntry when there is no simultaneous revo- 
lution in one or several other countries; 
2. The denial of the possibility of building Socialism in 
one country where a proletarian revolution has taken place- 
if here is no simultawous revolution in other countries. 
I 
This is contrary to historical facts and contrary to the very 
eesencc of the Leninist understanding of the proletarian I 
rev01 uti on. 
Let us begin with the latter. 1 
The Leninist conception of the proletarian revolution springs 
from the analysis of tbe present s t a g  of capitalism ae i m p -  
rihlism, the stage of the decay of capitalism, the "dying of 
of capitalimn, as viewed by Leninism, are: ( I )  The domina. 
capitaIism". The major characteristics of the imperialist stage I 
tion of finance mptd in the advanced cepitaliat countries; 
export of capital to the backward countries which represent 
s o u r n  of raw material; an omnipotent oppressive 6nancial 
oligarchy; (2) Growth of "sphres or influence'' of finance 
capital and its colonial possessions to the extent of h e  emer- 
gence of a "world system of h c i a l  bondage and of the 
colonial oppression of the vast majority of mankind by a 
handful of 'advanoed' countries" ; (3 )  The inevitability of 
bitter strugglee between those countries that have already 
-seized the territories of the globe and those that wish to get 
their "&are"-a atruggIe for the redivision of the globe. 
The first of the enumerated features of imperialism spells 
"an intensification of the revolutionary crisia in the capitalist 
countries and the growth of the elements of an explosion on the 
internal, proIetarian front in the 'mother' countriesn. Tha 
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m n d  feature lea& to "an intensification of the revolutionary 
crisis in the colonial countries and an accumulation of the 
dementa of disontent with imperialism on the external front, 
the coIonial front". The third characteristic includes the con- 
oept of '% inevitabiIity of war lmder imperialism and the 
inevitability of a coalition between the proletarian revolution 
in Enrope and the colonial revolution in the East, thus form- 
ing a united world front of the revolution as against the world 
front of imperialism". (See h i n ,  I m p d i s m ,  the Highest 
*e oo/ Capitalism; StaIin, F o d d o m  oj Lsdnkm; Pro- 
grmn of & Comnruaist 1 1 n s e r ~ ~ )  
What follows from this analysis is that there exists on iw 
pe&t q s m n  of world economy which repmmta an integral 
U R ~ ;  that tbis unit is continually rent asunder and exploded 
by the contradictions inherent in it, and that the proletarian 
revoludon which has ripened everywhere, even in the cornpar. 
ativelp backward countri* because the sptem aa a whole b 
ripe for it, may break the chin  of world imperialism in ite 
we&& link. 
This view of imperialism as an integrated system, and of 
the ~roletarian revolution as breaking through in that phcc 
where imperialism is weakest, gives the cIue to the u n h n d -  
ing of the proletarian revoIution. 
But this meam that the proletarian revolution will, at first, 
inevitably take place in one single c o w r y  only. Other corn- 
&its m y  or may not follow, but tbe rule would be a revolution 
ia one county where for one reason w another imperialkn 
can no more withstand the onslaught of the revolutionary 
forces. 
All this is ABC a d  should be known to everyone familiar 
with the fundamentals of Leninism. But just thia is denied 
by Trotskyism. 
Trotsky directed his struggIe against the Leninist theory of 
the "uneven deveIopment of c a p ~ m " .  It is in these words 
h t  Lenin summed up his teachings about the imperialist siqe 
of capitalism. and it is the uneven development of capitalism 
that Trotsky specifically denies. 
I What is the uneven development of capitaliam? Stalin, who, 
I more than anybody after Lenin, concerned himself with de. 
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doping ths h i d a t  theory of imperia1imn and 
tion, expldu it in the following way: 
The =even development of capitdim does 
world revolu- 
not conskt in 
the fact that nome countries are economicaIly more advanced 
than the 0 t h ;  tmemn development in other words does nol 
mean different degrees of hlopment of the capidist cow. 
trie~; m o m ,  these differen- of degrees of dedopmml 
have a tendency to diminish in the present epoch: there i~ going 
on a prooesa of W i n g  oui of the diiferencea in the degree ol 
emnomio progm in the various countxiea, the more backward 
ones fighting to reach the level of and 4 the advanced 
c o m b  Nor d w  the uneven development of capitalism 
wdst in jmt this fact that eome countrim reach the l ed  
of other6 and overtake them in an evolutionary way. Srmcb 
changea h the relatim position of various countries are not a 
peculiar characteristic of imprialimn: they are known to haw 
d even in the era preceding imperialism. 
What, then, ia the law of the m e n  development undo1 
imperialism? 
T h e  law of the uneven development in the perid of Impwid- 
ism [m Stalin] mans the spaamodic deveIopmmt of wms 
cm&a in d d o n  ta ophere. the rapid crowding-out from the 
w d d  market of some countrim by o h m  the periodical r d -  
vhhn of alreudy d i d e d  work? by the mema of military nnn- 
Bicta md m i I i w  catastrophe, the deepening and a h p m h g  of 
mfticb In the camp of impsriabm, the waakeaing of tha front 
of mold capitdim, tho pms&Ili~ of tbia front hing bmlran by 
tha prolohrhm of separate coontrim, the pmibilie of the viw 
tory of M w n  in eeparatc countdeb" (Jowph Stalin, On rAs 
O p p i t h ,  R d a n  Edition, p. 515.) 
Two years before the Xevolution of 1917 Lmii, arguing 
against the slogan of the "United States of Europe" as ad- 
vanced by some Bolsheviks at the beginning of the war, re- 
jected that dogan j~ becaw it implied the i m p d i l i t y  of 
mcialiem in one country. The United States of Europe under 
capital& d d  Lenin, is either impodble or reactionary be- 
cause it is tantamount to an agreement to divide up ths 
colonies. The United States of the World (not of Europe 
done) ia, according to h n ,  n Stste form of national federa. 
tion and national freedom which Communists connect with 
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~ i a l b u n t i l  the complete victory of Commutriam brings 
: about &a total dinappanoe of the St*. 
"Aa a w t t  dogan, however [MY Lmin] ths slogan United 
StamofthsWmldmddhvcaykaemrcctome,firsrbscamit 
marges with Socialism, secomd, btcotrte it may wrongly be a m -  
prcted to mwn & the victory aj S d m  in a sin& COW i s  
i m p w i h  [our cmpha&+M. J. 0.1; it may dm meam m h  
co~loaptio~ls M to the d a h l l s  of such a eountrg to o h . "  
hnin thm s t a b  positively: 
" U n m *  emno& a d  &tGml devebmmt i n  m / br of capirJirn [OW a o p ~ ~ .  I. 0.1 h c c ,  ibs rim ef 
I Socialism is M b l e  fint in a few or men in one single cafitdh 
' comw a m  nepuakly. me viaorby# p r o l d t  of h a t  coon- 
LF~, having expropriated h a  capitdisfs and organ id  ita orra 
Socialit pductim, would riae aglinat the mt of the capitaUlt 
rmdd, attract to itatIf the o p p d  elassps of otha coan~w,  
raiw m l t a  among them rgainss the capitalis@ and in the want 
of aecmity oome out evm with anntd force against ths exploiriag 
' 
classes and their mtatea.' For "tht free federation of natiom in 
I Socialism ie impmibla without a mom or 1- prolongd and 
s l u k n  sfmggla of h a  Socialhi republics againnt the backward 
Stam." (V. X. hnin,  CoUected Works, Ruwhn E d i t h ,  Vol. i r n p . ~ ,  
Trotsky denies the uneven development of the capitaii~t 
count& under i m p e r i a l h  He denies the entire L a h i s t  
analyeis of imperialism as forming one integrated whole that 
m u  inevitably be broken though by the proletarian revolu- 
tion in ite weakest arpot. He thinks that the internal and ex- 
ternal contradictions- of imperialism are not sharp enough to 
make a breatcing of the imperialist front in a single country 
p 4 l e .  He thinka hat tbe form of the proletarian revolu- 
tion are not strong enough to be able to break tHe front of 
imperialm in a single country. True to his covering up de- 
featiam with revolutionary phrases he puts forward the idea of 
a revolution in one cornG supported-by revolutions in other 
countries, but this cannot eliminate the fact that he saps to 
I the workere of every country, 'You cannot make a revolution 
alone; you are sure to be defeated; wait ti11 other countries 
begin; if there is no revolution elsewhere, you are doomed", 
* L t h e d & i t i ~ e E n g l i ~ b c d i t i o n ~ f  i o l . X W I ~ ~ d ~ o l & ~  
h e a d  of "uneven". This is errnneoua and should be oorxeclad 
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-whi& is tantamount to denying the possibility of m y  xeva. 
l d o n  at all. 
It waa; at rhe time when the first Russian revolution (1905.6) 
waa not yet h h h e d  though it waa obviomtsly going down; whm 
the BoIshevih with Lenii were straining every effort to ketq 
the organizations of the workers alive uuder the blows of 
growing reaction; when the Bolsheviks were doing their utmost 
to appreciate what was happening, to analyze the fo- of 
the revolution, to understand the reaaoxw for the deieat of the 
revolrrtionary farces and to prepam the massea for new rev@ 
lntionary battles which were inevitable &we the revolution 
had not accomplished its objectiveit  was just at that junw 
t u ~ a  that Troteky came out with the following estimate: 
~ i t h o p l t  direct Stam support from tha E w m n  p r o w m t ,  
t h e ~ c k a o f R d a c a n a o t m a i n b i n i ~ i a p o w u r a u d  
tr- L tampor*rg d a  into a durable M e  dietamship. 
T h h  we cmmt doubt for an instantm (Lmn Tmtsky, Ow RCUQ- 
EllbiQR. R r d m  Edition, 1966, p. ,278.) 
What cks Trotsky aay in tbis declruation? He says to the 
workers that even if through some coincidence of c i r c ~ ~  
k y  found thcmeelves in p o s k o n  of State power, they would 
not be able to retain that power. They would need, he mrts, 
the State support of the European proletariat, i.e., the support 
of the European proletariat in pos-ion of State power. In 
the absence of such a support, a mccedul revolution in Rnssis 
is impwible--and it is usel= for the R~ls~ian workem to 
attempt he seizure of power. TrotsBry agrees with the Men- 
sheviks who, disregarding the hperkList character of pmumt- 
day capitalism, still cling to the outworn idea that the prole- 
tarian revolutionary movement must be the strongest in the 
moat advand  capitafiat conntrier Trotsky, together with 
the MIX&& disregards the uneven development of capital- 
ism which e x p l h  why revolutionary movements can be the 
strongest where the chain of imperialism is the d e 9 t - w h i c h  
is not n e a e d y  in the most advanced capitalist countries. 
The following is Trotsky's answer to bin's theory of the 
uneven development of capitalism. He wrote it in 1917 b his 
pamphlet, Program of Peace. He repubIishd it in 1924 in his 
collected works, obviousty finding it correct. 
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1 ' Tlo o n l ~  more or lc~a ~oncraa b.mriul d d m t i o n  put 
~ . k a i o e t t h e d ~ ~ f ~ U U n i ~ S t a f c l o f E ~ l ~ o p s w a u  1 W S ~  in tho swim S ~ W D C I W O ~ ~  0-M. 
3. 0.) in the wntenw which follom: 'Uatvrm dd po- 
Utrd devtlopmut is an absolute Iaw d capiralisisla' From thh the 
Sa&&Dmmnztdrswtheconclusiwthsrthevietorpof~ 
r m r p o w i b l e i n a & g l o w u n l ~ y , a n d t h s r , ~ ~ t h e w a s n o  
+t in d i n g  the creation of a Unitd Stam of Europe the 
m d h h  for &a dictatodip of the p m h a h t  in each -ate 
v. That capi&t dmdopmsnt In M-t mu& is ua- 
man b an alwoluttly incontmvdble fan But Me vsry uns~en- 
aa# is W ex&mdy anmen. The ~apitaltat I d  of b&d, 
Aoltria, k n y  or France Q not idendcal. But in oomparbn 
with Mrh or Aaia all thw e o u n t r i ~ ~ ~  zcpmat capitdint 'Europe', 
which has grown r i p  for th BOCial dutio11. That no single 
~ r t g  M d  'waitm ior *them in ita own struggle h an de 
manmy idta which it is nsefml a d  necaaq  to repah JD order 
to a d  tbe auhi tut ion of the idea of apstmt - h a 1  
h w h  for the idea of siraPlraaaoxla international action. With- 
oprt - fo r  o h m  we begin and mlinna our m w g l e  on our 
~ d q u i t e a u r e t h a t o n r ~ t i . c w i l l g h a n ~ ~ t o  
Ihs struggle in other countria; brrt if th should not h a p m  
h it would be hopdw, in ths light of the &mco of ktoq 
asd in h a  light of thaoretieal wndmtiom, lo rbinl, for ~xamplo, 
&at a mvolutionary R w i a  c o d  hold its own in ths faoe of 
~ ~ v e  Europe or that a So&t Germany could remain 
hla~d in tho capitalict world." (Laon T*, Collscted W o r k  
Rwian Edidon, VY. In, Part I, pp. 89-90.) 
I Noh this reference to one sin~le scntencc. Thc onls ''more or - jess concrete bhtorical consideration", eaya Trotsky, 'again& the 
dogan of the United States of Europe and for tlbe p d i l i t y  of 
a s d u l  proletarhut revolution in a single eomtry, M found 
' jw in one mtence. T h y  disregarda the entire L e h h t  
theory of imperialism as the stage of decaying capitaliinn, of 
dying capitalism. The entire Leninist theory of revolution 
d m  not exiat for him. He awqm away the reference to the 
aneven economic dwelopment by stating that the principal 
countrim of Ewop are d1 ripe for the social revolution. 
What he d m  not notice is the contradictions behveen Engiand, 
A d a ,  Germany or France on the one hand and the contra- 
dictions between h camtrim and tbeir coIonia and spheres 
of in0mce on the other hand To him the mlution does 
not c m m  aar the mdt of thw contradictions, of a breach in 
the imperialht front in one or the other country. To him the 
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revolution comes simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in 
the most advanced countries-or it does not come at all. Since 
revolutions do not happen this way, it iar quite obvious that 
Trotsky does not see the possibility of revolution. It must be 
kept in mind that this was published in 19% even years after 
Qctober. It was hopeless, said Trotsky, to tW that the mvo. 
lution in Russia could 'hold its own" in the face of conmvaa 
tivc Europe. 
This LB, 8s Stalin put it, 'bsinnin@; against reality". The fact 
that the proletariat of the Soviet Union had held power for 
seven years in face of capitalist Europe should have convinced 
anybody of the correctness of the Leninist b o r y  about th 
victory of the socialist revolution in one country. But what 
are hlstoricsl facts to Trotsky? Even to the present day he 
 cling^ to his exploded theory of the impossibility of socialism 
in one country. 
, 
When the Leninists spa& about the socialist revolution in 
one country thsy do not deny the revolutionary aid and 
tan= coming from the lRaeses of other countriee. It is a well- 
known fact that without the aid of the m a w  in t h ~  capitalis! 
countrim the Soviet Union could not have maintained ihlf.  
This ve y amhhnce rendered the dictatorship of the proletariat 
by the m m e ~  of the capitalist countries is one of the contra- 
dirrtions of imperiah: the situation in he capitalist oountries 
may not be ripe yet for a revolution, bnt the workers and the 
other exploited end o p p r d  are revolutionary enough to 
realiz that the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S,S.R. 
is the great& achievement of the world proIetatiat, and am 
determiad eno@ to fight their home impmialista in defense 
of the w o r k '  fatherland. 
.On the other hand, the Leninist theory does not deny the 
po!&bility of the dictatorship of the proletariat of a aingle 
country being crushed by concerted action of world i m d -  
im-alth~ugh the probability of sucb an attack is diminiehing 
with the growth of the U.S.S.R. and of the revolutionary move- 
ment in the capitalist world, including the mbniea. But, being 
revolutionists, the Leniniats ask theprselvtx: What shall the 
p r o l m  Party do in a revolutionary situation when there 
is the probability of a sueceseful attack on the c a p h h t  State, 
the probability of the e e  of power by the proletariat? 
M 
b h i e t e  aay it is the duty of the wmkers r m k  sutb con- 
ki power. The, Trcitdqi~es ay the wmkanr have 
firet whether here is the probability of a mola- 
o k  countries; if there is nQt such a probability, 
:&works mast not &e power. The L d & b  are prole- 
'- revolutionists. Trobkyim tends to disarm the prole 
Wak, to prevent it from utilizing a revolutia~ary aituatioa 
could Tree overlook the &ce of the Soviet 
%km? Did not the w o h  of Rnsaia under the leadership of 
dm % h b i k  Party wim power in Octoh, 1917, Uin fme of 
s.emwmative Europe"? Was this not a revolution in a ain4.e 
m? Did not the workers maintain & d m  in powm 
%bky cannot overlook ?his fact that shrm bim in the face. 
Bnt in arder to vindicate his &&a1 Utheorg" a h  tbe im- 
powibility of a succ&1 socialist revolution in a aiagle coulr- 
try, he interprets away the fact What exiets in tha Soviet 
him, to bim, ia not a real socialist revolution; what is be* 
done in the Swiet Union ie not the building of socialism. 
In a pbcript to a new edition of his pamphlet, h g m  
af Peace, he writes in 1922: 
% assertion, repeated mml times in A Program of Paw,  
that the proletarian rmolution m o t  be &ed through to a 
vhorioua ~umnclnsion wi&n tha bwndmh of om oam~rg may 
appmr to wme readem to he refuted by almpet fim m- 
perience of our Swiat Republic. But auch a ~oaelaeion wottld be 
gfiruadlees. Tha fact rhat the workem' State has mnmta;ned itdf 
&mz h e  whde world in a W e  wonhp, and in a backward 
owntry at that, beam witnem to the colmal m a t  of the ppmle 
tadat, which in other auntriee more adwanad, mom cidhd, win 
be capable of performing real wondue. But, &on& we bnw 
held oar gmmd in the fleal a d  rmim stma an a State, we 
have not yet mt to wmk ta create a SDcSdiat d a t y  and haw not 
ww approached this rlegR So long M the h p i &  mnmh in 
power fp tbe othm European eoun* we am dompdhd, k our 
&uggh agaimt eowomic ida th l~ ,  to seek far mpecmcnia with 
fhu ~apitaZist world; at tbe mue time one may my with esrtaintp 
that thess agreement8 may at k t  help as to cure same of our 
monomic to taka one or another fo- but that genu- 
ine advance in tbe constmution of S d & t  economy in B u d  
will become m b l e  d y  aftat tho victory of the prolamiat ia 
the most 'important cormtrims of E-." ( b n  'hatsky, C o i l e d  
Worh,  Edition, Vol. IlJ, Part I, pp a 9 3 . )  
Thia is how Trotsky interprets away the ~~ of the 
proIetarian revolution in Rusda. He is wrong but he haps 
one faatastic assertion on the other to cover up his original 
error. The workers did maintain their power in Ruaaia; the 
proletariu cevolution did hold its own in the face of a hostile 
worId, but Trotsky must alwaye remain right. It ia the mvolu- 
tion which, in his interpretation, is alwayar wrong. Socialism 
in R d a  cannot be built without the victory of the proletariat 
"in &a most important countries of Europe': What is built 
in Rmia ,  therefore, is not Swialism, 
So he wrate ia 1922. So he writes in 1935 when he declares 
that the Soviet Union is approaching "its general crisis". 
"Fba political c r k  converge toward8 the general crisis which 
b craeping anward and wbieb e x p m  itwlf in the fw% that 
d e t a  ihe titanic expendhum of energy by the maww and tbe 
greatat tedmolagical sue-, tha economic achievtmeab kaap 
h&g far Mind, mnd he omhelming majority of the poptila- 
ticm aontinnes to lead a poverty-stricken existence.'' {Leon 
Trot&, Tbe Kirou A s s a j s i ~ t h n ,  1935, p. 12) 
Here we have approached the very fountain-head of Trotaky'a 
method To prove that Sacialism in one country is impossibl~ 
he attempts to prove that the achievements of the Soviet Union 
are the revem of socialist construction. To reinform hie 
arguments be heads tbe counter-revolution which attempts to 
damage Socialist construction and destroy the Soviet Union. 
Trotsky remains true to himself throughow 
The Revolution and the Peaemtry 
ingenious theory about the impossibility of Social- 
T z m  a .in& country has ban misnamed %= pamanat 
revolution". The term is misleading, like many other quasi- 
Marxist t e r n  used by Trotsky. It is the exact opposite of what 
Marxism understands under permanent revoIution. Trotsky'a 
II permanent revolution" is an attempt at explaining why a 
revolution in a single muntry must fail from within even 
if it is not crushed from without. The explanation is that 
the proletariat has no allies in a socialist revolution within 
dm country where such a revolution takes place. In particular, 
Trotskyism tries to prove that the peasant nmasses do not repre- 
sent a revolutionary reserve, and that therefore a revolution in 
a eingIe country is bound to succumb to the counter-moIu- 
tionary forces, which also include the pantry, unlesa aid 
comes from a victorious revolution in other countries. Trobkfa 
"permanent revolution" iB thus an erpreeeion of the disbelief 
in the ability of the proletariat to carry with it in the revolution 
the broad masses of the other exploitd and oppressed c l a w  
of the population. 
The Marxian theory of revolution ia baaed jmt on this con- 
q t i o n  of the proletariat being slrs l d e r  of all the exploited 
and oppressed in the revolution Begemny of the p r o k ~  
in rk r e w l u h n  is the foundation of the Marlrim undemtand- 
ing of revolution. It found its clwical expression as early 
ae 1850 in a piece of writing by Marx and hgels entitled Ap- 
psd OJ ihe Cmd Conmhte to the C o ~ ~ t  LeoEfuc. 
In that document, which waa addressed to one of the first 
revolutionary workingelm organizations in Europe, Marx 
and Engela pointed out the t ~ b  of a revolutionary workers' 
, 
party in a revolution such as took place in various countries of 
Europe in 1843, namely, in a revolution against the feudal 
I system. The authors, having in mind the interests of the work- 
ing class and being fully aware of the fact that a bourgeois- 
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democratic revolution, ie., a revolution estabiishing a boar- 
geois democracy, can never satisfy the real demands of the 
w o r h ,  nevertheIeas did not see the workers as isoIated from 
dl the other forces in the revolution. They formulated the 
task of the workers in the following way: Together with 
the petty-bourgeois democrats against the old system; @t 
the petty-bourgeois demwats, together with the village poor 
when the former wiah to entrench themelves and become the 
ruling power in the State. The document continues: I 
"Wbils h a  demwralic bourgwrie winh to ttrminate tho rwolu- 
tion aa quickly as poesible with the view to confine t h d ~  at 
kt to the n a l i t i o n  of only theat dsmands [the demmda of the 
patty bonrgmieie], our iatermts and our taaks consist in &g 
the d n t i o n  permanent untiI dl more or 1- propmty~waing 
c l w  have bean removed from power, uatd the proletadt bas 
conqlrersd State power, uatiI the anion of the pmlemiana not only 
in ono country, but in dl leading wunuiee of the world, lm 
devdopd to n t l d  aa -tent, that campetition bet- tha pro- 
lerariuu of t h w  w u n h  har ceased and at Ieaet the W v e  
pmdaetiva form are concentrated in the bands of tha pf01etarians. 
Ihat we art mncemed math L.mt a change i n  priYale property, 
bui f i  abd- of p r b t e  not aojkenhg c h  w d i e -  
h, b u ~  &Eshing drsares, twr imprwiR8 existing ~ocicty, bui 
jorrrPding a new soeicv." lour cmphasie-MJ.O.l Warx lad 
EngeIs, Sdectd Forb, R d a n  Edition. VoL VIII, p. 483.) 
i 
We have here, in a remarkably clear form, the meening of a 
pamanat moIation as understood by Marx and Engels. WW~, 
the Party of the proletariat, say Marx and Engeh, are not in. 
tsrested iD terminating the revoldon, that is to say, the bour- 
geois-demoeratic revolution. We are interested in making it 
a pemww-~ revoiutbn, &at L to aay, in making it pass from 
one atage to the o h ,  from a bonrpis-democratic revolution 
to a a&aliat revolution. from a revolution that t r k  to improva 1 
&g scrciety, to a m I u t i o n  that founds a new society, from 
a revolution which the bourgeoisie is !he dominant paw& 
and holds the means of ~roduction to a revolution where the 
proletariat is ia power Ad n a t i o n a h  all means of produc- 
tion, fiom a claae smiety to a ddese society. M m  and 
Engels also point out the destability of a permanent revolu- 
tion, from a olaa society to a classlean wciety. But f i l e  the 
burg&-ntic revolution is in prop& tbe workere 
rut not fbrget that they are the leaders of all the exploited. I 
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"As in h e  finit Freneh revolution, the petty hurgsoia will give 
o w  the feudal Matea to the p e w n m  ae £mu proparty, is, they 
dl wish to retain the rum1 proletariat and create a p w - b o w  
gmk-1 dm*...Tbe workera must mmtemtthis p h  k 
the ktpeeta of the yillage proletmiat and In heir o m  hte~erits. 
Thay mwt d e n d  that the confiscated pmpeny shodd b m t  
Shlrta property and &odd be t~anefomd into workm' mlonies 
that am cultivated by the village proletariat organiPRd in -a- 
PioaP and utilizing a11 rha dvantages of largwa1e agriculture. 
Under conditions Hrhtre boargeoia propmty Antions am being 
h k e n ,  ths principle of public ownership wiU thu k p l a d  on a 
&m baela. AB the demomats unite with the peas8nts, so ihe 
workers muat unite with the village pmletaria~" {Mi., p. 487.) 
Wa have here the sketch of an alliance of the w o r h  with 
the other exploited and the defense of the interests of the latter 
im the revolution. 
The theory and practioe of h e  hegemony of the proletariat 
in the moIution were developed and perfected in the Rtleaian 
bolation by the Bolehevh with h u h .  
~ l u t i a m  reigned in Ruseia The system was ad-feudaL 
Power was in the hands of the landed aristocraay and a power- 
ful bureaucracy. The Tsar conaidered h l f  the faremoat 
landowner. When capitalism developed in the laet quarter of 
tbe 1% century, Tsarimn reluctandy yielded a few g o m -  
d positions to the repmtatives of the wlealthy manu- 
. h and bankers. A new industry with a modern prole- 
tariat had come into being, but atmng - of f e a d d h  
d g d  In the villa@. Tbe pasantar did not wen pamm the 
f d  right to cbooae their place of living. The landlords had 
pdvilegen over the p-rs mmhhent of &me under d d o m .  
TPbs broad maaaes of the population, workem, ~ a t t t s ,  lower 
middle clasar of the dtiq had almost no political Mte. Time 
came when the revolution appeared inevbble. It wm in oba 
hemb  of the workers and of the other exploited maims that 
4 a  working dam s h d d  take tbe lead+ h q y n o n y 4 n  
ths mImtion. This is what the B o M  fought for. 
What &all the working clam demand of ahe coming revo- 
lution?, rhey asked. What is its task in the reoolation? 
v Ths hia l ias  of the Menshevik brand I d - r a f o r m b )  be- 
I Xisvad that tha d y  thing the revolution could aammpLiah wan 
' 
the establishment of a democracy after the EngM or French 
1 pattent. The Mensheviks mid the workena ahodd content 
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themlves with constitutional liberties and participation in a 
bourgeois parliament. Tbis they thought was B e  maximum 
anybody could wish under the given conditions. As to the 
introduction of sociaIim, they refegated this to the dim and 
didant future; if ever they thought of socialism, they naw it 
coming-by of course, and without violent upheavals 
-in perhaps a hundred or two hundred years after the bour- 
geois-democratic revolution. In f a  they never thought of 
socialism in connection with the revolution that was the order 
of the day. 
Quite different was the attitude of the Bolsheviks with Lenin 
at their head. As early as 1894, in winding up his treatise, 
Who Are the " F r i e d  of the People"? in which he defines the 
role of the proletariat and its party, Lmin sage: 
"When its [the praIttrrriat'sJ advanced repmentatives will 
bavs d I a t d  the idtea of scientilic socialism, the idea of the 
hietoric r8le of h e  R w i a n  worker, when tbeee idem HiU have 
h o m e  wid-mad, and there w i l l  be created among the workers 
1tab1a o ~ t i o m  which transform the now qoradic aconomic 
warfare of the work- into s mnacioun claw ~ t r u g g l ~ t h e n  the 
Rursian worker, rising at the head of all he democratic e lemu,  
will throw down h l u l i s m  aad lead the R h n  p d e m ~ !  
( h a d  in haad dth the. proletariat of d oowtries) on the ~ r a i p h ~  
mad of opm political rtmggls to a vielotiom Commdst  nvolu- 
tioa" (V. I. Jnnin, Cdlccted Works, R&an Edition, Vol. I, 
P. I(#.) 
WE have here a complete outline of the theory of the per- 
manent revolution+ The proletariat is marching at the head of 
the other democratic elementa towards a bourgeois-demmatic 
revolution ; together with theae elemenb it overthrowu abwlu- 
ti- and establish a bourgeois democracy; it doee not stop 
at that, however, but continua fighting tmtil it overthrows the 
capitalist system and eatabIishes Communism. 
This is the Leninist formulation of the permanent revolution. 
It c o m b  of two elements: First, the proIetariat is leading the 
other elements of the exploited; the proletariat ie "the only 
and the natural pepreaentative of the toiling and exploited 
population"; wond, the revolution pa- from h e  firnt to 
the mmnd stage, from ib burgededemocratia to its mcialist 
' h i s  approach to the permanent revolution implied h e  idea 
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Lain's Bolshevik argument, as formulated more than once f, -*during 1905 and in a h q u e n t  years, runrr as follows: The 
1 Uerah, representing the baurgeoisie, are in favor of the revo- 
i ltltion, but in an inconshnt, dfi& and cowardly manner. As won as its narrow selhh interests' are satisfied, the bourgeoisie 
, as a ma= will  turn ita back to the pmple, to the revolution, 
and will join hands against them with autocracy. Who then 1 will main? Ths proletariat and the peasantry. E v a  n b  
L 
wu deal with a democratic revolution only, it is clear from 
' the very outset hat the proletariat aIons ia cap&Ie of bringing 
' auch a revolution to its logical conclusion, because the pro- 
, letariat goes much further than that. The proletariat alone is 
dm nowavering and lmyie1ding dement in the revolution. The 
pmaantry is un8tabIe, because it conbins Bemi-prolemian and 
petty-bowpie elements. But the instability of the peasantry 
di8eni radically from the W i  of the b o u r ~ ~  The 
paasaDvy b interested not ao much in oonatitutionrtl gumantees 
far private. property as in taking away from the.landowners 
the land, one of the mrliaatays of private property. 
h i n  therefore taught that it was the task of the proletariat 
. to unite with the peaemtry in order tur far as p d I e  to driw 
forward the bourgeo~demoeratic revolution. This, he said, 
could be accomplished by uniting with the peaaanky as a 
whole. As 80011 as the bourgeois-democratic revolution is a@ 
complishad, the proletariat, in alliance with the d - p o l &  
wan elements of the pemtry, i.e., with the poorcat peasan% 
ha said, will be &Is to carry through the abolition of capital- 
im, hereby owrcoming the resisra~ca of the buurgeoide atld 
the rich= peamts. 
The plan was sound. It was in accordance with the m i a l  
forces as they e x i d  in R u ~ i a  nd in full hmmy with the 
doctrine of Marx and Engela. 
In order that the transition from a bou1pia-de3nocratie 
mvoIution to a socialist rev01ution might IR possibla, Lenin 
add, power must not be alIowed to pasa into the hands of the 
bourgeoisie at alI. In other words, even in the bourgeois-dem- 
ocratic revolution the baurgeoisie must not be allowed to be- 
come the ruling class. Power must pass into the hands d tbe 
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victorious workers and peasants who establish the rewhition- 
ary-Lmcrd ic  dictatorship of the p r o b t u d  a d  the peasantry. 
As soon as the proletariat is strong enough, as soon as condi- 
tions are favorable, it proceeds to the next stage, to a socialist 
revolution. It establishes the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
We thus have in kin's  corwption two stage of the revo- 
lution: (1) the revolutionruy.democratic dictatorship of the 
praletariat and the pmantry, md, immediately following it, 
(2) the dictatomhip of the proletariat. 
Why the former? Becam it is necessary to break tke r e  
&stance of the landowners, the r i d  bourgeoisie and the Tsar's 
&ialdom and for that you need an alliance with d the 
peasants dWirhout ihe (mvolutionary-democratic) dictator- 
ship it is impdble  to break this resistance, to repel the coum 
ter-revolutionary attempts." 
'But of course this will be, not a gocieliist, but a democratic 
dictatolahip. It win not be able to touch upon the fonndatione 
of capitdim (without a whole aeries of inramediary sta$m of 
Rvolntiorrery d d o p m e n t ) .  At beet it wi l l  be able intmduca 
a fundamental redinsion of land property in favor of the peae- 
antry, to mrry through a masistent and fulI democratism up to 
.nd includhg a repnblie, to eradicate an M i t i c  slave feat- 
not only fmm village Hf6 bui ale0 from factory fife, to make the 
beginning of an earnmt improvement of the situation of &a work- 
ers rmd of raising their atgndsrds of living, and, last hut not lmt, 
to transfer the molulionarg mdagratirm to Europe. Such a 
victory will by no maane make our bourgmh revolution a d i n t  
mlntion; the democratic &w will not Immediately reach 
beyond the fr8menork of bouqph mid-economic relations: 
n d d w  the aignifieance of nu& a victory will be gigantic for 
the future development both of Russia and of &a whole world 
Nothing dIl so much arorrse the revolutionary anergy of the world 
pmlstarie nothing will ao much shorten the road that leads to 
its f d  vicbry a~ thig dccisiw victory of the revolution that has 
begm in Rwia." (V. I. Lenin, Cobeted Works, Rnaeian Edition, 
Vol. Ym, pp. 62-63-1 
Will there be a long interval b w c e n  the first and the second 
mge of the revolution? Of w m ,  delays are p o d l e ;  de- 
feats are sorndmw unavoidable. At the time when the above 
lines were written (July, 1805) he outcome of the then devel- 
oping revolution was far fm certain. h i n  himaell s t r m d  
the fact that he was "not iaclhed to senselass optimism on 
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I &is arcore", tbat he realized "the tremendous W t y  of thiu task". However, he said, %e mulst wish for victory and h o w  
hhow to show the real way to itn. This way, as pointed out by 
; XLsnin, was h immediate transition from the bourgob 
d m m a t i c  revolution to the socialist mlnt ian .  
"From tha democratic revolution we wiU immediately be&, just 
In accordan~e with the ~OQBUFB of our  strength, the smength 
of the comious and o r g d d  proletariat, to pam o w  ur the s+ 
cialirt revo1utian. r e  s t m d  in jauw oJ th p e w n t  r e d &  
[Our e m ~ J . O . 1 .  We &all not atop midway. . . . Without 
. laping into aduenturi8m, without being dgiW to om wbtifrc 
cadence., without running d m  Cbeap gppuladty, wm can and do 
~ a y  only one thing: Wa dl, with all our p o w ,  help the entire 
perurantry to carry through the democmtk mlutfon, In order rbat 
we, the Party of the pmlatariet, may be the -er &led 
to  pa^^, as quickly as possible, M a new, higher task-tha mwrciaIiat 
mlutiom." tV. I. Lenin, CoUscted Forks, Rwian Ution, Vol. 
iTl, pp. 186-1821 
Help the mike peasantry carry through the democratic revo. 
lution! The meaning and content of the democratic revolution 
for the Bolsheviks wm&s in abol-g, in dation to the 
pmmhy, a11 remnants of fendaliam. Once this is mom- 
$shed, once power is in the hands of the proletariat and ths 
peasantry m a whole, once the resistance of h e  formerly raling 
c l a w  has h e n  broken, once the proletariat has, in the pro- 
w~ of the revelation, grown boriger and better organid, 
the road is open to the swialid revolution. The road wilI be 
hvelled by the proletariat in alliance, nat with the peasantry 
a a whole, because the rich peas- wiIl naturally b against 
the socialist revolution, but in alliance with the semi-prol& 
elementa of the population. 
Here is Lenin's c l d  fomuta: 
*The pmktwkt mast m y  &ugh, to the wty end, Ehc de- 
e d c  r e d m b n  by abtaclring to i t s 4  the m ~ s s  oj the 
iR order to c r u d  force th r a r f s m e  oj m r u q  a d  to 
pardyze the instobilw 4 the b g d i t .  The pr&& m s  
amornpihh th s o W t  reddon by c itself the rims 
OJ t h  somi-prd~ta* &em& oj :h popuhbn  iR order & crush 
by jorce the rest3tur~cs oJ the L w r g e W  md &a p ~ d y ~ a  the b 
scobili& oj the pet& buurgmisk." ILeh's emphasis] (V. L 
Lenin, Collected Worh,  R m i m  Edition, VoL WI, p. 96.) 
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We have dwelt at length on the Leninist theory of per- 
manent revolution, became only on this basis is it possible to 
judge Trotsky'r perversion of the theory of permanent revolu- 
tion. The Trotsky thing i5  in substance a rwgatbn oJ th pro- 
b a  revohtion. He clings to it, thinking that this b his 
own contribution to the science of revolution, but in reality it 
is a piece of Menshevism garbed in "revolutionary" phrases. 
He stated his "theory" in the following way: 
'The R w b n  proletariat, finding itaeIf in m i o n  of power-- 
e m i  if this were only a consequenct of a temporary combination - 
of forma in our bourgeois rewlInt ion-41  m e t  with organid 
hostility on the part of world rcucfion, and with readinem for 
o q d d  aupport on the part of the world protctariat. Left to i l s  
won firms, the working dms 01 R w i o  will hedubly be c m h e d  
by the counter-rd&n the moment the peusmty will turn a w q  
jrom ir [Om itslie+MJ.O.]. Nothing will remain ior it but to 
link up the fate of its ~ l i t i c a l  domina~ion, and consequently the 
fate of the entire Ruwien revolution, with the fate of a ~ocia lbt  
rcwiution in Europe. That colossal State poli~ical power which it 
get8 from the temporary mmbination of forcea in the Russidn bow- 
gmia revolution, the working clase win thrust upon the scales of 
the &a atruggb of the enlire capitalist world. With State power 
in ite bands. with the counter-revolution behind its back, with the 
European met ion in front of it, i t  wilI issue to its brothem h e  
world over the old battlecry, wbich this tima wi l l  be the battle- 
cry of the laat attack, 'Workers of the world, unite!'" (L. Tmay,  
Samndng Up and Perspectives, 1906.) 
The style is dramatic, but the contents, defeatist. If one 
is to mnme that the working class of Russia is done, that it 
has no aldies, then it cannot get into possession of State power 
at all. If one ia to amume that by some miracle it has gained 
power but that European r e d o n  is in front of it and nine- 
tenths of the populstion behind its back are hostile, then of 
what avail can ba he battle-cry? RevoIntions, even when con- 
ditions are ripe, take time to develop. The battle-cry of the 
proletariat that is bemt by enemies may not immediately arouse 
the w o r h  of other countries. Moreover, a similar class sit- 
bion prevails in aom &r countries crs mu. There, too, the 
peasatmy forms a large part of the population. 'here, too, 
according to Trotsky, the workers must have the counter-revo- 
lution behind their back and the world reaction in front of 
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n, according to T r o ~ s b ,  is ~ l t  hpmsiwiq. 
home. InrheUmitdStabawe 
letmiat (in manufa-, mining and 
forms a large d o n  but by no mwna 
e population. There are t a a  of miIlions of 
small t r a h  ptty-bourgeois in- 
&octd- huge part of the people. It fallows from 
3 b k y ' a  " 0 ~ 1 "  idea that the workers could not have the 
htppmt of theare millions in a revolution againet capitdim, 
'ht b y  would inevitably unite with the exploiters agdmt 
&a mofutionary It follows that there muld be 
ao hope for a re~.olution under any cir- 
Tha cbampion of what he mIls "permanent revolution'' 
h p i o n a  pemment defeat. 
"Fhe Borsheviks knew that m Rnssia, ae 3a any other -pi- 
e t  counq, the proletariat w s  the only d m t l y  -- 
Iuiionary class, and tbey worked to secure itil Iregmoty in Che 
mlution. Yet they also knew that the psawnts were an 
inexhaustible reserrre of revolutionmy energy. And theit 
.- d a t e  proved true. Leading the land-hungrp pemmb-in 
d o r m s  aa eoIdiers or without uniforms as mui-serf-w~s 
it pomible for the to aocompIiah tlae F e b w ,  1917, 
moluiioa Leading, not the-paamtry as a whole, but the 
pwmt paants  who were botb againat the cupitah of the 
c i h  and againat the capital* of the village, ie., the rich 
peaeants (kd&), and with the middle pasm?ry neutralized, 
ww it p d l e  for the proletariat, with the Bolshevik Party as 
ita vanguard and "A11 power to the Soviets" aa its slogan, to 
aosomplish the October, 1917, revoIutim which established the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, Leading the millions of th4 
poorest peasants wbo willingly joined the Red Army to de- 
fend the eonquesta of the revolution, was it posaible for &a 
proletariat-with the Bolshevih at its head-to win the civil 
wat and secure he finaI victory of the revolutioa 
History has d o p a ~ t l y  refuted trot sky'^ "permanent revolu- 
tion". Yet he never relinquished this stupid concept, which, 
by the way, is not even his own i n d o l l :  it was ha advanced 
by a Social-Democrat by the name of P a m  who later turned 
violent social-patriot during the Wodd War, Its basic idea 
that the peasantry a~ a whole ie counter-revolutionary is a 
Menshevik conception. 
Years paw. Revolutions come and go. First the 1905 
revolution, then the period of counter-revolution, then the pe- 
riod of upswing, then the February revolutionI then the Octo- 
ber revolution. Huge masma of peasants are drawn into the 
revolution and give it that m w  character which k requisite 
for victory. ColIectivixalion of agriculture is i n d u c e d ,  the 
kduh are liquidated as a claq the difference between middle 
and poor peaeant disappears due to common membership in 
the collective farm. But our peesimist still hoIds fast to "his" 
idea of the peasantry being ultimately hostile to the revolu- 
tioa 
He learns nothing. 
In 1909 he fore- a situation where the workers in power, 
once undertaking to introdwe a number of s a d i s t  measures, 
would inevitably come into conflict with the peasants. 'The 
confiid," he says, "must end either by the workers being 
chdmd by the peasant party or by the latter being removed 
from power." (Artide entitled, "Our Controversies", re- 
printed in his book, 1905, p. 285). It doesn't enter Trotsky's 
miad that the proletariat may introduce such measures as 
would elicit the supprt of the large maasas of peasantry and 
thw ensure a united march toward socialism. 
Again, in 1915, in the Paris paper, Nmb Slovo, he ernpha- 
sizes the fact that one mu& not cherish "exaggerated h o p  
concerning its [the paantry's] revolutionary role". (Ib&d., 
p. 255.) 
Again, in 1922, after five years of dictatorship of the prole* 
&at so replete with the experkma of peasant ma- sup- 
porting the revolation, he writes a preface to a collection of 
his articlle~ which is published under the general title, 1905, 
in which he sap: 
-It waa during the interval between January 9 and the g e n d  
striLo of October, 1% that the views on the character of the 
revolutionary development of Bueeia, which came to be kaown 
aa the thwry of the 'permanent revolulion', gradudy crptallxed 
in tha author's mind. Thii somewhat oomplicated term repre- 
sented a rather simple idea . . . The revolution would not be able 
to ~ Y B  its immediate bourgeoin problems except by pIacing the 
proletariat in power. And the la~ter, upon assuming power, would 
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pat be able to limit ibd i  ta the hurgeois framework d the mvo. 
Intion. On the wntrary, preciaely In ordm to ww ita victors, 
ibc pmbn'an vanguard would be Emad in tbe very mdy atagea 
:d ita rule to make deep inroads not only into fertdaZ property bot 
cap- property as wall. In thia the proletariat wilI come 
. iatP bosliIe oollidoa, not only with the bourgd groupings which 
mported the pro1etariat during the %rat stages of m1utionary 
atrug&, b u ~  alao with the bmad massee of the p-ts who w m  
-tal in bringing it iPto power, Tht cuntdhiom in the 
, dtrledon of h web' goveiwnent in a baekward mtq with 
an e d d m i n g  majority of peasmu can ba solved only on an 
fatarnational scale, on thG arena of the world pmkatim ravolu- 
- tion." (L Tmtaky, 1905, Preface.) 
I Trotsky stdl & i s  to his "simple" idea to thL wry day. 
; This idea has made Trotskyism the vanguard of comtet- 
molntion. Need one argue against it? The lmoas of h h  
tory are clear enough. Not only would the con@ of power 
and the repulsion of the  capitalist^ and laadlords have been 
impmibIe for the proIetariat of Russia without the aid of mil- 
Uom and d l ions  of peasanta, but the upbuildhg of k a l h  
woala not have been p d b l e  either. S&liarm, said Win, 
is not amnetling peculiar to the towns alone. Socialism is an 
organization of economic life &at can be established only by 
mperdon of indwtq and agriculture on the basis of social- 
izing the means of production Socialism b impomibb with- 
out anion htween industry and apricdture. Agriculture mesas 
not only land and implements, be in the first p iae  peasam, 
Liviag millions of p-anta. 
When the proletariat d e r  the Ieadership of the Bolshevik 
Party expropriated the manufacturers and bankers in the early 
&gm of the ~mialist r~v0Iution in Rusaia, who was it that 
f o n d  its w e d  force? T h  Red b y  in which the peasants 
f o n d  a large pa& When the mbelliona af the kul& against 
he Swiet power on the VoIga and in many ather districts of 
R w i a  had to be quelled in 1918-1920, who did it? The same 
Red Army in which the p r  and middle peastmu were numer- 
ically strong. When the ptoldriat %an to ~ d e k u l a l k "  
the rich m t a  witb the introduction of coliectivizatim in 
?be Pillagta who wm its main amppart and who wme ita allies? 
hs main support were the poorest peasants in who- intern 
it me to carry out mch eropriatioa. 1ta all& were the 
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middle peasaata. Supp- there were an attack upon the So. 
viet Union-who would be in the first ranks of defense? The 
Red Army, which consists of workers mzd collective jarmers. 
What ia ahere to the Trotsky "peculiarity" of the perrnmeat 
revelation? Et is an exploded idea. It is counter-revolution 
of a 4LpmuliM" kind. It is in contradiction to widely known 
and undisputed facts. It ia in contradiction to Leuin's under- 
standing of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
'The dictatoship of the proletariat [says Lenin] ia a special 
form of c b  allianoe between the proletariat, the vanguard of the 
toilem, and tha numeroua non-proletarian atrara of the toilem (the 
petty bourgmiaie, the nmall craftamen, the peasantry, tbe intel- 
ligentala, ate ) ,  w the majority of these; it is an alliance against 
capital, an a l l i i ~ t  aiming at the complete overthrow of capital. 
at the m p l e t e  suppression of the raistance of the bourgeoisie 
and d any a#emp~, on their part, at restomtion. an alliance dm. 
ing at the final mtabU8hment and coneolidatbn of ~ocialim." 
(V. L Lenin, CoUectcd Works, Russian Edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 311.) 
Trotskp's theory s o d  "revolutionary" only to the unin- 
formed. It implies that the share-croppers of the South in the 
U.S.A. will turn against the workers the moment they begin, 
after the seizure of power, to take away the mhea and mills 
from the capitalists of, my, Alabama; h t  the tenant farmers 
of the Middle West will join the armies of Morgan and Ford 
to fight the taking over by the workers of the automobile plantar, 
railroads and banks; that tbe large mass of the small citizenry 
of New York will turn again& the workers introducing socialist 
m e a m  in this world metropolis. T h i a  H what the blind fail 
to notice in Trotsky's Yvariety of MmsheviamY', a~ it was called 
by %]in. 
* * * 
T r o w  does not atop at this "peculiarity", however. This 
is anly hia baae, his starting point. He draws from It  "pecu- 
liar" conclusions, each more fantastic than the other. What 
follows from a wrong premh is a number of counter-revolu- 
tionary condnaions which make np the main features of 
Trotdryh: 
1. The bads is: The impossibility of sociaIiem in one 
country; 
2, H e n d e  d o n  that what is going on in the Soviet 
Union is not socialism; 
4@ 
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3. w e  conr,lwion that what is being buiIt in Russia 
C "national socialism"; 
- 4 Hen& ~wcIusion that the '%atipnal-sucialistY' gov- 
j-munent of the Soviet Union h u%rmidorian", ie., counter- 
m1utionary, and stands in the way of the w~rld revolution; 
; 5. Hencethe assertion that the Communist International, 
which is donhated by the Communist Party of t h ~  Soviet 
! Won, which is the party 01 "national soeialiam", b blocking 
&e way of the world revolution; 
6, Hence-the conclusion that the crying need of the world 
prdetariat is to build a "fourth international" to be led by 
-the "great strategist*' of the revohtian, hon  Trotsky. 
7. It follows from the above that support of intervention 
and the killing of Soviet leaders are mvolutionary acts. 
Aa you see, there Ee logic in t k  ravings. They all  fallow 
with irondad necessity from the fountainhead of the Trotsky- 
ite denial of socialism in a single country. That they do not 
happen to tally with historic facts % not the Trotskyites' faulL 
The Soviet Union 
A" ate as 1931, in e pamphlet, The Pernumefit Revolution, Trotsky writes, black on white: 
"The aacialist malutioa begha on nationalist grounds, bat 
it cannot be completed on thwe grounds, The maintenance of the 
proletarian mlut ion  within a national framework can only be 
a provisional state of affairs, wen though. as the experience of 
the Swiet Union showed, one of long duration. I n  an a b e d  
prolef(~lan dhamrship .  the inten4 and m~ernul contradictions 
g r w  i neP iWy  with th growing successes. R e d *  heolrrted, 
che proIew-h  state w t  # n d y  hecam a victim of these urn- 
rr(~di&w.~ (OW emplds--MJ.O.) (p. W . 1  
Now, it has never been a d  by the Bolsbevb that an 
attack of the capitalist governments on the U.S.S.R. is imp- 
a l e .  The blshevik leaders have been explicit in this respect. 
Lenin said: 
-Aa long M o w  Soviet Republjc remains a lone outlying 
province of the mtim capitalist world, it would be a ridiculous 
fan~eey-mongering and u t o p ~  to think . . . about the dis- 
appwmmce of dangm of ma kind m the other. Of couree. as 
long sa BI& fundamcmtd contradictions remain, there remain 
aleo daagsrs, and there is no phee we can run away from them." 
(V. I. hh, Cdlectcd Works, R d m  Edition, VoI. XXVI. 
p. 29.) 
With the growth of the Soviet power, with the progrem of 
industrialization, with the deveIopment of socialist agricnIture, 
with the strengthening of the defense forces of the muntrp 
while the sympathiw for the Soviet Union among the toilers 
of the capitalist countries grow apace, the means of k d n g  
a military attack from without have increased. Still, the danger 
remains. And nobody lrnows it as well as the leaders of the 
Soviet. 
But when Tr* speaks about the inevitable growth of inter- 
nal and external contradictions he does not mean this simple 
and clearly understood danger of a military Imperialist attack. 
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mema somedug &. He lays strm not so much on eter- 
contradictions, which are the contradictions behpeen the 
rn- sector and the sacislist m r  of the world, as on 
he calls "internal contradictions". The Soviet Union, he 
kwys, w t  h d l y  ''bacoms a victim" of these comadiations. 
What are they? What contradictions remained in the U.SS.R [ 1931? The land-owning dase wu, long extinc~ T ~ E  bow- 
:+sie was reduced to a small and utterly insignificant frat- 
' 
of its former self. kulaks had h n  tremendously 
!+ed in conqmnce of rapid co11ectivbation of the vil- 
/bga Claw wntradictiona were diminishing by the day with 
&a rapid liquidation of the remnmts of the old dasses. Dif- 
1facnw.a between city and village were damsuing in come- 
qas3lce of the introduction of machiaery and modern technique 
1 @tion meant further improvement in industrial production, 
h&er pra- in oollectivktion, further elimination of the 
Lsrlake and remnanb of the b o w g e o a  a fnrther rise to 
&hts of cuIture in a county where the existence of the 
is made mure. Why should these growing 
mmaI "internal contradictions" which must "inevitablf' 
p w ?  
Dif6culties were there, to be sure, The remnants of the hour- 
p b i e  did not wish to give up without kht, and they were 
damaging here and therebat the growth of socialist economy 
and the rapid mastery by the workers of the heights of howl -  
edge doomed these attempts to failare. The very aquidtion 
' of modern technique, the ovmming of old habits of work, 
, the eonquests over nature were accompanied by certain d i m t p  
mi- certain dadjustmenta But thm were d i w t k s  of 
gr-b Each succ+q step of the revolution prepared solu- 
tiona for such problems. 
Whence, 'then, the inevitability of "becoming a victim" to 
m e  dire inner contradictions? - 
This is one of the many gecreta of Trotsky'a reasoning. It 
ia no reasoning at all. Wish L bere, obviously, father to the 
' thought, wish that the Soviet Union may not s w d  in order 
that his theory of the ''permanent revolution", Le., of the in- 
, witable elash between the proletariat and the peasantry, may 
Perhaps Tro* wants to say that it is impmible to 
build socialism in the Soviet Union because the country has 
not the m r y  prerequisites? At the risk of being tedious 
we wish to remind on= more that the Soviet Union haa mom- 
plibed miracIes by way of upbuilding the economic and cul- 
tural life of the country, Even before the civil war was ended, 
even while foreign armies of intervention were &ill on Soviet 
soil, the Bolshevh began to plan the work of socialist con- 
struction. It seemed a superhuman task at first. The country 
had been ruined by tbree years of imperialist war. It had been 
laid wmte by the armiee of the Russian White generals and of 
the foreign g o ~ n t a  It had been choked by nearly five 
years of economic b l h d e .  It had gone through famine. In- 
duetrial produdon in 1421 waa one-6fth that of 1913. Agri- 
culture had been d w d  to less tbaa o n ~ h l f .  The tranmorta- 
tion svstern was in a denlorable state. But the 3 0 l s h e ~ s  aw 
the &eat emts of the-dictatorship of the proletariat; inex- 
baustibIs energy and c d v e  abilities of the liberated 
of toilers, with the proletariat 3 their head and the Bolshevik 
Party leading. 
tenin, who better than mybody e k  knew the shortcomings 
of that great country, saw also the possibilities of building 
socialhm. At a time when Trotsky was pnldishing his 1905 
to prove that socialism in one camtry was impoaeible, at a 
time when he was working out his opposition platform against 
h in iam,  bin wrote (January, 1923) : 
uIndced, the power of the State over all largegcale meann of 
productb, the powar of the State in tha hands of the pmlstariat, 
the aIliaum of thb proletariat with many miuiom of arnaU and 
s d d  peasan4 tha guarantee of the leaderahip on the papart of 
thin proletariat i rsladoa ta the peaamtry, ate, is tbiir not dl 
that is a m  to build out of the cooperativm of the gopera- 
tivas dona which we haw hithtlrto traated M Aopkecptr~' under- 
t a k h p  and did we, to a degree, have a right to treat so under 
the N.E.P. [New bnomic Policy]-is this not dl &at is M- 
s q  & brrild rl idJ m&bt society? [Our empba&M, J. 0.1. 
Tkiu i a  not pst tht building of a mcialist naciety, but this is dI 
that k and nafficimt for bailding much a dtty:' 
1V. L Len~n, Cobcacd W o r k ,  R d a n  Edition, VoL XXW, 
, 
P 398.1 1 
Today, the foundation of socialist society has already been 
52 
the Soviet Union is rapidy approaching a classlaa 
But behold Troteky standing in ?ha pose of a prophet 
" the world: 
T h a  impending erisi~ of Soviet wrmomy wiU inevitably, and 
' within the rather near fuhre, crumble the sugary legend, [of 
&a possibility of building mialiam h one country] and, we 
bm no r w n  to doubt, will acstfu many dead. . . . TBa Soviet 
ariwn will catch the European workem, and & d y  the Commu- 
nkh nttmly unprepared. . , . The contdictions of Soda econ- 
omy, he incomplctenma and the pmdousneaa of many of its 
cmqnw& the coarse ermrs of the ltadembip and the dangem 
that stad m the path of aocialiem. . . . The nearsat future wiU 
britll with it a new maCrmation of our eorrectnem." (Laon 
Tmtsky, Swit; E w ~ m y  i~ Wer, pp. 45.1 
' 
Having made up his mind tbat socialism in R h a  simply 
,enaot be realized, he h l o p s  a venomous h d t y  towards 
,werytbiag that happens in the U.S.S.R. He magnifiw difhul- 
'&; he invents diilicultiea where there are none; be a 
"&is" where there is only one of the many o b ~ l e e  to b 
memome; he m a  a dwindling of f o m  whure forces axe 
' h a s i n g  md gathering momentum; he den* stmmes;  he 
; iateqrets achievemsnta as failarea; he msuum the pow of an 
accuser pointing his finger at the Communist Party and at its 
1 Central Committee led by Starin and my: "Here they are- 
the bureaucrats who are the rub  of the workers' revolution". 
Back of it all is hia inteUmtnal's pe#y-bourgeois W i e f  
in the revahtion and fear before the obstacles coafronting the 
Betatorship of the proIetariat in the mida of a h d e  world 
What was it that up& bim so terribly at the beginning of 
his oppdtionist career? What waa it that mwd as the basis 
for the unprincipled union of Tr* with Zjnwiea and 
1 Kamenev? It was the M&t attitude toward the New Be+ I mmic Policy of the U.S.S.R 
1 In 1922 the Bolsheviks,against the unsound judgment of some 
"Left" Communists, abandoned tb so-called military Com- I munism and introduced the. New Economic Policy (N.E.P.). I Tba war Communism which p d e d  from 1918 waa a 
means to fight the civil war and to repel i n t e d o n .  The 
government laid its hand on everything p r o d 4  in the coun- 
ty, and it diiltributed everything according to a plan in order 
to be able to withstand the athck of the claas.enemy forces. 
During &me years production did not increase; it decreased. 
Traportation was not improved ; it deteriorated The major 
portion of what was prodwed in the factories and plants went 
for the front The government collected fodshlffs and raw 
materials from the peasants and was supposed to give in re- 
turn manufactured goo& Thew however, were not forth- 
coming due to the collapse of the industrial system and the 
necessity to mpply the front, h a result, the peamta w t m  
actually supporting the country in those crucial years, and tbe 
government, to use Lenin's expression, gave them promissory 
notes. It promised them a h r  fate in the futura When the 
war was hished, at leaat in its major a s p &  when the b 
~ubl ic  seemed to be secure, at least for a while, it becams 
obvious that the continuation of military Communism was an 
i m p d i l i t y ,  It w a ~  nmsaxy  to s t r m g t h  the alliance with 
the middle peasants which had bewm strained under tbe p w -  
sure of military Co- It was to lay the 
foundations of d i s t  con&ruction. In he firat place, the 
country under the soviets had to learn how to prodmu The 
p w n t s  had to h given the incentive to i n c m  their mops 
and this conld be achieved only when they were allawed to 
sell their go& in the open market. This nseeasitatad the 
legalization of the open market. In order to get out of the 
horPible economic -ation it was necessary to encourage 
even private industrial production. 
The New IECommic Po% then conaiated of the followiug 
f ~ ~ :  
Natural resour= and large-wale industria1 establishtmmta 
in the hands of the dictatomhip of the proletariat; 
The entire credit system in the hands of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat ; 
The entire railroad and water transportation system in the 
hands of the dictatorship of the proletariat; 
Foreign trade entirely in the hmb of the dictatorship of 
the proIetariat ; 
City lands and buildings in the hands of the local Soviets; 
Agricultaral laad in the hands of tbe regional and 1-1 
Soviets; 
Private manufacturing and private trading allowed under the 
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faith in the creative abilities of 
tha New Eeonomic Policy in 
in the peassnta as a revolutionary force. With the 
n of the New Economic Policy there appeared again 
kulak. True, be did not 
He was shorn of political 
rich rrs some kuIaka d 
's share of the rich peasant's income. Still, here 
ass division in the village. 
declaring that the revoIution was in danger, that the capital 
elements were eating up the socialist elements in Soviet 
omy. Whether the oppositionists were genuinely frigh 
or pretended alarm for political ends is baside the point. 
they did is to direct a vicious and u ~ u p u l o u e  attack on 
leadership of the Communist Party. 
One of the characteristic features of the Trotsky oppositio 
is that it does not want to see tbe Soviet Union in deirelopmrs~ 
it pretends to take no notice of &a1 fo 
one stage to another. In the N,E.P. it saw 
come to stay for decades, if not forever. Fr 
inherent in such a policy they drew fresh 
sheviks bad a definite p h  wbich was to change the situa 
radically, and within a short time. But it is another &a 
teristic feature of Trotskyism that it: diiards the declarat~om 
of the Bolsheviks which run counter to its own pronuncia- 
mentom. 
How did the Bolshevik Party and StaIin visualize that 
change? They vieualized, and worked for, a rapid victory of 
the socialist sector of national economy over the capitalist 
&or. They formaw that in the near& future the Soviet 
socialist factorim wonld improve to aucb an extent that b y  
would eaaily compete with the capitalist factories and drive 
them out of exi-ce. They formaw that very soon the moper- 
atives would have learned the art of kading so well that they 
would lx able to drive out of businese the private traders and 
force them into the r& of employeear. As to the small and 
middle peamnts, the Party and Stalin knew p e r f d p  well that 
private holdings and private husbandry were a passing p b ,  
that very soon the peawts wonld joir~in producing coopera- 
tives, i.e., that, with the aid of the Party and the State, they 
would begin to build c o i b h e  fwm, which would mean the 
end of the kdak and the abolition of cl- in the village. 
T h y  5aw that mme koI& were getting rich. But they were 
far from frightened. They knew that the kulaks as a clam 
would not last long. They had a policy that was bound to 
"remake" the poor and middle peasaate, to induce them and 
teach them how to 0-k socialist aphdtara under &e ' 
leadership of the proletariat--and this, they knew, would make 
the existence of the Make impodble. They p d e d  with 
Sb 
the dispatch possible uader the circumstsncm to prepare 
mmssary equipment for the eoIlectiviaation of agriculture. 
equipment had to consist of htter implements, agicul- 
I1 worked out. It originated with Lain. 
and ably carried out by the B a i ~ k i k  
swrcesafnl only when 
between the workers and the peasank 
t againat tlie kulak by impwing a heavy tax on hia 
and by ridding the Iwal Sovie~s of his inflwce, Aid 
m l v e a  with the 
road lea* towards socialh" 
ll-considered plsll of the Bolslwib 
this, there were developed two theories: the 
"Left". Tbe Right undweatimated the capitalist 
e kdak; it aaw in the kulak a middle peasant. 
middle peasant a kulak. 
peasantry comdmtimg to a 
Communist Pa* fought 
tohere they were bddm 
gOm main t d  in to meate indmata bonda b e u n  o d -  
rtld the broad mnms of the pwanm faaid Stalin May 9, 1925, 
in a rtport to the Party functioaarits of Mweaw], ka m h  dm 
dtmal and material madard of the paaant'n Me and to place 
~ f a s t o f t h ~ ~ t ~ m t h e m a d l ] s a d i n e t ~ d ~ -  
fm Our main Eaak b to *mild & &odder to &odder 
rrW the pmaantq unda tho I s a d d i p  of the working h; for 
& under s u l  haderahip can rm m t ~  that the economic 
&tion of the -nutry dl be ended on! dong mialLa 
path," (Jwpb Stalin, M n i s n t ,  VoL I, pp. 247-%%, 
d & d  in May, 19!25,) 
would the socialist path consist in the viIlaga? 
in answers to this: 
"How caa the peasantry be dram into the general current of 
Soviet economic developmeat? By ntenna of thb cooperatives. 
By meam of oooperativa credit, apirmltursl woperathes, dis- 
tribntiva mopamtiyea, and pductim cooperativaa. Such ace 
the  way^ and meam thmugh which the peasantry will h l y  but 
surely be drawn into the curreat of the general syetem of socialist 
oonstruction." ( I b i . ,  p. 249.) 
Productive cooperativee is m o t h  name for collective farm. 
Why was this to p r o d  dowly? Because the smialist fac- 
tories and plants had to produce enough machinery and impIe- 
ments to serve as an inducement for the peasants to organhe 
into cooperatives; because the Soviet mines had to produce 
enough coal and ore for the production of iron and s h ~ 1  to 
be used for agricuitural machinery; h u s e  the w o h  had 
to be trained to h able to produce-and all  this took a few 
years. Altogether it took no more than seven years-from 1922 
to 1929, from the beginning of the N.E.P. to the great rush of 
collectivhation. But what a noise the Trotskyites raised during 
those years! What a lot of mi&ef they did! What monkey 
w r d  they were throwing into the machinery of Soviet 
economy! How they were undermining Commlmi;st Party 
unity which was the first condition for the carrying out of the 
program of building a d a h  economy! 
For three year4 between 1924 and 1927, while they were 
still men&= of tbe Party, they kept on harping in a thousand 
w a p  about the growth of the kulak and the growth of the 
Nepman. Their practical proposals mre dictated not by an 
understanding of Soviet economy, but by panic. They said: 
"Collectivize the peasank at once; if need be, uee form"- 
which, if a#empted, would have aroused the peasants against 
the workers and played havoc with the revo1ution. They de- 
manded a w e n @  of the tempo of industrialization by the 
investment of another billion rubles in idustry. Thia billion 
was to be r a i d  by imreaaing commodity pr' ms-a measure 
which wodd have increased rather than d e c d  &&uIties, 
since higher commodity prioes would have hit hard the poor 
and middle peasants, the chief consumers of industrial corn- 
moditiw, and would have lowered their standards of living, 
which would only have served to strengthen th position of 
the kulaks. The Trotsky opposition was doing its utmost to 
force u I r e d  between the proletariat and the middle peassnts. 
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They were still in the Party, but they fought it as enemia 
benb not on criticism, but on deatrudon. No exaggtxation, to 
them, was too wild, no idnuation too low, no distortion too 
me- They circuIated literatore full of vile denunciatiorur of 
evwythink; the Party did. They greeted the tenth ~ n n i v m r y  
of the October Revolution with the &ation that the Com- 
munist Party w a ~ i  a party of the bureaucrats, kulaks and Nep* 
mea This propaganda wm accompanied by the formation d 
an underground faction, which ~ r i n t e d  l h  and d k h t e d  
o them cland&ely. The Party had to call a halt. The oppo- 
sition was expelled But h i s  did not stop the propaganda. 
We had to relate th is  phaae of the opposition activities at 
some Iength, because it gipee the key to the thehanding of 
what follows. Any reasonable human being, upon seeing that 
his fears and apprehensions were not justibd, would admit be 
was &taken. Not Trotsky. The rapid i n d d a t i o n  of the 
Soviet Union, the almost total disappearance of the N;~pman, 
the collectivization of agrirml- the elimination of the M a k  
, aa a claw, one would think, &odd have satiefied tbe Trotsky- 
' i h ,  if they meant what they shouted from the hoz~&~p. But 
Trotsky's opposition becomes more venomous the more the 
ground slips from under his  fee^ It is the venom of tho* 
elemate of the petty bowgwieie who see the victory of 
socialism but do not wish to become wmkrs earning an 
honest living under conditions where the proletariat is in pos- 
msion of power. 
Trotsky remains the damager throughout. 
I 
If there is any achievement in the Soviet Union that even 
the enemim have been f o r d  to remgnh, it M the phenomena1 
economic sumas both in in- and agricultma The facts 
are so widely known that it is almost mmcaaaq to mention 
them once more. From a backward country fhe U3.S.R has 
h o m e  one of the foremost industrial muntrh From a coun- 
try with twenty million individual peasant holdinga it bccanae 
a counky of large-male m h  farming. From a country that !# had to dcpold on other calmtries for iita i n d d  equipmen& 
it bas b m e  a country which can prodma fox itself the 
maat complicated and dm most advanced industrial equipment. 
From a country that overwhehiily illiterate it has be- 
59 
come a country in which ahw everybody, eepecially the 
younger generatioa, has received education. The Soviet plants 
are among the beat in the wodd. The Soviet engineers and 
industrial output has grown four hundred per cent in five 
years. Soviet agriculture has overcome the initial djfEculties 
w o r k  are mastering the most advanced fedmiqua Soviet' 
and has made marked headway towards eupplying the country 
with an abundance of foodstaffs and raw material. The Soviet 
factories are turning out tractors and tnrcks and other a@* 
oaltural machinery by the hundreds of thousands. 
The successes of the Soviet Union, the improvement in the 
mdards  of living of the masses, the cultural life that ie theirs 
--all this  ha^ aroused the admiration of millions of toilers the 
wodd over and has in proportion increased the ire of the 
exploiters. 
Where is Trotsky? He is not with the toilers. He spits 
venom in accord with the exploitem He gives them aid and 
comfort. Moreover, he initiates campaigm against the Soviet 
Uaion. He declares all theae successes nondtent .  
What is wrong, in his opinion? Simply this, that 'you 
cannot build socialism in one country". Why? Becam 
" . . . the general growth of economy. on the om hand, and the 
sprouting up of new demande and new disproportions, on the 
other, invariably increase the need of linking up with the world 
economy. The program of 'independenoe', that is, of the mf- 
sufficient character of Soviet economy, disclorres more and more 
its reactionary and utopian character. Autarchy ie the ided of 
Hider and not of Mar* and Lenin!' (Leon Troteky, Soviet Emn- 
omy In Dmrger, p 17, 1933.) 
There is not a single sentence in this whoIe tirade that has 
any meaning. The gentlemaq chooses to "overlook" the differ- 
ence htween capitalist and socialist economy. In the capitalist 
economy, contradictions are inherent and cannot be overcome. 
Growth of mass production accompanied by lower wages, to 
take one instance, creates that kind of udisproportion" which 
capitalism is powerlem to solve. In SoPiet economy it is dif- 
ferent. Tho* "disproportions" which Trotsky apeaka of, such 
as the lagging behind in the production, say, of coal or lubber, 
are far from catastrophic. They create d i n  diiEcdties which 
are easily overcome. With the growth of Soviet economy they 
tend to deerewe rather than to increase. When there is an 
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abundance of steel it does not matter very much if one or the 
other plant ia lagging. When the railroad s y a b  haa 
improved, it d m  not matter whether one or the other road 
h slightly deficient. When Wcultnte has been placed on a 
modem scientih basis, it doa not e m  m a m  m d  whether 
o lht ic  oonditions are favorable. Thia year'@ crop was- &a- 
dant in spite of a terrible drought. Diroportiona aud ahe 
acwmpanyhg didiculties, Mr. Trotkyf have a tendenog to 
decrease rather than to hmaee in Sooiet economy. 
As to the program of ihdepmdm~whP is it reactionary 
and why is I t  utopian? Isn't it a fact that Soviet economy 
wday is less dependent upon other countries than it was five 
years ago? Aren't the Soviet industrial giants in a podtion to 
supply the country with necessary equipment while five y e w  
ago the country had to depend on imports? Do not b enor- 
mous amount and variety of natural resources guar- the 
Soviet Union a free mnomic development indepndw of the 
capitalist countries? What is utopian in a fact that exists? 
And why ia it reactionary? If economic development ware 
rerudeti in consequence of a certain policy, that wuld be called 
%actionaryW from an economic point of view, provided it 
depended upon the Soviet leaders alone to alter the policy. 
If, however, economic development was immensely mceleratttd 
in consequence of the Bolshevik policy, if it went beyond any- 
thing any capitalis? coaatry codd dream of even in tima of L 
highest prosperity, where is the reaction? 
That  the ideal of a socialist economy is not autarchy but 
bternational exchange, and &at only under an in-l 
Soviet system such an exchange will be put on a a i d  
basis, we need not Iearn exactIy from Trotaky. This is one of 
the fundamental theses of Marrriaua Autarchy il mt the ideal 
of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union d m  not wish, and 
b not work for, autarchy. But economic independenoe of 
the capitalist world market is a neessdy due to the fad that 
the Soviet Union ir surrounded by a hostile capitalist world. 
- The idea that the developnaent of the Soviet Union demands 
an increase in "linking up with the world economy" k funda- 
mentally wrong. It haa been one of the pet ideas of Trotsky 
for mmy years that Soviet economy is part of world eeonomy, 
that it stands and falls with the latter. What are the facts? 
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Soviet economy is proceeding from one victory to another; 
capitalkt emnomy is rotting, diktegrating, collapaing. Soviet 
economy forges ahead to new unparalleled achievements nuder 
a system where &the country is ever more solidified under the 
Soviet rule. Capitalist economy is unrrbh to overcome ih 
crlais and the capitalist countrim are headed towards the 
overthrow of the entire existing sydem. Even the blind can 
see these facts. 
Sinm the appearance of Trotsky's S d k t  Economy in Darager, 
over two years more have p m d .  Trotsky said then that the 
nearest future would bring a new confirmation of hia corm%. 
neee. During those years Soviet economy experiend a new 
phenomenal upwing. But Trotsky's barking at the victoriouar 
socialist co~15t~~&on continues in even louder tones. 'h 
structure of eocialiam is nesrly completed-and he dl1 keep 
on repeating that ''miaLiam in one country is impossible". 
To the numberless '%ontradictions" that T r e  discovers 
in the building of socialism in the Soviet Union, a brand-new 
one was recently added: the contradiction between production 
and consumption. E v a  a Trotskyite can no longer deny the 
colossal economic p;rowth of the Soviet Uniw. Even the bit- 
terest enemy must, i o  his itorrow, admit that collectivi%ation of 
agricnltnre is a fact, But fmts do not deter the Trotskyit=. 
Facts can be misinterpreted. And the latest misinterpretation 
was giw by Trotsky to the fact that, in spite of a tremendous 
irmrease in the production of collaumers' good5 and in spite 
of the ~emmdoaq b r e w  ia the consumption of the individual 
worker and peasank go& are stdl greatly valued among the 
m- and everyone wishea to have more to consume. Trobky 
calls tbis "the stimulus for individual accumulation", and since 
he baa heard that Marx Ualso" epoke of accumulation (primi- 
tive ammulation of cuphZl), he proceeds to the very pro- 
found d n s i o n  that this Ustimulus for individual ammula- 
tioa" map lead to a revival of capitalism. 
"So long as the oveawkhhg majority of the population bas 
not yet emerged fmm actual want, he urge for individual appro- 
priation aad for the accmulation of goode retains a maee char- 
acter and come3 into continual coiaiou witb the oolhmidst 
tendenciee of the m m i c   lift^. . . If the accumulation ia per- 
mitted to cxcmd certain l e i  it mi transform i d f  into 
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/ primi~ire capitalist awnmulation, and can w a d  in ovtabro* 
tba U m m ,  and affmr them thp uuata [m-om of Stat* I m e d  Swier factoririee-M. J. o,] an A 'A~OSW ~f M 
in a sense, mema the w r m b a h g  to all membem of 
society such living mnditiom as will kill the s h h  for indi- 
vidual accumulatiop. We arc estiII very far from that. . . . The 
preeent hatuitional society is full of mnlradictims, wbi& in the 
aphwe of cwsumptim, the moat i d a t e  and vital aphera for 
-one, betlr a cb~acter of ext rm kdm and dwpa tbrmt.cn 
ie  cause an exphion in the sphm of production.. . . Potentially, 
as regards the posrsibilities and dmgm Iat%mt in it, it b a claau 
struggle.. . which i a  Iw&g fmm out of the i m e  competition 
betwetn the inkrests i n v o l d  in the q h  of c~mumptioa, on 
the Mi ~f a dl and lmbarmonigtnr mmlay." ( h n  
Trotaky, The Kirov A s s a s s W ~ .  Feb-, X935, pp. 10-31.) 
Trotsky stit1 cloaks b l f  as a champion of mialism. 
Since socialism in the U.S.SB has not yet brought about a 
I &nation where there is no stimulus f o ~  the acpuisition of con- 
. sumers' goods, be sees an opening far an atbelt The fact that 
the m a w  of the Soviet Union are still "gooh hungyW- 
: which is an incentive for mom end better p r d u c t i ~ d  
, formed by Trotsky into a new class struggle. The urge for 
acquisition h-by a sleigbt-of-h~n- into an urge for 
, mumulation. The collective peasant bemt on receiving more 
meters of cotton cloth or woolem for h 1 f  and his f d y  
will, wording to Trotsky, "awnmdate" so much cloth or 
woolens that in the long run he will became a capitalist and, 
who bows, ha may &I open a textile factory on !he basis of 
private ownership. The textile worker who is anxious to re- 
& more wheat flour and cabbage may hoard thew products 
-"mumdate" them-in the meantime refusing to consume, 
and--& "ctxtreme tension in the uphere of consumption"!- 
may still transform h i d  into the owner of a grain elevator 
competing with the State elevahz~ a d  awing "dm explosion 
in the ephere of production". Or elee the ~ I k t i v e  farmer 
who bas been so eagerly and impafientIy waiting to receive 
from the city hb radio set will not we it himelf but sell it 
to his neighbor and witb the money thua u a ~ u I a t e d "  go 
into buainew and gradually develop the "clam struggle3' and 
h o m e  a menace to the kolkhozm and the trusts. 
It is absurd, but there is system to all the Trotskyite absurdi- 
tise, Trotaky hapes hat beeawe consumem' goods are not 
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yet available in the U.S.S.R. in quantities s d c i e n t  to secure 
for everybody not only comforts but also luxuries, some peas- 
ants from the collective farms may still be deluded into putting 
their hopes in the knIaks-who are still to be found in col- 
lective fama disguised as Ioyal member-and, with the aid 
of the Trotskyites, cause a disruption of collective agriculture. 
Alas for Trotaky! The masm of the collective farms 
learned their lesson in 1932 when, due to inexperience, sume 
of hem yielded in the North Gaueaeus and the Ukraine to 
the pressare of the Maks. They know now that their hope 
lies in more 6u1d better collective production. The individual 
member of the collective may trp to hoard part of his share 
of the common crop "against a rainy day", but this will not 
make a knlak of him, and with the growth of security and 
abundance in the village even this practioe will soon be aban- 
doned. AB to the city workers, they never "aocumulate", they 
hoard nothing, they gladly and eagerly spend all they earn 
because they are not afraid of losing their jobs and are expect- 
ing and achieving ever higher w a p  and a better standard of 
living, There is no danger of a renewed class struggle "in 
the sphere of consumption" in the U.S.S.R 
To be sure, there exists a contradiction in this aphere: that 
h n  the facts and Trotsky'e wish- between a former 
revolutionia and a prmmt counter-revolutionary. He would 
like to see momulation of capita1 where there h a deeire to 
produce and comwne and where the masacs know from their 
daily experience that the more they prod= the more will 
they consume. He knows that the ma- have heard about 
the contradiction between mags production and a rtarrowing 
market in the capitabt countries, and he hastens to use similar 
exprdona in regard to the U.S.S,R, boping to delude the 
nnwary into believing that the crisis of capitalism-poverty 
amidst plenty-and the relaiive go& shortage in the U.S.S.R. 
-where the production apparatus had to Ix built up firat and 
where increasing production is rapidly eliminating the short- 
- one and the same thing. 
Nowhere ha Trotsky revealed himself more in his true 
colors ae counter-revolutionary falsifier as in these fabrications. 
What does he want? Baa he any plan? Hae he any program? 
Some time ago he a d d  the very profound proposal that 
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the Soviet Union slow up the tempo of industrialization and 
coliectiviaation. That was all in the name of "M" Corn- 
m a i m ,  "real" Communism. It was so much I i  Trotsky: 
revolutionary ~hrasea and reactiomry propodr. NOW that 
the Soviet Union has been put on a gradto foundation, wbool 
the workers and peasants are being supplied with aver greater 
masses of c o n s ~ r s '  goods, when b i r  knowledge and e q m  
. rience have increased a thousandfold, when they can, with 
ease and comfort, increw the output of a o r g  and field- 
what can he propose? Has he a program for today? 
In vain will you seek for an answer among the multitudinous 
: writing of Trotsky and his hemhen. 
In reality they are not oat to propm a program. They 
intend to confuse the workers in the capitalist countries who 
are not sufftciently familiar with &list construction in the 
, U.S.S.R They aim at discouraging the woxkers of the capi- 
talist countrieh including the workers of the U.S.A., from 
choosing the Bolshevik way oat of the crisis. They h e  to 
sow pessimism regarding the greateat achievement of the world 
proletariat-the only great and lasting victory of the &list 
revolutian in the p m n t  era. They are intent on preparing 
the masses ideologically for war against the Soviet Union. 
They serve the capitalist ends perfectly. 
From the Trotskyite pecufiar version of c ' p ~ e n t  rwo- 
XutionY'--to the theory of the impossibility of building social- 
ism in one country; from the theory of the irnpogeibility of 
, building socialism in one county-to counter-revolutionary 
attacks upon eveqth'q &at is being done ia the Soviet Union; 
from verbal attacks upon the stronghoIds of Communiam--to 
practical aid and comfort to the class enemy, Is them any 
wonder that the extreme I o g i d  followere of Trotsky and 
Zinoviev resort to the revofver? 
The Communiet Party 
"We are marching in it compact p u p  dong a precipitous and 
Wdt pa&, firmly holding Gach other by the hand. We are 
ennwmded on all aides by d e e .  and are under their a b t  
mrmtmt 6ra We haw d i n e d  voltmtarily, eapacially for the 
pu- of fiOhLiag the memy and not to mtreat into the adjacent 
marsh, the inhabitants of which, right from the very out&, have 
mpmached na with ha* stparated ourselw into an excluuive 
group, and with having h the path of amggle instead of the 
path of wndiation. And now ~ v e r a l  in our crowd begin to cry 
oat--let us go into this marsh1 And when we begin to ahamc 
thcm, they ratort: How wmmnive yon -1 Are you not 
aabsmsd to deny ua tho right to invite you to take a better road! 
"Oh ym, gentltmm1 You am frst, not ody to invite uq but 
to go yoarwlvw whmm you dl, into the marsh. in fact. 
we think that the 4 b p u r  proper plaeq and we arc prepared 
t o r e n d m y o n e p e r g ~ t a a m t o g ~ t b m #  Onlg le tgoofour  
hsad~, don't clutch at  us, and don't h a m i d  the grand word 
' fdom';  for we tw are 'fd ro go where we please, free, 
not only to dgbt &t the marsh, but also t h w  who are turn- 
8. towardo ths d" tV. L Lain, The !aha Period, Eagliph ition, VoL II, p. 97.1 
I N them h n t i f u l  words written in 1902 Lenin d m r i h d  the m4aning of revolutionary proletarian discipline fox the Bol- 
d u d  Party. The Par% t a volrmtary d t i o n  of people 
who agree to pmue the aama task and fight the same enemy. 
Inwdertobemoet&dvuPEseymnatkwpordmwi~their 
ranla They will tolarate diffsrenca of opinion but they will 
inaist on unity of d o n  The individual who disagrees with 
a decision hi free to leave, but while he ie a member, he may 
not pursue his own road in contradiction ta that of the Party. 
 om of opinion aa long as the  par^ hae not formed 
its own colIective opinion. Qnce this has happed then apinione 
contrary to the Party's muet not be spread h w e  that would 
be dimupti=. The more unity and cohesion among tbe Party 
members the greater the h of 
Thia ia now so evident that it hardly me& particalm strew 
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mg. Not so, however, with Trotsky. From the early days of 
hh career TxotsEcg develops a peculiar hatred for the bl- 
ievik Party organization, for B o l M  dhipline, for Bol- 
shevik unity of thou& and adion. C ~ I  this ware he fought 
b i n  for fourteen years, on this m e  ha has been hghng 
S t a h  lor twelve years, and on this acorn he ia fighting the 
Commuuist International. 
It was after the Second Congrew of the R- Social-Demo- 
cratic Labor Party, which form the great divide between Bol- 
icvism and Menahevium. The Balshevh under Leuin's lead- r ership advocated and wried through ths dacision to form a 
red Bolshevik Party where every member would be undar the 
control of the organization and doing work according to a 
mtral plan. The Menhvika, true ta their reformist mlf, 
advocated a Ioow organization in which everybody wtdd be 
actnalIy free to do as he pIeae5. Troesky went with tba Men- 
ahe* In a pamphlet published by the a d  of 1903 he mid 
about the oongreee: 
"The dead dictatsd theit will to the living. Wa haw b n  
offered for papcat a m d a  bin f a  tho dsbtr of dm xemnt 
past-and histoxy, with the m d m w a  of a ShyId,  h d d  
flmh from the living party organism Cum1 We had to 
pay. . . . Of co- we da nonot. mean to deny hamby tha p d  
mpodbility of Commie Lmin st the oaeond rmgrm of tho 
RS.-DLP* Thin man, with the energy and talent which are nab 
ural in him, played the rola of a party dbrganhrbrn (Z Trocslty. 
The Second C o n g r e ~  oj the R W  SoEiaEDBmmatic L a h r  
Party, Rep& oJ SiberiaR Dtkga~bh p. 1L) 
Here we have it in a nutshell, Tro+ carees the decision to 
form a real weltorganized ~~ Party. h n b  to him is 
the d i ~ o r g a b  of the party becam he i n a i d  on a party 
organbation in which petty-bonrgeoiar riff-raff, indipiduali8tic 
intelIectuals with their own fancy program and wilfnl tactics, 
wouId have no place. Tmhky exorcises eentta1h He thinka 
that centralim has a p d y  "formal meaning". In particular 
is he incensed agaimt Lenin'~ statement that the prohia t  
is more inclined to discipline than the iateUBdaale witb their 
anadhtic individnaliam. 
In another pamphlet dm about the same time he MJ": 
"What an indignation t a k ~  hold of you when yon rend thosa 
I~idcme wantonly demagogic lien [of Lain] l: The pmkukt, 
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that aama proletariat of which p a  m told only yesterday that 
it naturally d d t a  towad mde d o *  today aIready h d e d  
to 1- of pdMd & p b l  And to whom? To &at 
i a t d b ~ t u h  which, acwrding w tha scheme of yearmday, 
wa8 3 ~ p p d  to plap t h ~  file of bringing h o  the proletariat the 
class consciouenm ths political d o n s a e e s !  Yestenlay the 
p d d a t  wan sriu a w h q  in tha dnet, today it h a  bsen de- 
v a t d  to an unaxpected height1 Yesterday tba W g e n t s i a  was 
the bearsr of mialiat ooneeiotmws, today the gauntlet of factorg 
MpIine is being i& Bgainst it1 And this is M a d m !  
And thin Is S o c I a b W t i a  -1  Verily, it ia hpoasible 
to  at with greatar +durn tha beet ideological heritage of 
the proletmi& than hie k done by L a h I "  (L Trotaky, Our 
P o l i W  Tmks, 1904, p. 7%) 
Tm&y fails to understand ihe very fundamentals of the 
W a n  approach to the proletariat and the intelligentsia. 
It ia one of the basic ideas of Marxism that without a Corn. 
mini& Party the prohatiat will drift towards mere trada. 
uniwim The Commuuist Party represents the vanguard of. 
tha working claw, its beet elements, its moa courageous and 
intellipt d o n .  Here the knowledge of that part of the 
intellipteia which  ha^ identified itself with the working dass,  I 
is of great importance. This kind of intelligentsia helps shape 
the ideology of the working class. There is no contradiction. I 
in the idea that whiIe the bearer of the revolutionary theory 
and mlutionary practice is the vanguard of the working 1 
c l q  the revolutionary intellecmala also play in this vanguard 
an important parL And it is h o s t  a truiam that the prole- 
tariat ia more inclined t o d  dkiplioe, that it understands 
better the & of discipline than the petiybourgeoia in- 
telligentaia which may ~ y m p a t k e  with the labor movement 
but whi& has not identified itself with the working c l w  
Note with what contempt Tratsky spealw about the prole. 
tar& giving leasons of political discipline to the indligenteia. 
This was no awident. Trotsky takes under his protection the 
petty-bonrpisl intelligentsia. Over atrd over again he stresses 
the idea that the 8tudmts and other intellectuals may be of 
greater importance to the revoIntion than the profmional rev* 
oIntionh-&ose who give themselves entirely to the revo- 
lution, aa visual id  by LRnia. Note also the hatred for Lain. 
uNot an accidemt but a deap 'omen' ia tbs f& that she Ldw 
of the r d m m y  dg oJ our garfy [our emphh-MJ.0.J 
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1 Comrade Lenin, who i a  defending the tactical m d d a  of 
I turn Jacobi~li~m, was psychologically foxed to @w such a d&d- 
tion of SociaI.Democracy which ~epmenta nothing but a thaoret 
leal attempt at destroying the elaae cbsracter of our Panp. Y w  
a themetical attempt no h dangerow tbm the political id= 
of a h s t e i n  [the lder  of the Right revhimist wing 
of Social-Dsmocracy.-MJ.O.1." I IbSd, p. 
b i n ,  the leader of the r e a ~ t i o v  wing of the Social* 
Democratic Party! The words should be branded with hot 
iron on the forehead of Trotsky. 
For thirty years themafter he has baen d l h g  the BoE 
shevika the reactionary wing, the bureaucrats, the dictatom 
over the proletariat, the eplitters. In 1904 he declared that 
bin was preparing "a philosophid j d c a t i o n  for the split 
of the Party which he has conspired to accomplish in order to 
retain and comlidate the remnants of his army". 
Here is his classic formala of bl&evism to which he in 
clinging to the present day. 
"The barracks *ime cannot be ihe r & i i  of our P m  just 
as !he factory cannot ba its example. Tbase m e h d a  \rrin bring 
about a sitmiion that the party or-don will the parry, 
the Cmtrd Committea will m h  the party organization, and 
finally the 'dictator' wiIl qh the C m t d  Committea . . . 
The cornmittem will do all the 'directing' while %ha people remain 
I 
silent'. " 
This is how Trotaky understands the orgmiaation of a Bol- 
ehevik Pariy. 
Years passed. Trotsky had been taken into the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union and had fought under the direction 
of Lenin. He had beea devated to high posh. He had seen 
the Communist P a q  in action as l e a k  of the proletariat in 
a victorious revolution over one4xth of the 8dac.e of the 
earth. He had seen the aame paay Wting the most glorious 
hiatoric battles in the civil war for nearly three years. He 
had seen the Conrmunist Party working hand in hand wi& I and leading the massee of the paasaatry and &ua securing the 
victory of the mvolutioa. He bad men the beginnings of the 
period of reconstruction when, oat of an almost devaetated 
mantry, the proletariat began to build a new indtmtrial aystem 
which was to lay the foundations of socialism. He had seen 
hat which made victory possibleinitiative from below, 
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s t r e a m  of creative energy opened by the dictatorship of the 
proletariat aud d i i t e d  in a planned way by the Communig 
Party, 
This Party had been led all the t h e  by the great master, 
Lenh, who devoted a major portion of his gigantic powers to 
dm problem of building the Party. The Party in 1923-24 was 
juet b e g b i q  to reorientate itself along the Iines of economic 
reconstruction. It w s  tun@ to new &a&. It was c h & g  
its psychology from war time to relative peace time. The t d s  
of peace time were often emu more &a2t than those of the 
war. Readjwtmata, personal and organizational, were accom- 
p W  not without friction. The management of industrial 
&aim was not dways dcient. The inner-Party organization 
did not+& nd-always work smoothly. The Party had 
grown It was a proletarian party heading the first dictatorship 
of the proletariat in b world Imperfections b its organha- 
tion, unepemea in its function wem inevitable. 
Did the Party pomw enough inner democracy, enough d f -  
e&&m, enough kibilitg and courage to recognize these de- 
fects and to take measures to correct them? 
Wa cannot give here the history of the Communist Party 
of the U.S.S.R S a m  it to mention the Thirteenth Conference 
of the Ruaian Communist Party ( E o h h d )  that met in 
Jantlary, 1924 This conferem3 dimmed the inner-Party 
&u&w thoroughly. It critic$& shortcomings. Sharply and 
manfully it pointed om d hbga aa differexma in tha ma- 
terial situation of th & of the, Party; wnmxiom of 
Party memkm with bourgeois elements and ideological 
inflmce of the latter; deparhwntdism which is to be dis- 
tinguiabed from necessary specialktion and which bar a ten- 
h c y  to w e a h  tbe connection between Corrrmunists engaged 
in different branches of work; danger of lo&g ight of &e 
p r s p d v e  of aociaiist comhdon as a whole and of world 
revolntion; danger of N.E.P.-%mation on the  pa^ of 
workers who came into 010- contact with the bourgeois 
milieu; bureaacrati9ation of tae Party apparatur, here and 
there and the menace of separation from the masms that fol. 
Iowed therefrom. 
The sonferenm made a thorough rurvey of the aitaatioa Was 
it alarmed? There was no c a w  for alarm. The shortcomings 
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did not really endanger the exbkme of the Communist P q .  
The body of the Party waa sound. Its ideology was corm& 
The saurcea of ita vitality were inexhadIe. - T h e  S Q ~  
were the proletarian maaaes of the Soviet Union. TO these 
ma- the conference direGted tbe Party. The conferen08 
atated that "the confidence of the prohrian m a m  in ha 
Party has grown". l t  declared aar the Ufundamental taak" of 
the Party 40 m u i t  new member8 from the workera at the 
bench". 
"It h &a task of the Party organimtion to devote puticul~f 
attention prscimy to th% category of workcra, to & m q t h g  
poseible not to tsar them haray from prodnctivu + ta help 
them raise &air dtuml lewd, and in every poaeible mannw to 
make mier for them dm pdbility o f  actual participation in all 
 he affaixa af ths Party. The work of h m w h g  the pxnlttariau 
mra of the Party must in tbe wming few m ~ n b  form On9 of the 
mmt impPrtant mku of all Party o-tima." (Red&&n 01 
the Thirteenth Conjemm of th R t k h n  C o d  WoLshetikl 
* PcaW.1 I TroEBky was prwent at  thia confer- He had every chanm to p w t  his mriticimn and to offer r e  He had no ob- jection against the reeolurion, which wm adopted Imanimwsly. But after was over he published a pamphh entitled The 
New Cwrae, which ia a broadside againat the Bolshevik Party, 
again& itn old tusted leaders. His battle my was-''dugmms- 
tiw". In this pamphlet he prehda to be ha champion of 
the younger members as against thm who had been in the 
underground before the reevoIutioa He m h  the d o u s  
I statament that it is the students who are the "harmwbrn of 
the revolution {and not the workers or the workewbm- 
manists) l In his sood old manner he d d a m  that "the Party 
Iives in two stm.8~: in the uppar they ddde, in the lower 
they only h r n  about this decisionH (p. 9) .  He + of 
"bureaucratic self-contentednesar and ignoring of ahe moods, 
thoughts md requirements d tbe Party" (p. 9). He goep M 
far as to speak of an "oppo- &generation1' of the old 
Party m& (p. 11). Again ha ia afraid, as he waa twenty 
years earlier, that the "apparatus", the Central Commlttes, ia 
replacing the Party, 
Md Trotsky advance a pragram Werent from tbat 6f the 
s o d m a w ?  Could he advance one? Hu hnd no program d 
n 
hia own except one point which haa to be discussed in a Iittle 
M. He demanded "freedm of groupings" within the Corn- 
m d s t  Party. In reality what he handed  was freedom to 
split the Party into a number of sub-parties fighting each other 
and me exerdsing discipline over its members. He nevee 
gave up the viajan of a parliament in capitalist countrim 
That a party so split cannot lead a ra~olution, goes without 
8aying. 
Lenin was atill dive when Trotsky started bis opposition. But 
I 
already at that time h Iaunohed an attack against Leniniem. 
He spoke of the Communist Party as 'Yransfonming Laninism 
from a method, the application of which repuires initiative, 
critical thought, ideological muraga, into a dogma which re- 
quires only interpreters chosen once and for dl time", 
It waa not the s i t d o n  in the Party that dictated TrotsIry's 
"new mumn. It was nd tbe defects of the Party apparatu5. 
It wa6 the influence of the p i t y  bourgedsie outside the Party, 
ir was its hostility to BoIsheviam b a t  found expression in 
Trotsky'~ braadside. It was counter-revolution. Had L really 
k e n  crmtxmd with the revolution, he wodd have stopped 
his criticjam right after Len& death when within a few 
weeks one quarter million workera from the factories and 
plants poured into the Communint Party to replace, as they 
mid, hnb7s leadership by collectin Ieaderebip of the work- 
ers. Trosky did not stop. IEs sharpeaed his attacks, He formed 
a faction within the Party. T h r d  the propaganda of ihii 
faction he was undermhing the unity and the striking power 
of the Party* 
The Thirteenth Conferace of the Commnnist Party of the 
U.S.S,R characterized his opposition as "not only a k t  
moving-away from Iapinism but also a clearly e x p w d  petty- 
bourgeois trend downwaxd". 
Years p m  The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is 
going from victory to victory. Tts tada grow. Its work mumes 
gigantic proportions. Its theoretical equipment d e e p s  and 
broadens. Its unity becomes stronger. It is a monolith. The 
" ~ o p h e "  which Trobky predicted in 1924 did not ma- 
ter idh The ammation of king a party of Nepmen and 
kulaks was wiped off and made rididom by s u h p n t  
developments. And yet Trotsky maintains the same attitude 
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towgrd the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union that he bad 
towarde it in 1904, in 1914, and in 1924 Only in plao~r of 
Lenin he has now as a target of attack-Stalin. 
He .transfers his attack on Bolshevik party organhation to 
the international field. Centralism, now aa before, ia eo ab- 
horrent to his Menshevik coaceptiona that he wea in it the 
destruction of the Party. The Communist htemaiond, and 
the Communist Parties that form its national Sections. are jast 
AS obnoxious to him in consequence of their Bolshevik organ- 
ization, as wae obnoxious the BoIehwik Party under b i n .  
He uses the same invective3 against the CQmmunid I n m a -  
tional that became a habit with him in attacking the Bol- 
shevik Party of pre-revolutionary Russia. And alwaya he d- 
it ostensibly in the name of "inner-Party dernoc1'acy" and 
"freedom of criticism" which nobody is denied in the Corn. 
munist International. 
In one of his books Marx cita the German phil-pher, 
Hagel, as saying that all great world-historic facts and persons 
occur, as it were, twice. Marx says that Hegel forgot to add 
that they happen once as a tragedy, the wcond time iw a farce. 
Trotsky's ranting against the Bolshevik d o d  of oxganim. 
tion have never been a world-historic event. But if his first 
attack seemed to have the traits of tragedy and the second the 
traits of farce, then what are the third and the forth and the 
I hundredth? You would say they are grotesque if it were not 
for their counter-revolutionary eubstanca 
The following is as near a coherent explanation why the I Bolahcvik metbod of organization is wrong as can hs found in 
I his writinw 
I mlBol.herkn [he up] always didn.uishd i d  by a hiatodd 
I ecmmatixatbn in d8botating oxganhdon forms, but nor bg 
r d d  schemsa [the Enghh b the -lator's, not oms-MJ.0.1. 
The Balabeviks changed their o r ~ m t i o n a l  attacturn radieany s! 
every uamitioa fmm one stage to auothn: Haw, on tho tan-, 
on0 and tho same principle of kevolptimary organization' Is ap- 
plied to the powerful Party of the proletarian dictatomhfp as well 
' as to the- &man Commudmt Party, w h 3 1  p m u  a miom 
political factor, to the yo- C k h m  Party, which wan hmedi- 
I ately d r ~  into the vortex of rerolutiomuy aa d aa, 
finally, to the Party of the U.S.A., wbich d y  comhtlee but a 
sman. propagarada circla" (Leon Tromky* s m  of th rwkl 
Rm~oldon, 1459, pp. 7475.5.) 
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Not one iota ia true in all this "theory". Trotsky makes be- 
lieve he ia 6ghting for adequate organizational f o r m  whereas 
in reality he is fighting hgainst the fundamental Bolshevik or- 
ganizational princdpks. He is against the very essence of Bol- 
shevik organization which consists in having one undivided 
party, one party Iine, one policy, one leadership, whiIe 
changing the forms of organimtions and methods of work in 
accordance with changing conditions. He conveniently forgets 
that he a l q s  was opposed to Bolshwik organization which 
he now pretends to p r a k  He alwaya remained the petty- 
bourgeois individualist, the inheritor of the "lord of the 
mmor'sn (as Lenin called it) hatred for proletarian argani- 
%ation. 
What is the principle of Bolshevik organization? It is 
democratic ce~dim. 
* 
"DemotFatic r e n t r k  of h e  C o m m d t  PPsrty organistion 
mwt be a r d  ayntbesia, f h  of cantdam and prolatadan 
dwnacracy. This fwion can be a c h i d  only on the basis of 
continuom common action, mntinwuo common struggle of the 
entho Party orgunktion an a wftols Centralidon in a Com- 
munist Party merpzur, not formal mslchanical muslition, but 
ctntrdidun oj Communist action, Le,, the formation of a &u&r- 
ship that in strong, endowed with ePiLing power, and ffe*lb1e. . . . 
Only the andes of Communism can assert that the hmamnint 
Party, by virtue of leading the pmIstarIan claw rtrug%t and een. 
traliaing a Comm&t leadership, strim to domination over the 
wvolationary proletariat. This is a Ii&" (Thesis u] the Third 
C o n p s ~  of Clhs C o m d t  1 - 4  1921.3 
Democratic centralism aIlowa for a maximum of flexibility, 
a maximum of unity, a maximum of striking power. The or- 
ganizational principles of 3018hevhn are not a dead dogma 
but a li* and enlivening force. 
"The Party of rewIutionarg Marxiwn denim in principle dm 
search for an absolutely cormat form of party organization fit 
for all a t a p  of the revolutionary procew, or for snah abmlutdl 
correct methods of ia work. On the contrary, the form of organi- 
zation and ths metho& of work arc entirely determind by the 
peculiarities of a &en concrete historical situation and by rhs 
tasks that directly urine out of thin situation," ( R d u h n  oj 
the T e a h  Congress, Commnisr Party, USS.R, 1922.) 
Thew are the guiding principles of Bolshevik organization- 
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in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in the Corn- 
munist Partiea of the capitalist countria % Partiee d ; f f ~  in
stragh, in experience, in the concrete tasks codranting each 
of them, but they are united in their aim and in the prhciplm 
af their organization. Everywhere the Bolahds inaiat on 
compleie ideological unity, which means agreement of all Party 
members on basic principles and tac t ia  h all atages of devel- 
opment the BolAevik Parti- main& etrict discipline which 
is not mechanical but baaed on an understanding by every 
member of what is to be done and why. Bol&&k principles 
have proven sound and ftaitid for the organbation of the 
proletariat of the most advanced as well as of the compara- 
tively backward countria These are -tially prEnciplee of 
bottle formation, because the life of the Communist Party is 
m r  &at of peace, since even in the times of comparative 
quiet it heads the clasa struggle wEch always, in om way or 
another, has the elements of civil war. 
The shop d e u g  and the P- fradion-bm foundations 
of B o I s h d  organization--are btmments of proletarian ad. 
vmce both before, during, and after the revolution. They allow 
for the greatest adaptation to conditions and for the greatest 
unity of action. Jf Trotsky fails to ~~d why these foun- 
dations of revolutionary organhation are applicable both to 
the Soviet Union and to Germany as well ae to the Chinese 
Party, it is his misfortune, But that do- not do away with the 
fact that they have been singularly a u d u l  under all con- 
ditions. If Trotsky refers to the Communist Party of the United 
States he only defeats himaelf. It is because the Communist 
International did not wish to allow the C o m m d  Party of 
the U.S.A. to be a "small propaganda abcle" that it insited 
on basing the Party on shop nuclei and on developing fractions. 
A propaganda circle doear not need a BoIahevik apparatus. 
But a party oJ action, a Bolshevik Party leading masses in the 
class struggle, mmt pmws~ an apparatus which is rooted in 
the massee and which can move them by virtae of the dosest 
contact with them in the struggle for their everyday needs. The 
shop nucleus and the Party fraction are not  organha- 
lions walled-in in their own circle and hdated from the 
other workers. They must be the live wire in every factory, 
mine and workers' organbtion, defending the basic rights of 
7s 
the workers, mupying the forefront of every struggle and 
thus becoming the leudm of the mas=& 
It is obvious that if such an organization is not we11 organ- 
ized and well dkiplined, it will not be able to fulfil its task. 
r l  L& warned tirelassly against excesses regarding central- 
i d ' ,  aays Trotsky. Of course, Lmin wsrned against formal 
central& which is nw a synthesis of centralism and proleta- 
rian democracy. Of course he warned against r n m h k d  cen- 
tralism and advocated a living conne~aa'on between Party lead- 
ership and tbe ranbud-file Party members on the one hand, 
and between the Party and the broad proletarian massea outside 
the Party on the other. But as to discipline, this is what he 
wrote in the Conditions of Admittance to the Cornintern: 
"At the p m n t  epoch of eharpemd d d  war the Communist 
Party will be eble to fulfill ita duty only whtn it will be organid 
in the mast oentralized manner, ndy when there dl be dominant 
in it an iron diecipline brdering on military diwipline and when 
its party center will be a powsrful authoritative organ with broad 
juridiction enjoying the general confidence of the m d e m  of 
the Party." (V. I. Lenin, Collected Work ,  Rmian Wition. Vol. 
xxv, PP- a82-ZB3.3 
This is eaid about Party discipline where power bas nut yet 
h e n  conquered by the proletariat. As to a party which, like 
that of the U.S.S.R., is heading a dictatorship of the prole- 
tariat, Lenin said: 
"He who in the I m t  degree w u k m  the iFon discipline of the 
Party of the proletariat ( ~ c u l a r l y  &ring ite dictator&ip) 
a c t d l y  helps tha bourgmhie against the proletariat." {V. 1, 
hh, Cdlarctsd Vorks, R u s ~ b  Edition, Vol. XXV, p. 190.) 
Trotsky helps the bourgeoisie against ihe proletariat. 
As to factions. In Ki advmacy of "freedom of groupings" 
withii  the Communist Party Trotsky actually defended the in- 
terests of hmtile form against the interests of the proletaria11 
dass struggle. He is the factiondist supreme. He never worked 
in a masa o r g a t i o n  aar its loyal member. He dwaya man- 
aged to erg- around M m I f  a group, a clique, a retinue of 
admirers. He fought Leain, he fought S t a I i  he fights the 
Communist International. He o r g a n s  a factioa in 1- 
but was smashed. He organized a faction when tenia was alive 
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C in 1922. He maintained this faction for many pars although he publicly foreswore it several t i m s  (what is trot sky'^ word 
when he deals with the Bolshevik Party!). He subscribed pob* 
! licly to the decisions of the Fiftemth Conference of the Com- 
munist Party of the U.S.S.R. (October, 1926) which prohibited 
factions-and he immediately broke his pledge. 
"Without temporary ideological gronpinp, the ideological 
Iife of the Party is unthinkabIe9*, he writes in his S ~ g y  UJ 
the World R w d h n .  "Without a real freedom of Party life, 
freedom of diwussion and freedom of c o l l ~ c t i v m a d  under 
that also of group+daboration of their paths, these Parties 
[of the C.L] will never become a revolutionary power" 
(P. 75). 
W h y  are groupings necessary? Suppose the Party discu- 
the question of the best methods of work in the labor done. 
Suppose the majority agrees that the Communists mmt work 
in the reformist unions, must build them up to become a mil- 
itant organization. Suppw a minority ssye that the revolu- 
tionary workers must leave the reformist unions and form 
separate revolutionary unions of their own. As long as the 
question is not decided yet, every member of the Party baa 
the right and duty to advance his opinion when thb problem 
is discumd. This ia freedom of d iscdon Groupings are 
not necessary for this purpose. But suppom the majority of 
the Party has decided in favor of working inside the reformist 
unions. Under such conditions the minority muat atop agita- 
tion in favor of its line, What Trotsky proposea is that his 
minority be allowed to function as a p u p ,  that it h given 
freedom for "group eIaboration" of its 'path". What is that 
"path"? Obviously a fight against the majority of the Party. 
Either "freedom of groupingsy' means nothing, thea it is 
sheer nonsense, or it means freedom to form a p o r ~  within a 
party-that freedom which Trotsky took for himself d l  his 
life. 
Such "freedom" weakens the Party, underminee it, creates in 
the Party a state of seige and demorahs the forces of the 
revolution. When this happen$ mys Stab, the Party f faced 
"with the danger of being transformed into a plaything in the 
hands of the agenta of the bourpisiey', 
+ 
Trotsky calls himaelf "true Bolshevik-ninit, but the more 
he rants the more does he stand expomd as an enemy of every 
principle advocated and fought for by Lenin. His article in 
the reactionmy magadne, Liber&y, of March 23,1935, entitled 
"If M c a  Should Go C o d t " ,  is extremeIy illuminat- 
ing. Troteky spealcs to the bourgeoisie of America but of 
c o r n  he h a  in mind the workers. He trim to convince his 
readers that a revolution in b e r i c a  would be child's play. 
The M c a a  Communistic Revolution will be imiiificant 
compared to the Bolahmik Resolation in Russia", he declares, 
di&gardmg the fact that the American bourgeoisie is vastly 
better organid, enlightened and equipped than was the 
Ru&an bourgeoisie. The obvious Iwon for the workers from 
this Trotsky theah ia that there ie no need of organizing a 
Btrong Commuaist Party of great "Civil war.  . . isn't 
fought by a handful d men at the top-tha five or ten per cent 
who owns ninetenthe of American wealth", declares Trotsky, 
disregarding the great infIuence of those "five or ten per cent'' 
oa the middle class in the citien and on the rioh farmers. (It 
is highly significant that &c man who eaye socialimn in eke 
country is i m p d l e  because all the exploited clawses will 
t a r n e g a i n u t t h e p r o ~ a m ~ ~ P h a l a t t s r ~ p o w e r ,  
now b l f  md says that -body will be for sccial- 
ism as soon as the capitalist government is defeated--anything 
to delude the workers.) 'Everybody below this group [of 
five or ten per cent] is already economically prepared for 
Communismy'. says Troisky. Obviously, with such a great 
n& of ready C o m m ~ ,  tbere is no need of forging the 
ranks of a real proletarian party in b United States. 
"Withont compulsion!"- this is the slogan advanced by 
Trotaky for America, for the American Soviets. In a cammy 
where vioIence and bloodshed mark every step of the ruling 
claw in relation to the workers, Trotslq wishes to imprw on 
the m r k e ~ i n  true Norman Thomas-clergyman fashion- 
that "!he American Soviets wodd not need to resort to the 
drastic measares which circumstanm have often imposed upon 
the Russians". T r d ~  trim to kill two birds with one done: 
on tha one hand he a& to show that the Russian workers were 
wrong in using "too much1' fom and violenee against the 
cownter-revolution of the bourgeoisla and the landlords, on 
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the other hand he attempts to 'Leach" the American workers 
that their revolution will be a feast of amiable cooperation on 
the pert of the property-owning claswu and that the Iaainiat 
approach to revolution and the Leninist method of organiza. 
tion and struggle do not apply on thii side of the WHUI. Not 
in vain is Trotsky the father of the Lwestoneite theory of 
American "exceptionh". 
It must be noted, though, that T r o w  d w  not aee m y  
reason why the property-owning classes, with the exception of 
the heads of the Kigest trusts, should be alarmed by a Soviet 
RevoIution. He proposes to have them continue their bud- 
nesses on the baais of private o d i p  and private operation 
even after the revolution. The governmat, he says, must give 
them allotments of raw materials, credits, and quotas of orders 
until these businesses "were gradually and without cornpalsion 
~ucked into the socialkd business s+". The man who once 
raved against the New Economic Policy 3a the Soviet Union 
where it was an economic and political neceesity, now advo- 
cate~ a wide ~emi-capitaliat system in America for the period 
after the molution w h  h is no for it beeam 
the country is economicsJly ready for socialism. Anytb'i to 
corrupt the minds of the w o r ~ u p  to and iududing the 
reformism of the Old Guard leaders of the Socialist Party in 
America (why not p u r c h e  the businems from their owners 
at the price of governmentd bonds, as proposed by smne 
SociaIhts? This wil l  be even more "without compulsion".) 
Most eloquent, however, ia Trotsky's plea for burgeoia 
democracy in the American S w i d  Here he aompIetely ex- 
poses his naked political =If-a worshipper at the shine of 
the political system of capitalism, 
He envisages the American Soviet not aa the dictatorship of 
the proletariat but as e conglomeration of parti= and groups 
fighting each other. "Wxth ae [meaaiog Russia],'' he says 
in his Liberiy article, "the Soviets have been bureaucratid 
as a result of the poiitical monopoly of a single party.'' No 
such thing must ever happen in America, Not only must there 
h groups and grouplets within the Communist Party-more 
than that; the Party ik l f  must have no monopoly". 
There muat be several parties with equal righte, i.e., with no 
special privileges for any. Whom will  those parties represent? 
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ff the Communist Party represents the workers, then obviously 
the 0th parties mmt represent the rich farmem the poor 
farmers, the middle bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, ,per- 
haps t h  intelieetuals. How will those partierr funotron? I 
NaturaIly, by struggle. "A wide struggle between interests, 
gxoap, and ideas is not only conceivable-it is inevitable," I 
says Tmisky. Splendid A Soviet very ma& resembling. a 
qd rights. Each party fighting the others. Several parties 
making e coalition to defeat the dangerous common rival. Why 
not a coalition of all the other parties against the party of the 
workers? This latter party, in Trotsky's conception, should be 
split into a number of Iegalized g~oups nd factions with their 
own separate platforms. The population will have its choice 
of parti% groups, programs. No apecia1 discipline is needed 
for any party; no monolithic unity for the Communist Party. 
(It is characteristic that in his Gberty scheme Trotsky does 
1 bourgeois parliament. Several parties represented in it wiih 1 
not mention tbe Communist Party at all.) A majority of votes 
in the legishive chamber will decide the policy to follow. 
Among the majox questions thns to be fought out is also "the 
h ' d o d o n  of the farm'', i.e., the transition from capitalist 
to midist agriculture. Should there be a majority of voka 
qainat collectivization, this will then be the ''will of the 
pple". Each party aud g o u p  will have its own press, "for 
Soviet America will not imitate the monopo1y of the press by 
the heads of Soviet Russia's bureaucracy". Each goup and 
party will reoeive its share of the press "on the basis of pro- 
portional representation for the votes in each Soviet election", 
'We mum principle being applied to the nse of meeting halls, 
allotment of time on b air and so forth". 
Underlying this idyllic picture is a conception of a Soviet in 
which private business flourishes and the State organization is 
copied after capitalist parliaments. The assumption is that there 
is no counter-revolution, no attempts on the part of the Bonr- 
p i s i e  to overthrow the new system, no necessity for the work- 
ers to defend the revoluticm against attacks from within and 
without, no necewity, therefore, to be organid in a powerful 
fighting politid organization with discipline of an almost. 
military &hem and with unity of will and action which in- 
cares quick and effective striking poaaibilitie~. What Troay  
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I pictures is not a proletariat organized in fighting formation 
and drawing to itself allies from o h  fonnerly o p p r d  
, elasses whiIe suppressing counter-revolution and abalishing 
cIamm, but a heteropneolls mass of humanity divided, owing 
allegiance to various parties and party splintera and defending 
their "intemts, groups and ideas". How mity can be a c h i d  
under those conditions, remains 8 ~ecret of Troteky's. But then 
he does not worry much about unity because bis slogan is, 
'Without compulsion ! " 
The petty bourgeois, afraid of a strong proletarian State, 
afraid of a strong proletarian party, unwilling to aee the pro- 
letariat exercise revolutionary power--shows here hi c l w  
nahrre more clearly then he haa ever done this before. 
What he p h e s  as the A m h  Swkt lras nothhg to do 
with the dkhtorship o/ the p r o M  orb sough and p r d  
by L e n h  
m a  dietatorship of the proleidat ia the mat atubhm, the 
I m o a * a c u r e , i h e m a s t ~ s ~ e o f t h e w w ~ ~ t  tho nwre pmerfd  m m y ,  tha bonrgwiaie, nhow h baa p w n  tenfold after It h a  k e n  overthrown. The dictatomhtp of tL prolemiat ia a stubborn 8&uggle, bloody and b l o d e q  vio- 
lmt and peaceful, military and ~wnomic, gedagogiEal and ad- 
miniutratim egainal the powem and tl.aditiona of zba old W P  (v. L Lcnin, C d e d  r0~A-q llwh Edition, Vol. XXV, pp, 
173-190,) 
The reason for Trotsky's "criticim" and " w ~ ~ s "  is 
very simple. Whatever does not fit bis hurefaoia parhmmky 
ideas he &nounma as "bnreaucracy". Whatever m t s  real 
dictatorship of the proletariat, red proletarian r e v o l ~ ~  
unity, the petty bourgeois in Trotaky decries as "psrrJyP;trQ; the 
revolution". A true Bolshevik Party molded dong hm 
iines becomes a "Stalinist faction". 
VIII 
The Anglo-Ruedan Committee . 
HE Trotskyite attitude tow& the problems of the wodd 
T m o l u t i o n  is an o11tpowth of %tsw basic error about 
the impossibility of Soclalim in one country. 
Out of numberIes.4 questions we select the following as 
typical : 
The Ang 10-Rueeian Unity Committee ; 
The Chinese Revolution; 
The question of tbe Third Period; 
The quedon of aocial-faschn; 
The German situation. 
The crowning glory of all these policies appears in the shape 
of that mawelous new etmcture, h e  Fourth Interndbnai. 
f + l  \ 
The Anglo-Ruian Unity Committee was organid  in 1926 
for the purpose of bringing about common action of the work- 
ers against imperialism, against war, and for world trade- 
uaim unity. It consisted of representatives of the trade 
unions of the U.S.S.R. aad of he British trade unions. It was 
to bring to the British workers and to the workers of the world 
a better understanding of the situation and aims of the Soviet 
work- to help revolutionize the British workera in their 
fights against British imperiaIism, and to increase the influenoe 
of the Soviets among the workere of the capitalist countries. 
Why did the leaders of the Br iW trade unions a m  to the 
formation of such a mmmittee? Became the workers in Great 
Britain and other countries were becoming radicalized; be- 
muse the influenee of the Bolshevik revolution among the 
workers of all countries was growing; becam the trade unions 
of the U.5.S.R i m p w d  the workern of other countries as 
sharing in tbe State power of h e  Workers' Republic, and 
becam the Communists everywhere advocated the necesity ! 
of unity of the working masses on the economic field 
W h y  did the leadera of the Soviet trade unions agree to enter I 
such a committee? They knew perfectly wet1 the character of ' 
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even the "Left" wing of the British trade union leader@: P u r d ,  
I Cook and others. But they saw in this committee an opening for 
contact with the broadest masses of Europe. The committee was 
a aoauding board from which the voicea of BoJahePism would 
be heard on s wider range among tbe workers of England and 
other countries. Above all things they saw in it a weapon for 
she defense of the Saw& Umim at a time when the imperialim 
were perfecting their plans for an attack on the Soviets. The 
tradition of the proletarian Actwn C ~ r n ~ t k e ~  against Britisb 
htemention in the Soviet Union in 1920 was dl freah. 
Through the Anglo-Russian Unity Committee the question 
. of a u n k d  /rod of straggle again& capitalism and war was 
presented to large masses of toilers in the capitalist wun- 
; tries. Delegations of n o n - p q  w o r k  to the Soviet Union 
are a common oecurrencu Purcell and his m a d m  were 
allowed to come to the U.S.S,R and were accorded friendly 
 tio om. h exchange, representativ~ of the Soviet Union 
were given a chance to appear before broad ma- of the 
Britisb workers to present their revolutionary viem. 
The opposition was "against". 
In a pamphlet by the thmretician of Trotskpiam in the 
United States, Max Shachtman, the arvsertion is made tbat 
the Anglo-Russian Unity Commitkc waa 4 political bloc 
hhveen the reformists of England and the Russian party 
bureaucracy" (Ten Years, p. 39). As a m a w  of fact it was 
not a bloc; it was not even an alliance; it was a c o d  
for the propaganda of trade d o n  unity. Tt was a committee 
that opened up before the Soviet d o n a  the possibility of 
exposing even the "Left" leaders when the occasion arose. This 
came about after the collapse of the general #trike in Great 
Britain in May, 1926. The British leadera of the Anglo-Rw 
sian Committee then swung to the Wt; they begm to hide 
from the British w o r k  their beloaging to the unity com- 
mittee; in fact they were trying to wriggle out from under the 
obligations agreed upon by entering the committee. Thii 
I gave an occasion for the Soviet trade unions to appear Mom the British workers and to explain to them the treadmom dle of the 'lieft" union leaders. And it was just at thie moment that the Trotskyites became most vociferous, demanding the breaking up of the committee. 
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An ingenious theory ia presented by he above mentioned 
Trotslry dhciple in the United States. He stresses ''the falsity 
of the conceptian" that such leaders as Pur~elI, Cook, Hicks, 
Swales, and Citrim can become '?be revolutionary orgauhem 
of the world's working dass against imperial& war and for 
the defense of the Soviet Republic". Oh profound theoretician! 
Oh penetrating tactician! The Communia had to wait until 
1933 to learn this consummate wisdom about the reformist 
leaders remaining reformist leaders. Mr. Shachtman conve- 
niently forgets that when the united front h built in which a 
reformist leader is jorced to join, it is not the feder  but the 
w e s  under his influence that are won for the defense of the 
Soviet Union and for other revolutionary tasks. 
Mr. Shachtmaa clinches his deadly attack with this broad- 
side: In the Anglo-Russian Committee he sees the hand of 
the "Stalinists" who are frantically in aearch for "anti-inter- 
ventionisis" and who attempt convert rhe C o d 8  Pap 
t i e s  into Swkt bordkr patrols". (Ibd., p. 39.) 
Mr. Shackan does not want the Communist Parties to be 
border patrols of the Soviet Union. Why should he if the 
Tro&akyites do not think that socialism is being built in the 
Soviet Union? He sap ao quite plainly: 'The Stalinist con- 
ception of the r6le and nature of the Anglo-Russian Com- 
mittee flowed directly from the theory of socialism in one 
country. According to the latter, Russia could build up its 
own nationally isalated socialist economy, 'if only foreign 
military intervention could be staved off." To the Trotskyites 
this is not so. The staving off of foreign military intervention 
therefore is for them not the prime task of the international 
proIetariat. 
One more thing should be noted in connection with the 
Anglo-Russian Committee. Just at the time when the sititua- 
tion became more Wcult,  when the betrayal of the British 
general s t r h  raised greater obtacle~ in the way of the Soviet 
approach to the Britih workere, when it was necessary to use 
more patience and more flexibIe tactics in relation to these 
workers, the opposition shrank before the difficulties. In true 
petty-bourgeois fashion it fell into a panic. The expeasion of 
this panic was the demand of withdrawal. The demand sounded 
"ult~a-revolutionary". It w a d f e a t i s m .  
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The Chinese Revolution 
HE Chinese Revolution is, next to the Rmian Revolution, Tths greatest achievement of the toiling ma- of the world. 
For the first time in history, world imperialism was shaken 
in one of its strongholds-in a backward country which was 
rutblesdl1y robbed by British, French, Japanese and American 
canital. The Chinese Revolution is excellent proof of b 
c&rectneas of Marxism-Leninism, which seen twg fu.ndlwnend 
jorces of world revolution: the proletarian movement in the 
capitalist countries and the nahomi-liberation movement in the 
, colonies, and which insists h a t  these two major forces be 
united in one common front against the common enemy, im- 
perialism. 
The theses on the colonial and national problem presented 
by Lenin to the Second Congress of the Communist Interna- 
tional (1920) say: 
The Chinese Revolution has been, in the lagt decade, the 
greatest force that was shaking capitalism in its colonial aspect 
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I "European capitdim draws its power mainly, not from the .industrial European coun~riea, but from its colonial domainn. $or ib d t e n c e ,  control over vast coIoniaI markets and a broad 1eId of exploitation are necessary. . . . 
"The ~uperprofib received from the colonies are the chief source 
of meam of modern capitalism. The European working clltsdl 
will succeed in overthrowing the capitalist eystem only whem thia 
mum will dry up. 
V h e  separation 01 i th colonies [from their "motberlande"], 
and the proletarian rewrlution at horns, wid m t h r o m  the 
cqddLs# system in Europe. Consequently, the Communist Inter- 
nation81 must keep in the closrrst contact with t h e  rmlntionary 
forces which at  presunt are engaged in tho work of ovsrthrowing 
imperialiem in the politically and eoonomimlly o p p d  mu- 
trim. For the complete success 01 sAe wrld  r d & h  common 
ection of h t h  these /or& is nccesswy.'' [Our em-.- 
11 J.O.] 
-by attempting, and partly succeeding, in taking away from 
it the mntrol over a vast semi-colonial market and a broad 
field of exploitation. 
Witness the spectacle of the Chin= Soviets today. The 
Red Flag with the hammer and sickle is waving over a terri- 
tory embracing a population of some ninety million-about 
one-fifth of the total population of China. There is a Central 
Region, dl d e r  Soviet de, and there are outlying other 
regions in which scattered Soviet districts are located The 
~o&s have a Central Government and local governments 
e o ~ f s W g  of w o t h  and pcaaanta and led by thc~ommunist 
Party of China, which earIy in 1935 counted over 44l0,000 
nmembefil. 
New life is stirring in this oasis of peasants' and workers' 
rule in the midst of an imperialism-bound, impoverished, and 
down-trodden country! Free people, maaterg of their own 
destinies. F m  toilem marching under the leadership of the 
Communist Party and the Communist International toward 
the d d i s t  system. The system is not shal ism yet. There 
can be no nationalization of the land until the major part of 
China is in the hands of the revolution and until the Soviet 
territories are fully consolidated; and there can be no con. 
firnation of the factories and shop-wbich are not large in 
the Soviet area-until Soviet Power is spread towards the 
more industrialized sections of the country. What has been 
achieved under the Sovieis, however, lays the foundation for 
the future socialist which will be the next stage of 
the Revolution. Power, State and lml, ia in the handa of the 
toilers and is wntrolled by the Communist Party. The 
a d  forces of the State are in the, hands of the toilers. The 
workers are occupying a Ieading place. They have the 
atrongesc representation in the Soviets. There is real revolu- 
tiona ry unity between workers and peasants. 
The Red A m y  of the Chinem Soviets has become the wonder 
of the world. The Soviet armed forces count in the neigh- 
borhood of one million men, of whom at least 400,000 are 
in the regdar Red Army while the other6 forrn irregular de- 
tach-  The Red Army is the real army of the people. 
In case of d more and more workers and peamta join both 
the reguIar and the irregular f o q  also the Red Guards 
who carry military duty in the rear. The Red Army of the 
Chinese Soviets, like that of the U.S.S.R., is not only a milihry 
but also a cultural force. Palitical education is conducted 
in the ranks, and Chinese Soviet victories are explained not 
only by the =@or organization of the armed form but also 
in the main by the fact that the lighters are defending what 
is dear to them-heir o m  Soviet fatherland. 
' A letter from a Chinese Soviet Republic, written in the 
spring of 1930, desc:* how a Soviet is organized. 
"At the present time Sovietized weatarn Fukim is an entirely 
diiletent world from the rent of the pmincen where the Kuo- 
mintang ia still in control. After tbe victorious rwolt the p m t a  
I divided the land among themdm and the wag= of &a workem 
were m i d .  The ntandard of living of the toiling maem has 
been changed drast3cally. D a e l  on land, promiwry no- 
mortgagmi and the like all wwa burned. The sIogao 'no rent t~ 
rhe landlord, no tax- to &a Kuomintang authoritiw, no payments 
to Lhe usartrs', now bacama redid. The old oolIsctlag & 
anr gone, tba tax collactore are sh~t.  Plow we are d o h  our 
best to help olhec wunrsica to get rid of b e  r e a c t i d  and 
to start construction work; to increaaa pmdn&n, to h p m  the 
irrigation eymtem of the rim fields, to repair the roads, to open 
 school^, ete. 
"In ewry coun~y of westem FubIm there ate Svietn. . . . 
Everybdy of 16 pears of age or ~ g ;  of hth -can vote 
and be elected. Only tbow who beIong to the exploiter dase 
are disfranchised. . . . At this moment all the deputimm from the 
poor peasants, work- mldiq  dut ionarp  stud- and 
tradeamen. 
'The Soviet g o w e n t  has etarted redamntion work. Everg 
ptaaant now receives enough water for the irrigation of his 6e1da. 
. . . We have moperah ~ o c i e t i e ~  . . . credit awciatiom whw 
we, the peasante, can borrow money without behg robbed bg the 
money lenders. . . . N i t  comes for addm are erg- . . . 
Among the delegatee c h e d  to the Soviato them am women; 
women have become r q a l  with man in ewry respect. Their m- 
lutionarg zeal is not inferior sithtr . . . you may sea them evm 
in the Red Amy. 
"We have no thimq no beggars in our territory. Ev;verybody 
ran work . . . Thm who am disabled am taken care of by the 
Soviets . . . we opened hospitals and phatmacim with no 
for their sedcm; if previolwly the peasants had no place to 
turn to d m  ill, except to Pusa, the Buddbiat gad, now d~ come 
ro the Soviet indtntions. . . . Every commdty bas ita own club, 
which aewa not for recrtatioa alone but for cnightenment as 
well." (Victor A. Yakhontoft, The Chinese Souieks, pp. 83-90.] 
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Six warn have been waged by the Nanking government 
again& the Chinese Soviets in the last five years, and all of 
them have failed The sixth war (they call it "Expeditionn 
in China) started about September, 1933, and Imted ti11 the 
end of 1939 The plan of attack was elaborated by an old 
servant of the Kaiser, the German General Van Swckt, now 
chiefsf-staff of the Nanking armies. Chiang Kai-shek can- 
centrated between 65 and 70 divbions agaiust the Soviets, 
each division numbering 7,000 to 10,000 men. He had field 
artillery, tanks, and 300 airplanea, partly purchased in the 
U.S.A. on money borrowed under the guise of a "wheat and 
cotton loan". B ~ B  pIan was to surround the Soviet district 
from a11 aides and drive the Red Army out of its territory step 
by step. 
What was the outcome? He lwt, in the central Soviet dii- 
trict done, over 100,000 men, among them 40,000 to 6,000 
kilIea, l2,ooo to 15,m p b l ~ e r 0  and 40,m to 45,000 
wounded. All the troops of the Saechuan militarists, num- 
bering about 30 to 35 divisions, were defeated and lost, about 
70,000 killed, At the same time the Red Army kept on grow- 
ing; in varioue districts its etrengih i n c d  from SO to 1,000 
per cent. The Fourth Red Army alone grew in one year 
from 15,000 to 140,000-150,000. During this campaign 
the Sovieb lmi some territory but the Red Army mupied 
new territorirs in various districts twice the size of the one 
lost. This is nothing new in the history of the Chinese Soviets. 
They may be f o r d  temporarily to evacuate one place- 
they occupy others. Even the enemy is forced to admit that they 
have wme to my* 
Comsider their &a@c sitnafion on the battle front between 
capitalism and Socialism. Here is the Soviet Union, strong- 
hold of the world proletariat and of all the oppressed. Here 
is Japanese imperialim, whioh has swallowed Manchuria, 
has occupied Jeltol province, ie making attacks on the Mon- 
golian People's Republic-all in preparation for the ultimate 
attack againat the Soviet Union, Here is Qliang Kai-shek, 
the head of the Nanking government, a servant of Japaneae 
imperialism, car* out all the dictates of the Japanese 
war-lords and allowing them to s t r e e n  themelvea at the 
expense of China in order to be able to advance against the 
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I U.S.S.R Here are the imperialbts of England, the United Stam, and 0th- who ate jealous of Japanese imperialii  and who would like to take a &am of the loot of China but allow Japan to proceed becauae she ia the qearhead of world imperialism against the Soviet Union in the Far East. And here, 
in he very path of Japanese and world imperialism, in one of 
the most fertile and densely populated aections of China, m- 
pying a large territory in the Southeast and stretching towards 
ha central provincaar, stands the Soviet Republic of China-* 
bulwark against world imperialism, and the  dona^ 
government of the landlord8 and capital* of China itself. 
OaEeiL of the U,SS.R, no greater rde has ever been played 
by any cot~ntry in the w d d  in the p t  hbtorical m&t 
between the dietatorebip of capitalism and the di-rahip 
of the proletmiat. 
In a document presented by the Japanese government iate 
in 1932 to the League of Nations Commiwion of Inquiry, the 
so-caIled Lytton Commission, we read: 
'The futum of the Chinese Communist movement in a mattor of 
wrioue concern and d i d t  to deal with. On the snrfaca, the 
movemat may appcar like a casoal phemomemn, begun in 1920 
with the formation of the Cbineae C o m t  P m  md tbmugh 
Cornintern machinations. But, sa s matter of fact, its origin lies 
deep in t b  peculiar social, economic and political conditions of 
China; md d e e e  fhteo are rsmovad, the m o m  wiU not sad 
but in dl l&&hood will expand The Nanking pvarnment in 
ita preseat etato of impotmcy cannot k erpected to aocompllah 
the taek of clearing China of Red A d e n  and Soviet areas. 
Fortunately, tIte latter me yet gcagrapbicdy aepmted from 
R w i a .  In tJLe IWRC they a h &  u&&h dhct gwgpphic 
COR~OE* &ng the borders of Siheria, Outer Mongo& w Twh- 
ran, a s i t m t h  might arise #hut no Chineae gommwt  mdd w 
cope with alone. [Our emphasis-MJ-0.1. The Sovietization of en- 
tire Cbina i s  not an abmlute impossibility. And w h  the COP. 
biition of a Red Chma with 400,000,000 people and immaaaurable 
natural resourcee and tho Soviet R w i a  p o d g  onesixth of 
tha 6 ' 8  surface might rmran to the world-4 say nothing of 
their neighhr elates, such an Japan-is a qwstion that ahodd 
ba borne in mind in following the trench of the Communist 
mwement in China." 
Assuming even that the Japanese g o v e ~ t  o d  
somewhat, it muat be #id that the pichue as a whole is cot- 
rect. The strongest enemy of Communism in &% Far h t  
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sees dearly the danger of the Chinese Soviets for Japaaese 
imperialism and world imperialism. 
The Chimare Soviets and the Red Army ere the strongest anti- 
imperialkt power in China oflexing resistanm to the exploita- 
tion of China by foreign capital. They are a beacon Iigbt for 
the toiling masees of the other Chin- territories. They show 
how, when the Nanking rigime is overthrown, the life of the 
m a w s  immdiateIy improves and the agents of imperialism 
are destroyed. They rally tbe sympathies of every Chin- 
patriot who earnestly wlshee to me the foreign yoke over- 
thrown. This is why the Chinese Soviets are now in a position 
to win over to their side not only rank-and-file soldiers from 
the Nanking army but whale armies, induding the lower corn- 
mading d s .  And this in why the Sopieta of China are 
invincible and their territories are growing. 
In an intemiew given to the correspondent of tha Japanese 
monthly, C h  Ym Gun Lhn, in June, 1933, Chiang G-ahek, 
commander-h&ef of the Nanking armies, gave &e follow- 
ing explanation of the mortal blow dealt hi armed form 
by the Red Army: 
"It i~ wry a u l t  to find aut who in tho I d  population is 
a pod and who a bad dsment Beaid-. the regular mi@ of 
the Red Army them an also partisan dtt8ehmsnw that is, m- 
c a l l e d p c a s a n t ~ .  . . T h e w p M j 8 a M ~ e r 1 * i r h t h t  
mame3 wage parlisaa warfare ae objsctivc conditions may mquh, 
aiming to &row tbe rear of ithe &itionmy f m  into aw- 
fusion or to make ~ u q r b e  attach on unite which attend to the 
supply of the @donarp fo-, 
"They a h  do rsconaoiteFing, ntir up dieontent m n g  o u ~  
troops md ~amouflage the p h  where the &r Eltd Armyi 
troop am dhabcd. En h r t ,  they do mrytbing in tbdr p o w  
to h t r a t o  our plans. . . . Wen they am not fighting they work in 
tbs iddn, but whtntver thay me needed tbty all arm t h m d v e n  
and come to tha aid of the Commnniet army. . . . Precisely bt- 
cam it is  impoddo  to draw my line h e e n  I good c h n  
a d  a l e d  panha, our troop cannot but fed that 'the enemy 
is lnking eyqwhem'. E m  ia diatricta whem tbe popuktion 
hnu not yet been contaminated by Communist &ti-, the 
also fed that there will be no rest until Lhe whole population h a  
bssn wipd  out. 
"This &dty gives rim to tba hardships mcouatered by the 
expeditionary forcee which I will earnmark scr follow: L It 
hsa absolutely f m d f 8  to p! food supplice or m y  per- 
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sand servicee performed for tha troop; 2. The population d the 
disthcto bordering on or only nmr the bandit &trictn tiurn Red 
more and more f m q U ~ 4  for fear of bdng m~~mcred without 
exception by the mpezhionaxy hn (Qd by Wan bQins, 
R e d u t b n w y  CMRa To&, pp. 39-40.) 
I What is Trotalry's stand in relation to this great center of 1 world revolution? 
1 We will appreciate Trotslry d e n  we recall that in 1929 and 
1930, the period of the formation and e x t d o n  of the Chineas 
S o v i a  Trotsky caUed the Red Army "bandits" and that after 
the temporary retreat of the revolution at the end of 1927 and 
early 1928 he kept on shouting "defeat, defeat and defeat", 
"decline, decline and decline", declaring the atkmpte of the 
firat leaders of the Red Army, Ho Lung and Yeh Tin, to be 
"adventurd', proclaiming the Soviets to be a malicious S t a h  
invention, and continually harping about the "strangled revo- 
lution", about the Communist Party of China kmg "defunct", 
about Stalin having "disarmed the Chinese revolution" and 
"stabbed it ia the back''. At the time when Congremes of 
Soviets had already been organized in numeroue districts of 
Kiangsi, Hupeh, Fukien, Hunan, Kwangtung, Kiangsu, Anhwei, 
Chekiang, Honan and plans were made for the first All-China 
Congress of Soviets, Trotsky kept on lamenting &at Stalin, 
". . . dmrdhated the- Chinese w o h  to the b o d  put 
eha brakca on the agrarian mmmmt, s u p p o d  the 
generals, djsarmad he workem, pmmd ths appmamcu of h 
viste end Iiquidated tbww that did appear." Ikon Trot&, 
Stdin ond the Chinese R d l i o a ,  w r i m  in A-t, l99Q. La. 
duded in Trolly's hk, Probbms o/ tk C-4 Red&% 
pp. 307.308.) 
Like many of Trotaky's "attitub", this negation of the 
Chinese Revolution and this blaming on Stalin of imaginary 
evils which are just the reverse of historic facts, may seem 
crazy to the uninitiated. As a matter of fact it hae logic, 
counter-revolutionary logic. It spring from hia  ~ I W ~ C  Men- 
shevik conceptions. It b in absolute harmony with his cam- 
ter-revulut ionary attitude toward revolution, the Soviet Union, 
and the Communist International, 
The man denies the building of socialism in the Soviet 
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Union,-why &odd he not deny the existeam of Soviets in 
China? The man ~M&S that Stalk has destroyed the R ~ a n  
Revolution-why should he not say that Stalk has destroyed 
the C h k s ~  Revolution? That the facts which are glaring in 
fha face give the lie to all his awiertions has never bothered 
him in the leaat. 
In his attitude toward the Chinese Revolution, in his "ad- 
vice", 'kecommendations", u ~ ' ' ,  and "memoranda" deal- 
ing with the policy of the Cornintern in Cbina, his line of 
counter-revolution, always decorated with "ultra-revolntion- , 
ary" phr- d i b l f  even more than in his attitude 
toward the Ruedm RevoIution. Here we have Trotskyism in 
a wnwmtratad form,-so to speak, the quinkwmae of 
Tr0talq-h. 
To begin with, he amumed a Menshevik position as regards 
the very natare of the Chinese Revolution. He failed to me 
that it was a revohtion for national liberation in a semi- 
colonial country, where the basic driving force was the agra- 
rian revolution againat remaants of feadalism. To him there 
was no basic difference between China and any imperialist 
oountry. 
h e  need not adduce much proof to the effect that Chins 
is a semi-colonial country on the one hand, a semi-feudal 
country on the other. By the beginning of the second Chinese 
Revolution in 1925 (the firat took pIace in 1911 and liberated 
China from the monarchy), China was enslaved by foreign 
imperia~iab both economically and politically. About 80 per 
cent of the Chinese railways and 78 per cent of ocean and 
river navigation were in the hands of foreign capital. A 
network of fomigacontrolled banks pumped the life blood 
out of the Chinese population. Foreign trade and customs 
r m u e s  were in the handa of foreign imperialists headed 
by Great Britain. The imperialists establi~hed low tariffs 
on goods imported from their countries-to the detriment 
of 1-1 Chinese manufacture. The foreign capitaliste had 
a monopoly of tam on salt, wine and tobacco which, ia 1931, 
~ielded 245,000,000 Chinem dollare. The best coal mines, 
oil wells, docks and machine shop, d&c station#, chemi- 
cal plmq flour mills, cotton, sugar, tobacco, paper, match 
milla were in the hands of foreign capitaliets. Foreign capital 
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I 
d gendarmerie for the protection d 
ial establkbents. They secured 
and freedom from 
They ham so.called con- 
like a state within a atate 
m China. The Internati ement in Sh- ie p v -  
, court. 
Tkis is how a Chine patriot described the sitmation: 
UFimt a man in biack cl& (mimionairy1 comse to me and 
snyn, %YB mt like thy brorhsr, e h  I w i l l  send yon m rowt in a 
big f-ce in the beyond'. Then a man in bright doh- 
to ma with g d n  and rays, 'Buy rhis t r d  for a high priw, dm 
I will complain 10 h a  man in nhb clothm with the big pi'. 
Finally the man in whim d o h  comes and mys, 'YOU do not 
want to h the man in black do- ea your bmthsr, yon & not 
trrant to buy tb8 p& for a gOOd prioa from th8 man bright 
dotha, That being the cme, get out and leave your hotmse and 
your Celd to the man in black ~ 1 0 t h ~  and to ths man in bright 
dothea, or else I'll kill you'. But hefora I saoaeed in o& 
mouth he kills me anyway, and all three af thnm ara hdiag It 
wer mt: ths one sphklea me with water, tbe o h  ermpdoll my 
pockeh the third thmw my My to the d-. Than thop d 
taka away my h o w ,  my Imd, my wif6  my ohildren and tbs 
holy imagoa of my mwtors.'' (Quoted by P. C-8 
R e v o k h ~ ,  p. 21,) 
Foreign & r n i ~ i o n ,  whkh mpped Chinu and sftctsCdd h 
growth, w om of & maman sources of the Chinese RmoWon. 
Foreign domination was inextrieably b k d  up with war- 
lord and hndhrd rude in China. The wa~-1md with his mer- 
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cenary army wan cawying o a  the will of the imperialists ia 
side of Chin- reward for their aseistance renderad him ia 
keeping the Chinelre people under his iron heel. The war-lord 
+ma1 of them ruled over &a, the most powerful lmiq 
Chang Tso-lin, the dictator of the North--was som 
like a Tsar, i.e., a semi-feudal despot. His power WM '%! b 
on the power of the local landlords who combined, in 
feudal fashion, economic, administrative and judicial porn 
over the peasants. The landlord lived on tbe sweat and 
blood of tha pew&. 
In the early 'twenties of this century statistics showed that 
2,800,000 landlords held over om-laalj of the total tillable am 
of a typical section of China, whereas 31,000,000 peasante (the 
lower two groups) held together less than dI the landlords. 
As a result the peasants could not conduct an "economy" om 
their own d l  pieces of land and had to rent land from the 
Iandlords, paying for it between 60 and 90 per cent of the crop. 
The te3larrt hsd to eupply the landlord with a certain numbar 
of chickens and ducks and with a certain amount of wine free. 
h i d e s ,  he Bad to work a certain nlrmber of daye for the land- 
lord Out of every hundred peamnts in central and southern 
China, 40 were tenants, 28 semi-tenants, and onIy 32 owned 
their lams. A11 peasants paid exorbitant taxes. B & h  tEw 
main tax, there existed a number of special tam:  for the 
army, the militia, the garriaom, the guards, ew-411 in all 
about 30 kinds. The ple~aanta were often forced to pay their 
taree in a- Cases are lmown where a tax waa cdlecled 
from the peasants for 90 years ahead, AH this went to ttte 
Iandloh and war-lo& 
Wurkhg with unbelievable e d u i t y  unbelievably long 
hours on anbelievably tiny parceIs of Iand, the Cbineae paas+ 
ants could not make a living, try as they m i g k  Famines, 
pestilence and flo& were the usual lot of millions upon 
millim of the toilers of the land. 
The peawst musses, h d r e d a  o/ millions 01 them, were 
the chief sotme of the Chinese Revol~ion. 
The workers (there were 2,000,000 workers in large d e  
d t y  induetry out of a total of 5,000,000 workera in all d 
China) were d e r h g  the Hind of exploitation that wm known 
in Europe only at the beginning of the ninetcntb century. 
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e-hour workday wae the rule, with some workem forced 
sheen and eight- hours a day. No restrictions for 
at the age of seven or eight warking 
e wnal wage d the f i l e d  workers is 
atmoephm from 4 in the morning till 8:30 in the 
with only orre intermission for dinner, m i v i n ;  3 
a day. This barbarous exploitation made it possible 
capitalists to gamer profits of 100 per eent and more. 
life of the workers war such that 90 per oent were forced 
ve below even the atandad of living of the Chinese ooolie. 
the workers were suffering at the hands of the imperialists 
country and ae workers. 
great fa- of tbe Chinese 
in cmp&n with &e total 
RUE&, they could not im- 
on the r6le played by 
ediately establish the 
done in M i a  in 
1917. But their GI43 in the revolution was never- 
a leading force. It is the genera1 d k e  of 
5, that is c o ~ d e r e d  the beginning of he Cmat 
ation. Strikes in other citiea followed In all 
ary mtlvements after 1925 th working class, 
Commuuist Party, occupied the front rank  In 
ineae %vi& the workers are aa lead- 
in d s t a n e a  the Chinese Redation has been 
&+mpe&Iiss reuoirion, and not a Socialist 
was mognkd by the Communist InternationaI very 
In its instructions to the Third Congrem of tbe Corn- 
Party of China, in 1923, the Communist IntemtionaI 
tional malation in China d the creation of an #ti- 
front wi l l  inevitably be acmmpanied by an & 
rriilg in tba duadamsntal mase of tha chinma population. 
mall.paml p a n t r y .  
% 
Thus the central queation of the entire policy ie tho p d  
qumthn .... That ia w-hy the Communist Party aa tha pa* of 
the working &BE muet strive toward an alliance of tho w o h  
and the Thi can be &wad only through tha in- 
aant pmpaganda and h a  r e h t i o a  in praeti- of the slogam 
of the a p d a n  revolution, such an fhs d s c a t i o n  of LIW land. 
lo&' lands, conbacation of the Ian& of the monaerarim ad 
c b h  d turning them over to the peasantry without cam- 
pensarion, abolition of tbe hunger rents, abolition of the p-t 
tax systm~, abolition of the leasing of tax* abolition of custoun 
dutim bet- prwlncea, abolition of the msnderinste, creation of 
a r m  of peasant w l f w l f g w e ~ t  into whom hands the canfie- 
c a d  Iaad shall pa= 
YRoeeediag; from thme fundamental damands i t  ia n m  
to brhg riag entire mam of paasant poor to the reabtion of &a 
n d t y  of stm& agdmt fm&n imperialism. . . . Only whm 
the agrarian foundation b p l a d  under the dogam of h e  anti- 
imwaliet front can we hope for a nal a m m s ~ .  
qt gma without myiag that h l c ~ d d i p  muat belong to the 
party of &a working dam. The last events from the realm of 
&a labor mmmmt (tremendons strikm) haw c h l y  &own all 
the hpormce of tht labor myemant ia Chins. 
*The Cwnmuniet Party in obligd conatandy to push t b  party 
of ths Kumintang toward tbe agra&n revdution." 
The character of the Chi- Revolution a c o r u b i i  th 
anti-imperialist and the agrarian revolution, and the r6le of 
the wa&m and their party, the Communia Party, could not 
be more adequately defined than was done in thia dan- 
ment even before the real b g i i i n g  of the revolution in 1925. 
The Communist International, then dl1 headed by h i m ,  
never uaderedtuated the r6le of the proletariat in the revoIu- 
tim. It saw. however. that the revolution was that of an 
o p p r d  cok~try risihg against the yoke of imperialism 
and that ib main driving force was the bulk of the population 
eomidng of p e w t a  
What about Trot~ky? T m  to his disregard of the 
antry, he simply failed to see the millions of impoverished 
and oppreaaed peasant5 who were then w i g  to form 
Iacd c o d  to fight against the landlords. To him the 
peasantry did not exist. 10 him, therelure, the tnHui force 
of the revolutionary struggles ifi  his aeuLi-feudal country did 
not exist. 
As late lui 1928, alter three years of heroic peaant lighting, 
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the following to say a h a t  the peasraatrp and the 
"Numerically, the Chin- pensantry cunsdtmta an amn mom 
-mwtbantheRtdapeasanls; b n t ~ i n t h a  
h of world mnmdictiona n p n  the d d o n  of which in om way 
the expadon: %ice of world contradictionn". It 
that the contradiction between the intmesb of the 
of the Iandlords and war- 
some &r f o m  
ixe the anti-im@Iist character of 
If his disregard of the p s m t q  
wan an old trait revealed in hia 
be revded him- 
that libration 
power was a qudm of life and 
at all: he conceived the whole movement to be an attempt 
by the manuf- to do away with foreign control 
of tha custom, to d l k h  ''cwtonu mntonorny*'. 
With such an approach he sodd matre only blmdem, oas 
more ludi- than the o h ,  and a d v m  proposals WE&, 
5f carried oat, would ham spelled disaster for the revollltionI 
The Kuominmg which ia mentioned above in the instme 
tiom d the Communid International was, up to tb middle 
of 1927, a party of th nadiod revolu#ioa Formed in 1922 
bp Slln Yai Sen, it gained gmat inflwnce and power in the 
early 'hpentiek By 1925 it held the City of Canton in dm 
south of China and mimounding territory, it had an army of 
iia own, and its influarm grew. First a party of i n t e 1 h l  
and tbe petty bourgeoisie, it soon attracted great numbmi of 
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He proposed t h  the C a d i  Party SOitMraw 
Kuo- Md jorm Swish. HE contended &at 
imparialist bloc h e e n  the proletariat and the b o w p  
during the March to the North wan against h h i s m .  He 
dated that the immediate formation of the Soviets was the- o 
U i 5 t  way. 
"If, at tht begidng of &a northern m m p b  [w Tm*] 
we had bagrm to organiw Savieta in the 'lihatad' districts (and 
the mesece were i a a h c t i d y  fighting for the) we would ham 
r&d to our side the a m  nprihgrr, we would ham b d t  
ow own army; we wodd haw andmmbcd the o p p i n g  anaim 
and-notwithd'ing the youthfulness of tho Communist Purty of 
China-it wodd k v o  been able, with a jndiciotlil Comtrta~ 
g u i d m  to mature in these yem of mtrm and to wraa to power, 
if not in the whole of aha at once, then at leaat in a oonaid- 
d o  part of iL And a h m  all. we would haw had a pany." 
(Loon Trotaky, P r d m u  oJ the C&se Red&% p. 134.) 
Let mr not forget that Soviets are organa of power. Trotsky 
did not conceive them as organs of the revolutionary dictator- 
ship of the proletariat and peasantry. He wanted to skip the 
hihorically nemwary stage of the revolution and proceed forth. 
with to  S o v i a  as the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
What would have been the task of such organa? T h q  wwcfd 
IPavc h e n  a governmetss dir-d aigdmt the n a t h d  govern.. 
l lben~ l'3ey would haPe m o d  the peasants against &am, 
becaw the pasants would ham seen in the attempt to disrupt 
the revolutionary Kuomintmg which t h y  still mted,  an a. 
tempt to inwere with tbe agrarian revolution. They would 
not have heen able to build a Soviet army becaase the over- 
whelming majority of the pawants and a large wction of the 
workers b e h e d  in Chiang Kai-dek w h  ut thd time m a 
reudurionmy, They would not have been able to undermine 
Chiang Kaidek's army h u a e  that army wag engaged in a 
victoriona mlution, They wodd not have mmgthened the 
Communist Party becaaee the Communist Party wodd have 
ibolatsd h l f  from the revoIuiimary masses. Aa to the Com- 
muniata coming into power in a considerable part of China, 
they s d  in d o h  so just because they did M pose in 
the eyee of the ma- as d h p t e r s  of the national revolatim, 
but showed to the mww from their own experiences that 
Chiang Kaidek was a traitor. 
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The a h g m  of Soviets noun& r e v o l ~ o n q ,  but wdm given 
/ conditions its lkse when impossible to re& would have h e n  
an act of counter-revoItttion. Xt would have crippled the 
I t e v ~ l ~ o n  
Smnming up the experiences of the Chinem Rwolution, at 
' tbe Sixth Congress of the Communist International, K d e q  
one of the Ieaders of the Cornintarn, mid: 
"Well, comadm i n  jmt u l t f a - m l n t i o ~  bighaltage 
snbjsctidrm o£ a petty-bowgmb gone wSm? 1 do not 
know what It L s u b j d d y ,  but I k m w  p d d y  d w h  wodd 
haw barm tbc objective m e w  of such adon in praEtiw. If 
& a t h i n g ~ t o b s t r i s d , t t m d d b . w b a o a h s ~ m e t h o d  
of bringing about the immsdiate mUapM of the d m i o n  or at 
ltut of tha . . . a g m h  movement On the prwmt ia 
China rho adswing of euch a slogan add d q  hvs ths &sot 
of a prowcation." p mi nu&^ of tRs S W  Conpes~ of tk C o b  
tern, Gennan edition, Vol. a p. XI 
I The fact that in March, 1927, Chi- K a i a  ths revolution and hame a tool of world imperialism, is gr@ by T r d y  to prove bin m ammen. Didn't ha know Mom hand that one could not rely on tha bourpisie? Didn't he propose Soviets? He pretenda not to knw that it ir one thing 
w h  the bowgeohie betrap the mo1ation and another thirag 
whm, the c m  Pwfy ahodd attempt to disrupt ?he 
revolution. He " f o q d " ' t  what he p r o p 4  wodd have 
amounted to a war of the workem agehat the peas- He 
kepi on repating, ad tbat ths Communist Party 
could not be "an appduge to a bourgmie party''. Ha mi* 
reprmated the Cornintern as saying that WE-  of worker8 
and peaeante can be set jb motion and led if only tb Cbmurer' 
of the Kuomintang ia w a v d  around in the air a We". (h 
Trotsky, T h  C h  R d ~ ~ o n  grid the Them of Comrade 
Win, May, 1927.) He jmt -orgot" to ,,little thing- 
' that thoes d o n a  of p t s  - - engaged in car 
d q m r h  raroh&n nimultanwdy with the &-imp 
riaIiat mitad-front atmggle. He never un- the various 
atages of &a revolution md ita padng from one to the other. 
Was the Clmrmdst Inturnatid awam of the fad that &a 
ravolntion codd not rely on the bompohiu for vary long? 
MI its bmctiom skmed the point that although thwe wm 
101 
a united front, a bIoc of the msw~ with the bottrgeoi&, the 
fate of the revolution depended upon the workem and peasants. 
The Combtern a d v i d  the workers and peasants to arm; if 
n e d  be in defiance of the Kuomintang leaders. I t  advised 
them to form peasant committees, to fight the Right wing of 
the Kuomintang, to puah the Kuomintang to the Left, to bring 
forward,.boldly, the Corn& Party. It warned the Com- 
munists that it waa necessary to develop h e  mass movement 
which alone would save the revolution. "Otherwise," said 
the Deoamber, 1926, instructions of the C.I., "the revolution in 
threatened with a treaaendoarr danger.* 
The C o m m d t  Party of China, young, miIitant, ardent, but 
 in^^, oommiited rniatakes, There were some Corn- 
muniat leadere who failed to d i m  the n d t y  of rtll inde- 
pendent revolutionary movement of the workwe. There were 
Communist leaders who aaid, "We must nat embarrw the 
united anti-imprialiet front by too much agrarian revo~utim''. 
There m e  Communists who aaid, "We must not have too many 
strikee k a m e  that would alienate the bourgeoisie from the 
revelation". There were Communish who, for the same 
reason, shrank from arming the workers. Many such mist* 
ware made; soma wem inevitable due to the compIexity a d  
novelty of the situation. The Communist leaderahip at ?hat 
time was, dne to hietoric conditions, petty-bourgeois (from 
the cities) and iateilectualiet. It was not yet steeled in strug. 
gIa It had not yet & o r M  fully the Leninist principles of 
Communiet discipline. But that by no meam signifies that 
the line of the Communist International or of Staiin was 
wrong. 
At the Sixth Congre~  of the Communist International the 
errors of the Communist Party were characterized as follows: 
"The hmmuniet Parry of China adered a A e s  of great defeats 
which ~ X O  connected in the p t  w i ~ b  a series of grave opportuaiet 
enom: the absen~e of independence and freedom d criticism in 
r a h h  to the Kuamintang; the lack of understanding of the 
transition from o m  stage of the revolution to another and h e  
n-ity to prepam in time for miaanee; finally the hiidering 
of tho agrarian mlutioa." (MkPuw of the Shth  Colylrwt, Ger- 
m n  Edition, VoL IV, p. 40.1 
The line of the Cornintern, however, was in accordance 
la 
with the teachings of h n h  and with dm intererrts of the 
molution. 
This is what Lenin said about supporting the national b o w  
geoisie in a revolution: 
"The Communiet International must go h d  in hmd in a tam- 
porary alliance w i ~ h  the bomgmis democracy of the d o h  and 
backward countries, but not merge with it and by dl meana retain 
the independonce of the proletarian movement even in io mlrt 
-rudimeatarg form." (V. I. Lenin, Cdiectcd Warh,  YoL XXV, 
p. rn.) 
"We aa Communbh will nnppon rb6 b o u r g w i o ~ o n i s t  
movements in the mlonial cwnPiea only in such where 
thssa mwemmtn arc d y  mwlationnry, when thsir ropreesara- 
tivm will not hisder na from ducating and organking tke peas- 
'antry and tha broad uploitcd masea in tbe mmludonary ~pirit." 
(Ibid, p. 353.1 
The Kuomintang movement of 1926 and up to March, 1927, 
rws really revolutionary and its repmentativea not only did 
not hinder the Communists from educating and organizing the 
masses of peaeants and workere in the revolutionary epirit but 
they even paid lip service to Communism Thaa, at the Sev- I enth Plenum of the Co-rn {November, 1926) a repmen- 
tative of Chiang Kaidek declared : "What the Ruomiotang 
strives for is that there ahould not be created a bourgeois 
domination after the nationalist revolution in China, as hap- 
pened in the West and as we see it now in all the countries 
except the U.S.S&. . . . We am all conwiwed that under the 
leadership of he  Communist Party and the Cornintern the 
Kuomintq will fulf~ll ita hido& &'' (Mi- of the 
Seven& Plenwn, German Edition, p, W )  
The C o m m d  Internationat1 never had any ilIusione about 
a lasting blm of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie. What 
it insisted upon was to use the bourgeois xevolutionhb as far 
as possible in order to achieve the maximum d t s .  
Chiang Kai-shek did betray. When  the^ imperialiets began to 
bombard Nanking in March, 1927, Chhq Kai-shek joined 
hands with thm againat the revolution. Why? the 
bourgeoisie became frightmed by the spectre of the p a n t s  
and workers gaining t ~ o  muoh power. Faced with the alterna. 
tive of either suffering at the hands of foreign imperialists or 
being crushed by the rising wave of workers' and peasants' 
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revolts, the bourgeoisie c h m  the former. Chiang Kai-shek 
did the bidding of his masters, He split away from the Kue 
mintq.  
Them begins the mcond atage of tbe revolution, the Wuhan 
"The national bourgeoisie moved away from the revo- 
lution while the agrarian movement grew into a powerful revo- 
lution of tens of millions of the peasantry" (Stab). The 
Left Wing of the Kuomintang f o d  the Wuhan Govern- 
ment. The Communists patticipated in it. Trotsky, who never 
undmtanda the pwing of the revolution from one stage to 
another, now makes a round-about-fa= and "advk" the 
Communists to participate in the Kuomintang "We are in 
favor of the Communists worlcing in the Knomintang and pa- 
tiently drawing the workers and peasants over to their side" 
he decIaree in his tract, The Chinese Revolution and the Theses 
of C o m d  Stulirl, (May, 1927). Why now? The Wuhan 
foms were not different in principle from the G a n g  Kai- 
ah& force prior to March, 1927, But here we have one of 
the many gyrations which are BO characterietic of Trotdq. 
What was the Wuhan perid? With s u r p h g  clarity 
Stalh explained thie in his speeeh before the Plenary Seasion 
of & Ceabal Committee and Central Control Commission of 
the U.S.S.R, August 1, 1927: 
u Z f h ~ ~ ~ m d ~ d b y h f o c t t b a t t b t e d g e o f  
tho mlution was dJrsEtsd mainly agab t  foreign imperialism, 
tha c h m m d d o  trait of b s a d  + i B  the fact that tht 
moIudon diracta ita edge k-y agnht the haid end- 
I n t h s 6 m t p ~ ~ t t h c f s a d a l i a t q ~ t h s f d r e $ i r P P e .  
Baa ths k t  n t w  solved the problem of &wing foreign 
impmialism? No, it haa not solved h t .  It pmmd on the d- 
ization of this m&, M ita inhaitan* to the m u d  stage of the 
Chi- Xlewlntion. It jwt gaw the rsvolntIrmerp. m s w  ths 
h t  jmpetnt a g h t  impmidim in ordar to termitlata ita ~ n ,  to 
pass the cnuw on to tha fr~urs. Neither 4 the mend stags of 
tha meolutlon s a c 4  fully to lolm the task of *g out, the 
imparialists, m may It WIN giw the broad of 
Chinese workern und pwanta furthar impetns against h-, 
but it w4U do it in order to pam on tha eomplstion of this mast 
to tha fdowiqg stags of the Cbinaw M u t i o n ,  tha Soviot -'' 
(Spssph Stalin, Y& ud $he NBtiod.Cobnb1 Q ~ ~ t i o m ,  R w  
man didon, pp. 182-183.) 
Stab, the Leninist, understood and explained what is in- 
IOI 
comprehmible to Trotsky: the transition from one stage of 
the revolution to another. He foresaw that the next stage of 
the revoIntion would be the Soviet stage. He knew that the 
bloc with the bourgeoisie in the Wuhan government was not 
I 
I 
of long duration. However, he could not comeel the Com- I 
munist Party to try arid set it& against the Wuhan r&me i 
That would have been harmful to the revolution which now 
had arrayed against it, in addition to the war-lords and im- 
perial* alm a large section of the bourgeoisie headed by 
I 
Chiang Kai-shek-the so-called Nanking r@e. 
I Why was it necessary for the Commuuj~ts to stay within the 1 
Wuhan government? Their task, according to Stalin, was: 
'To ut i lh  f d y  the p o m i h i i  of q m l y  organizing the Party, 
tba proletariat (labor unions), peasantry (peaeatlt Mione), 
the mlut ion  genurallj. T o  p d  the W h  Kuomintangitw 
Lsftvrard, in the directio~ of the agrarian revolution. To turn the 
Wnhan Kuomintang into a mmm of I P U ~ ~ U  &t the wunm 
revolution aad into a nucleu of the future m l u t i o n a r y h -  
cratic dictatorship of tha proletariat and the psaean~p.~ (I& 
P* 1%) 
In reply to the demand of the Trotskyitm regar* the 
immediate formation of Sovieta Stalin explained that that 
ww1d have been "adventurism", an "adventuroue akipping of 
stages" since it would have meant skipping over the Lft 
Kuomintang phase of develop men^ 'The Kuomintang in 
Wuhan did not yet discredit and expose itself in the eyes of 
the broad mama of workem and peasants; it did not exhaust 
ikI f  as a bourgeois-revolutionary organization." 
Revolutions move rapidly. The second stage of the revolu- 
tion was succeeded by the third, at the end of 1927. The bour- 
geoisie did become thoroughly discredited in the eyea of the 
workers and peasants, Large. &ions of the territory con- 
quered by the March to the North were now in the handa of the 
Nanking r@me which rallied to its side also the bourgeoisie 
from the Wuhan r6gime. The Communist Parly now alone 
headed the workers' and peasants' movement. Clam differen- 
tiatiom took their place. The bourpwisie ran back to ibe for- 
eign imperialists to seek safety, albeit dearly paid for, againat 
the Red wave of the agrarian and workers' revoIution. The 
next step of the revolution was, inevitably, Soviets. The bur- 
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geoie-democratic revolution p d  into the phase of the revolu- 
tionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the 
peaaanwy. 
The fir& Soviet was organized in Canton after the armed up- 
rising of December 11, 1927. The Canton Commune lasted 
for only three days. Jt was drowned in the blood of the 
heroic fighters by the rmited forces of the Chinese hour- 
geoide, landlords and international imperialists. But this 
was not the end of the Revolution. It was only one of its 
reverarea True, in the Nanking territory the Communist Pady 
was forced into illegality. Great masses of workers and peas- 
ants were executed by the hangman, Chiang Kd-shek. Bus t h  
Revdubn kpi murching on Even before the defeat of the 
Canton Commune, Chinese Communists under Generals Yeh 
Tin, Ho Lung and Qla Teh carried out a s*rccwful revolt 
among the k t  army corpe of the Kuomintang in Nanchang, 
Kiangsi province. They d e d  in winning over to the 
Coxrrmaniat Party an armed force of about 15,000 men, which 
served as the nucleus of the future Red Armies, For a while 
the Red ArmIee reheated into mountainam regions, but already 
in February, 1928, we a Soviet + established in 
Yuagdn, Fukien province. h May, there is a Congress of 
workers, peasants and Red soldiers in eastern Kiangsi. In 
Septdm-October, we ham a Swiet *me established in 
Wman, Kiangsi. From then on tbe Chinese Soviets kept on 
gowing until they have reached their pnmnt atage of power 
and comolidatirm. 
I 
One cannot overdmate the importance of tbis develop- 
ment in the face of overwheIming d&ulties. The Soviets 
were, aud &ill are to a large extent, cut off from great centers 
with m m  of modern They have s u k e d  inter- 
d o n  and blockade. Numerous drives were organized 
against them, not only of a d i t a r y  but also of a propagandist 
natara T b  new Soviet Republic had to create its own Red 
Army and to arm itself in a country which is not highly 
industrialized. Its a m  were mainly taken from the Chimp 
Kai-ah& armies in vietoriow b a t h .  And yet--what marvel- 
ous progr€Sa! 
What was the Canton Commune? The Communist Interna- 
tional, in the ihesss of the Sixtb Congrew (19281, mid: 
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"The Canton uprising, being the her& -guard battle of tha 
C&we proletariat in the past period of the Chinme Rmolution, 
remains, notwithatnadiag gmss errors of the leadership, tho ban- 
ner of &e new Soviet pham of the revolution." 
About the same time when the Commuiat Xnbmtational was 
framing the thesis about the Canton Soviet having formed &e 
banner of the new phase of the Revolution, Trotsky declared: 
I "The [Canton] 5miet which waa created ia a hurry, only so as 
to observe the ritual, ww d y  a camouhge for an dvanturiet 
pumk That ie why we found out, a f b  it wae dl o w ,  that the 
Canton Soviet wan just one of those old Chinew dmg0-t wan 
BimpIy drawn on paper." (Lwn Troeeky, The Canton I~urrcc. 
&n, -em July, 1928; included 3n his volume, Problems oJ the 
Chinese Rwolutibn, p. X57.1 
Stalin, don't you see, simply staged a "ritual" to prove that 
L was a good revolutionist. He made a putsch to show that 
he was no worse than Trotsky! But Trotsky will not be de- 
ceived "We w e e  for the creation of Soviets in. Cbina in 
1926. We were against carnival Soviets in Cantoa in Deoem- 
her, 1927." ( I b g . )  He was for industriahation and oollectivi- 
i d o n  in 1925 in Russia, He mea camou0age industrialhation 
and "carnival" collectivization in 1935. 'There are no con- 
tradiationa &ere", he saye. No, there are no contradictimm 
Trotsky's policy is always counter-revolutionary; either he 
advwates the splitting of revol~ona y forces or he r e p m t s  
a major revolutionary W e  as a ' ~ v a l " .  That Canton 
"carnival Soviet", he it remembered, was one of the most 
heroic upriahga of the workers and peasante. Over 7,000 
fighters were shot in Conton done after the cruclhing of'the 
upridng. 
In the yeam following 1927 Trotsky refuses to recogniw the 
spread of the revolution in China and the establishment of 
S o h  What in reality h the transition to a higher atage of 
the revolution, to him is the end of it a l l - d m b  and de- 
feat. The wish is father to the thought. In this, his vicious- 
ness borders on the grotesque. "Ho Lung and Yeh Ti even 
leaving aside &air opportunist policy, could not fail to be 
an isolated adventure, a pmdi+Commnnist Machno feat 
[Macho was half bandit, half revoIutionary during the civil 
war in Russia); it muld not but GI& agaimt its o m  h l a -  
WI 
- 
tion, and it haa c l d d ' . '  (Problems of the Chinese R e w k  . 
tion, pp. 1M-150.) llh is how he greeted the formation d 
the nncleue of the fatare Red Army. The report of the Com- ' 
mnnist Party of &a to ?he Sixth &gma (Summer, 1928) 
about the growth of the number of Party m&+ a report . 
that ahowed hat the rmlutiw was not Mested, was gmztd , 
by Trotsky as "monetroaa information" which bed "in- ' 
dieant refutation". (Ibid., p 160). He could not red7 ' 
refute tha figmq bnt he found another fadt: The 
majority of the new Party membegs, he said, were peasrmts, 
and thtm the Commu&t Party of China "ceaeer, to be in con- 
f d t y  with itn h r k d  ddnation" (Ibg., p 161), id., in 
conformity with Tmtnkfe eontmtion that the peasantn cannot 
pIay a revolationary r6k The reevolution, in hin opinien, in 
loat. 'The mIution b at tha p m t  time Md over into m 
indefinite fu&re. Apd moreover, the conaeqmnm of the 
M e a t  of ths revolution have not yet been caqletely ex- 
hrtaatecLn (Ibid., p. 177, October, 1928.) 
The formation of S o w  daring 1929 was treated by him aa 
a joke. "Perhaps dm Chin- C 'sta haw riaen in rebel- 
lion htmsu they have received the l a w  comments of MoIo- 
tov on the mlntion on the 'Third Period'. . . . DOES thIe 
bmmectim ephg from the situation in China or rather fmm 
the imtmdons cmamhg the SHird Period'?" {lbid, p 
233, N o n d n ~ ~  1929.) 
While the workers and peasants of China under Communist 
leadership were fighting heroically and sacrificing their l im 
on the battlefields d M i g  Soviet rule, Trotdry, safe in 
Alma-Ata, gave sent to 6ia venomow hatred against Stalin , and the Communists Oh, he htaIly h o v e r e d  the wre; of 
the Ho Lung and Yeh Tin and the Canton uprising# of 1927, 
alao the e i n i m  meaning of h formation of So* in 1929. 
'The advanturous camp+ of Ht, Lung and Yeh Tin in 1927 
and the Canton up* [were] timed for the moment of the 
expulsion of the oppodion from the Rudan Communist 
Party," (Ibid., pp. 233-234)+ were organized, that is to 
1 
say, to divert the a W o n  of the workers; in themadm they 
were nothing. As to the formation of Soviets in a r t a h  sec- 
tions of W a  in 19XUme ie the mt, md its expaare 
d e s  Tro* "aIermedn, indaad: 
lm 
I UHaw the Chipcae ccmm* rim in rohriian haw of Cbiang Kai9hek1a aainvb of ths Chinem Esatern Railway? Haa tbia ineurrection, wholly pnrtiwn h charadm, aa ita aim to Chiang hi-shek n n d m  at hb -1 If that in what ft jq w aak who hm given such w d  to the Chinae Commanistr? Wbo beare the politid mpondility for their pasuing owr to guwilla &a?" (Ib id ,  p. 835.) 
Note the double malim: the disregard of one of the great- 
& achievemaits of the world mlution, aad the d i d h  for 
the mucity of de Soviet Union, Trotsky is against &e work- 
em and peasants of C h j ~  defending the d v  of tha Soviet 
frontiem (wouldn't he rather be glad if. Chiang Kaidek'a 
forces s d e d  in dealing h e  Soviet Union a blow?). He 
declares: 
I The  proletariat of tha USS.R., which hae the power and the ~ i a i t s ~ e a n w t d ~ d t h a t t h e v a @ o f t b c ~ ~  . proletariat begin n war at once apFainet Chiang Kai- that is, that It apply the maana which the S d e t  gownmnt i t d  doss not h d  it padble, and c o d y  a q  to apply." ( I b K ,  p a) 
Tbls speaks volumes about the attitude of Trotsky toward 
on the Chinese Eastem Railway waa Btopped bg swift and 
aecjaive action of t h ~  Red Army of the U.SS.R,--the army of 
wo&m and pea- 
As usual, Trotsky predicts-and his p d t i m  are stupid 
Thus ha sem by the end of 1929 ?he perspective of a terrific 
debacle and of an adventwrist &generation of the remnantu of 
the Communbt Party". That tIie reverse happened is no fadt 
of Trotsky'a 
Enough of tbis dastardlineas of a counter-revolutionary gone 
mad. We could recib more and more anmples to show that 
the man is a b i m  enemy of the Chineare Revolution, that he 
faib to see in the Cbhme Soviets a revolutionary achiemmen& 
that as Iate as August, 1930, ha h h  that '%he paantry is 
incapable of creating its Soviet government independently", 
that the leadership of h e  Chinese Soviets, in b jndgmenb i r  
not in the hands of the Cornmimist Party but "is d e l i d  to 
so~na other political party", etc. But the gems so far qwted 
dl a d b e  to give a piciure of this enemy of Ebe world 
revolution. 
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One instance, however, must be cited to mmplete the pic- 
ture. After 1928, Trotsky suddenly begins to p d c t  the 
economic stabilization of China tinder rhe Nanking righe, 
the increase in its productive foroes, a veritable "economic 
recovery" and, c o ~ ~ n d i n g ~ y ,  a ' W a h  bourgeois (polit- 
ical) stabilization" which is "radically distinguished from a 
revolntionary situation". We need not dweII on the fact that 
China today is in a deeper crisis and that the revdutionary 
forcea in the Nanking ares are growing vety fa& What inter- 
ests us is Trotsky's slogan: For a Constituent Assembly. 
'% Communist Party cm and ahodd formulate tha dogan of 
ths Conatitueni AasembJy with full powers, elected by universal, 
equal, direct and nmmt su&age." (Ibd., p. 189. written &to* 
bsr, m.1 
No more revolution. No more Soviets. No more arming 
of the workers and peas- The Communist Party should 
e n ,  atym Trohky, "from the beghk&--and that means to 
hcIp the bourgeoisie consolidate its State power, to help the 
bourgeoisii unite all of China under one Constituent Aastrmbly, 
to form an oppomtion, legd in its very mature, within thq 
bourgeois parliament. 
A defeated counter-revolutionist exrrosed by the course of 
the revol~rkion and foaming at his mtrith bk of hi8 weak- 
n U i  is what Trotsky has h o m e  in relation to the 
Chinese Revolution, To hia hatred of the U.S.S.R was added 
his acrid hatted far Soviet China. When he sess those two 
coming together, when be sxa the Chinese Communists bsuing 
the slogan of a national-rewlutionary war against Japanese 
imperialim, he stirs to "warnn in the very same way aa be 
"warned" agaiaet h a  def- of the Chinw-Eastern Railway. 
He was trying to profit by the mistdm of the Chinew Corn- 
mudst Party but be trim to hide its world-historic sucmses. 
He carefully avoida mentioning one thing, however, that the 
Chineae Communist leader more than all othera responsible 
for the oppxtunist errors of the Chinese Party was a man by 
the name of Chen-Du-Hsiu, who was later expelled and M e  
the leader of the munter-revolutionar y Trotskyites in China. 
X 
The Third Period 
HE pariod between 1918 and the end of 1923 was a period T of large mass movements and revolutiom. S&ce it to 
recall the proletarinn revolution in Hungary, the proletarian 
revolution in Bararia, the h e  of factcrb by workers in 
Italy, the uprising in 1921 in -y, tbe p o d d  re~ola- 
tionary m~vement in Germany in the Autuma of 1823. This 
period ended with the defeat of the German revolati011. 
The folIowing period is that of relative and p d  stabilk- 
tion of capitalism. Capitalist production inorem but it can- 
not overcame the general crisis of capital&, World economy 
is split into two s a e t o d e  capitalist and the- sociarliaff one. 
Capitalism introducm bigher technique, it mmrk to mass pro- 
duction, but the new and monntiag m= d goods needs a 
market while the mar- are &inking, The capital* in- 
maw their exp10itation of the w o r b  in order to secure 
pro& for capital. Bat this, la turn, dimhishes ahie home 
market, In many eountrie, while there k "prwperitf', the 
standslrda of living of the workere became lower, which meaua 
a decrew in their purchasing power. All this drives the 
imperi~1b-t~ to search f rdml iy  for new mark* for new 
investment spheres and sources of raw material. This ia 
fraught with renewed dashes between the i m p e r k b  powers. 
Every government is f e d y  arming. New w m  are in the 
o h g -  At the same time the exploitation of ihe mwa, both 
workers and fannem, d b  forth increased mistawe. In the 
wlonies there is a dm-peued d-imperrialbt movement often 
wudng t h ~  proportions of revolt. 
Srmch was the situation by 1928 and this was the ream why, 
when the Sixth Con- of the Communist Inkrmtional wn- 
vened in the Snmmer of 1928, it declared that the end of capi- 
talist stabilization was at.hand and that B ~ l b ~  period had 
begun-& third post-war period. In tbat period, said the 
Cornintern, the maases are h o m i n g  more radical. Tbey are 
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participating in struggles against eapitali8m in greater n m -  
bwa In consequence of the gtowing inner and outer con- 
tradictions of the capitalist countriw the revolutionary spirit 
of the workers, said the Cornintern, will rim. In the not dia- 
tant future the Cornintern foresaw a new round of ware and 
molutions. 
The man most instrumental in bringing about this under- 
standing of the world situation was Stalk. It is he who pee. 
4 the teen sense of reality and the clear under~tanding 
of the road to be folIowed. It is he who fought unremittingly 
against both fronu: the opportunists from the Kght who, like 
the Lovestoneitea in the U.S.A., saw no impending crisis, no 
radicalization of the workem in capitalist countries, and no 
p o d i k y  of rapid advarrce towards socialism in the U.S.S.R. 
-and the o p p o d t s  from the "hft" who advocated unsound 
advenhlroae experiments out of sheer disbelief in the matur- 
ing revolutionary fomes. 
Snbmpmt events proved the correctmm of hia d y a i a  
TL world-wide mom& crisis struck full blmt at the vary 
vitals of the entire capitalist a g s t a  hardly one year after 
the Con- Tha revoltltionary movement in India, Arabia 
and a number of other colonies, the victories of the C h e e e  
SaPieta, tba revolution in Cuba, the revolution in Spain, the 
revolutionary uprising in Austria, the growing revolutionary 
movement in Fraace and the United States are a few of the 
many opbavals marking the third puriod. 
We mmt wmfeaa, we never found in the Trotskyite writing 
anything d l i n g  an explanation of why they disagreed with 
the "third period" analysis. They just scoffed. They did not 
aree any new period. To them capitalism in 1928 and law 
was atill stable. All thew fa& of revohtionmy movements 
failed to imp- them. Capitaljam is still unshakabIe in their 
estimation. 
XI 
The German Situation 
and the Question of Social-Fasciem 
T* reatest factor in the stabilization of capitnlinm after the first round of wars and revolmtiom was Social-Democ- 
racy. In m h  countries as Germany and Auatria the Smid- 
Demmatic leaders actually undertook to o r g d  and 
maintain the capitalist State against the revolutionary on- 
slaught of the workers. A German SociaI-Demowah Nosh, 
drowned in blood the workers' revo1ution in Germany in 1918 
and 1919. Social-Democratic miniatere suppressed strikes, fired 
at workers' demmstrations, declared martial law against the 
workers. A Socialist govmmmt in Great Britain sent mmim 
to subdue the upridng of the coIonial peoplm. The W- 
Democrats of France took the initiative in itltrodncing the im- 
1 perialist martial laws. In short, everywhere the leadera of 
Swia1-Demwracy became part and parcel of the bourgeois 
State apparatus. They advanced the idea that where there is 
a cdir idn g m e n 6 ,  is., a government of capitaht and 
Socialist ministera, there we have a tramition from capitalism 
to socialiam. The fact of the matter is &at a coalition govern- 
ment r e m k  a capitalist government since it does not shake 
the foundations of capitalism, private property and exploita- 
tion. On the contrary, it only serves to strengthen capitalism 
I by deceiving the workers with the idea of p f u l  transition to socialiam. In Germany and Austria Social-Democracy actaally aided the growth of fascism. Fascist. bands were being o r g h d  
under the protecrion of Social-Democr&c govemmmts. Fas- 
cist demonstrations were nnrnolested by Social-Democratic po- 
Iice presidents while Communist demonstrations were being 
dispersed. Fascist bands were allowed to arm while the 
militant Red Front organization of the German workers was 
outlawed. Martial law and semi-martial law were repeatedly 
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introduced to curb the movement of the workera who demanded 
an improvement of theii intolerable conditions. 
In the very same way as h i n ,  after the htrayal of the 
proletariat by Social-Democracy at the beginning of the War, 
called the Social-Democratic leaders s o d p a s d o t s  and s o d -  
chuwinists, so the Communist International, after the new be- 
trayals af Social-Democracy, called its leaders socid-jscisgs- 
in tbe sene of paving the way for fascim, 
It was distroua for the proletariat of Germany and of tbe 
whole world that the Social-Democratic leadera made co- 
cause with capitaliean It was disastrous that EO many mil- 
lions of workers were deceived by the socialist phrases of the 
Social-Demrrcratic leaders and believed them to be true fighters 
for the intereets of the working class. It was unfortunate that 
the Communist Party of Germany could swing only around six 
million votes and did not have the majority of the working 
c l u  behind it. It would have been better for the workers 
of Germanv and for the world revolution had the m of 
German w&keca cherished fewer iIlasioas about heir Social- 
Democratic leadera, It would have been di6cuIt for f d m  
to eweep into power in Germaay had there been organid in 
Germany a powerful united front. 
It cannot be denied that there were certain weaknesses in 
the work af the Communist Party of Germany, but opposition 
to the united front was not among them. The Cammuni~ Party 
did not s-d in bringing all its xtwnbc8 into the reform- 
i& trade unions ao aa to have there a stronger revoIutionary 
support It did not work sdicienily in the reformist trade 
dons-and this was the most neglectad sector of its activi- 
ties, although it did build tba red trade-union opposition with 
a membership-prior to the advent of fascism--of over 300,- 
000, It did not root ihzf sufficiently ia the factories and 
plants. It w a ~  not flexible enough in approaching Social- 
Democratic rank-and-file workers. All these shortcominp were 
repeatedly pointed out by the Communist International, and 
the Party made strong efforts to Improve its work. As a result 
its influence grew tremendowfy. 
%wing the lsat period M o m  FfItler came to power. the Clm- 
mnnist Party sueedad in pctruthg the broad maws aad even 
in obtaining influenca among the sociaI.democrats, the members 
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t);B reio& tra& A ad a h  the d m  of tha Repub. 
;&ma Fhg ( M W )  cRgankx* fox ths * mwon rhaz 
~ i t w a a a b l e t o o ~ t h o ~ a g a i a r d f h i e a m e ~ d s Q a a  
The authority of the P e  wan m t l y  a h a n d ,  sad m b s m  of 
. d d t  trade miom began to parih@ate in the uailrea led bp 
the Red Trade Union Opposition and the CommunisL& Thw 
h i d m  Commnniats, m& of peformiat t r a I  anions and cvm 
National-Sockhb prtkipated in the hh tr-rt a m  
.cammittw." (0. Piatnitsky, The Present Si tuuhm &a G e m ,  
I p. 20.) I Phe Communh Party of Germany waa ready to fight fas- cism. As a matter of fact, the Commanists did @t the fascist ban& in the streets on numerow o d o n s ,  meeting their at- tacks and the attacke of the police which, in P m i a  for in- 
atanm, was under Social-Dwnmratic command and every- 
where protectd the Brown Shirts. 
That the Communb were working for a united front with 
I the Social-Democr~c workers, if need be through an agree. ment with the Social-Democratic Ieaders, may be seen from abe following: In 1825 the Communist Party proposed to the Social-Demo- cratic Party a united s-Ie against the mowrchist W e r .  
Later in the year, seeing that the Commmisb and the Social- 
Democrats had a majority of membws in the Berlin mdcipaI- 
, 
ity, the C o m d a t e  propcrsed to the Social-Democrats a corn- 
- p r o g m  of &on for the intereats of the workers. In 1826 
the Comunim &called upon the Social-Democratic I d e m  to 
join in a plebiscite against returning the property to d~ former 
German royal family. In h e  Spring of 1928 the C.P. pro- 
posed j d  Yq-Day dmwmtmtiu11~. In October, 1928,jt 
proposed joint ~ i - m i l i t m i s t  aim-against the building of 
a battle cruiser. In 1929-1932 it repeatedly proposed j u d  
action ag&st ~ e - c ~ ~  Xn April, 1932, it p r o p 4  a joint 
struggle of all working-class organizations against an impad- 
ing wageat. 
All thm proposals were turned down by Saial-Democ- 
racy. Broad rn- of workers responded to mme of the 
Communist appeals for united action. Social-Democratic lead- 
ers preferred cooperation with the capitah p& 
Whea Von Papea drove the Social-Democrate out of the 
Pruseian government, the Communist Party propad a joint 
1W 
g w d  s& for the repeal of the emergency decreee and for 
tha disbanding of the Storm Roops. On January 30, 1933, 
whem EitIer came into power, the Communist Party again pro- 
p d  a general strike to jight r e  Again in March, 1933, 
after the bPrning of the Reichstag, the Cammu& Party called 
upon the Social-Democratic Party and the trade d o n s  to 
declare a general strike againat the attack on the worksre. AU 
tkm proposals were rejected by the Social.Dmomats who 
preferred to believe that they eou1d function and maintain a 
mwliclun of power under any capitalist r6girne. 
Who is to be blamed? 
Tree ~ y s :  tfme Commdatm are to blame. Why? Be" 
caum they d l e d  the Social-Democrate m i a l - f d  Trotsky 
m o t  b y  the fact that the Commtmista were trying to or- 
g a b  the united front. They organid  the Anti-F& Ac- 
tion which was to unite w o r k s  01 various par tie^. They tried 
to orgath the united front in the factories and unionr The 
Social-Democratic leaders mwed mistnut toward the Comma- 
& and toward the unitsd front, aud this hampered the Corn- 
m& d o n .  TI+ did &a bit 
Now he b htiirfied. 
Hqe is hie chief bump: 
Wad tha Comiattrn &mi, horn l9B,  or m a  from 1930 or 
1931, at th foundrtion of ita p d k h  the obi& k c c o d -  
.bilitg k w e c n  and fasckm, or mom aractly 
k w e m  fwbm and 5ocid-q; P u p  thin it bd bnilt 
a d e  and pda&nt poIicy of ths mired front, Gsrmany, 
witbin a fsrr nwn& d d  ham been cmmd with a nstworL of 
mighty Eommittm of ppolatmh potential mrkws' 
Smith, that is." I k o n  Tmtaky, The Militant. March 10,1934.) 
But, my dear Mr. Trotsky, b r a  waa no irrecosrciIability be- 
mean Social-Democracy aud f- or more exactly: between 
the Social-Democratic leadera and fascism. T h  m a  no 
irreco&liiy as far as & S d - D e r n o c r h  W e r s  were 
concerned. They certainly had not anticipated &at they would 
be ao ruthlwIy driven out. They had formed a sub~tantiaI 
part of the State apparatus under all r+es prior to that of 
Hitler and they were convinoed that even under Hider would 
they retain a certain ahere of powex. No matter how 
much he Communists would have painted before them the 
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I dire reedts they were to qd from the aaeendarsey of fascism --they &ply would not have Meved it. Thsg would have said they h e w  e. W I ~  tbe conduct of the Austrian Sacial-X3cmocratie lead- ers who were suppod to be much more radical. than their German brethren and who had the e x p e h  of *r G e r m  
camrade~. Lisa to the testimony of tbe "Mt" Marxist, Otto 
Bawr, in in h i s e w  with the N m  York Times cormpond- 
at, G, E. R Gedye (published F h r y  18,1934) aa to how 
tbs Sacial-Demmatm of Austria were mdy to cooperate with 
I the f& dictator DolIfnss at the expense of the A& con- 
' stitation: 
5 h w  the data of the Hitlar criampb in h m m y  (Mar& 5) 
whsn the R d z m j ~  'slsetions' gaye h e  German N a  oonm1, om 
p & y h a a m a d e t h s ~ w g g r u a t m t & o r t r t o c o m s ~ a n ~ t  
with the g w m u n m t , .  . . I n  thew w d ~  of March ourhadm 
were still in cIm perm& contact with Dollfnsa md -r 
~ t o g e t ~ t o ~ t o a c o m ~ t u t i o d d u t i o n .  A t h d  
ofMat&bsp~dotrrleadsr,Dr.Dann&g,~rtbu 
at thebesinDingof A p d  ha wodd o p s n m g o t i a ~ w i t h u s f o r  
&s reform of ths Co~titution [for thP Umihg d h ~ & 8  
dwnocraq to muit fascism-W.O.]. Thia promfw ha nsrer 
fnlMM, for at rha h g h b g  of April ha p w d  wa ddde 
to tho fmckt camp. . . and dud to ope& to any of ths d a l -  
iats. he said that he could not me the sriating hdm we 
d e d  ta ~ m d  him 0th- nsgo!iamm He xafumed -1y. b 
we could not sta bim again, we Vid lo negotiate rhrough 0 t h  
people. Honestly, we left no atone natarned. W e  approached 
President M i k h  . . . Then we tried rhs clerical politidanq 
whom wa had kmm fox a  lo!^ rima . . . But mq-cbhg wan 
shattmd w the ntubborn of Donfaan who aimply re 
frrsedtobtarofthswcialjstaagaia A g r o u p o f d M n m d -  
iste got together dth a group of C a W c  domocrata and trid to 
indues tho Church to interme This alw f d d n  
Suppose yon offered them at &at time a d t e d  front with ths 
Commrmirsts to iighr Dollfuss? They did not tbink of Eghthg 
faacism. They had no intention of defending bowgeoia 
democracy. Listen to this precious a-on by Bauer in 
the amme interview: 
"We d e r d  to msks the g m m t  d o n a  that a danocmth 
and soeialiudc pang uvw mada We k - D o U b  kllOlD if k 
WUK only pars a bilt h u g h  P d h m t  we mukl -pt a 
m c ~ ~ * t h e ~ b ~ ~ ~ *  
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out P&I LUO y a m  [OUT mph&MJ.O.], on two 
emditionq that a small mmmittaq in which ths 
gommmmt had a majority, ahodd bs able to c r i t i c h  decrees and 
that a comtimtianal court, tba'only protection sgaimt breach- of ' 
the Cone~tution, &odd bs -red." 
They certainly were prepared to go far enough. The "Left" 
SociaI-Democrats were ready to agree to the abolition of 
Parliament provided the abolition is p d  by Parliament 
(a procedure actually practiced in Germmy under Hider). 
They were ready, they say, to agree to a government without 
Parliament "for two years", but it is quite obvious that it 
wodd not have been over-&ult to indue them to accept an 
exlension of the the ,  They were interested in maintaining 
their positions in the trade unions, in the municipalities, in ths 
police power, in the judicial system--lmowing very well that 
those poaitims wodd k curtailed under fascism. They clung 
to a shadow of power at the time when, according to their own 
testimony, "the diarsatiefaction and agitation of the workem 
against the conservative p o k y  of our Party m m m k  grew 
aa the government provocations increased . . . E x c i m t  
rose to a fever pitch during the last we&.'' (Ibd.)  
It ia for not baving induced mch leaders to organ& a united 
front that Trotsky blames the CommulllUlllsts. 
Be it remembered that he dowr not blame the Communists 
for not approaching the workers haw he h o w 8  very well 
that they did approach the workers and did make every effoxt 
to induce them to join the united front. His chief stock in 
trade ia t h ~ ~  accwation that tha Communist leaders did not make 
pearre with the W a l - W a t i a  tap leadem 
T r o w s  ar-t m support of the po~sibilif). of a united 
front with the Social-Democratic leaders hdda no water. 
"Social-Democracy Iha wys] can neither live nor breathe . . . 
without lsaDing nprm tho political and vads union organhutions 
of ths working c lw .  C o n c ~ t l p  It Le precidy along t h I a  line 
that the irreconcilabla c o d e t i o n  between M - k m  
and fadam b place; pmcisely along thia line doen bere 
open up he t h e i y  and unbridgeable stags of the polkim of 
h a  united front with the Social-Democracy." (The M i l h t ,  
March 10, 1934.) 
This argumant is just as incorrect 88 the English tradation 
of the m?ntmm is rotten. Events have proven that the boar- 
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p i e  reaorta to fascism when it hda that Social-Demwwy 
ia no longer able to keep in d u d  the revotutionary movement 
of the maasea For this reason all the masa organhatiom- of 
the working c l q  even if dominated by S&-Demoeratio 
leaders, are s u p p d .  B& prior to the skewed of Hitier the 
Sociul-Demmrd leaders did lnos b e k  I&. 
They relied on capitalist d m r a c y ,  on the W b  Coneti- 
Won,  on the Cmztaa respect for Iaw and order and laa t  but 
not leaet-on their mord in the serpice of the bomgeoiaie. 
They invented the poiicy of supporting the " l m r  e d "  just 
to have an excuse for collaborating with the bourgeoisie. Their 
Berlin Chief of Police Zoergiebel opened machine-gun h on 
workers pstrticipating in a May-Day prade (1929) without a 
@t. The number of victimn was m r  30. WU h d e m  
approved of w m i - d a l  law i n t r d u d  to -11 the w o r m  
revofte. Their leadera snpported wagecub and ammmts. 
Social-&racy supported the govmmmts of Brtaening, 
Von Papa and Schleicher. It was ready to rupport Hitler. 
Did it not give its recogpition to the Bitler government after 
I the elections of March 5, 1933, ddaring that Hitler had been legally appointed by Bindenburg and given a clear mandate by a majority of the people? Was it not d y  to cooperate 
with the Hitler government if offered a chance? WM it not 
assuming the r6fe of a loyal oppoeition men after , k i g  kicked 
in the face by the Nazi boob? Did not the Sooial-demo era ti^ 
parliamentary group, on May 17, 1933, vote aaanimously in 
the Rei- in favor of Hitler'a policy? Did not Carl Sever- 
ing remain s supporter of Hitter in spite of ail? Did not the 
same veteran Sacial-hccratic leader appeal to the popala- 
tion of the Saar to vote for the Nazis? Did not the Social- 
Democratic union leaders make overtures to Etlw? 
When their w l l a p  came, when they were ignominiously 
driven oat without &stance, then the p r m  of revaluation 
of values began not only among the Social-Dwnocratic workers 
but also among some of the leaden. One d o n  (Severing 
& Co.) are jwt w a i w  for an opportunity to be "taken in" 
by the faAsts. The center is vacillating. The Iaft Wing is 
for a united front with the Communiah The united front ia 
making headway, notably in France, in Spain and a h  in the 
United States-under the initiative and leadership of the Corn. 
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munisas. But to expect that the leaders of Gerpvln 
Democracy would have agreed to the united front WY 
Communists befoe January, 1933, is to be a 
At the bottom 01 all th preachment is Trotsky' 
attitude to Social-Demacracy. The old Menshevik 
df in the bader of the "JXt oppoition". 
lien that Social-Democracy is "an bad aa that". He is 
&en he ~ a y s  that the Commfl~ists hould not have called 
Social-Democratic leaders aoeial-fawists. He believes they 
noL He believes they are &o fighters, at leaat for bourgem 
democracy and for the intsreate of the workers 
can be defended under bourgeois democracy. 
Democrats to him are "also" socialists. Now it 
true that if &a Communists had abandoned 
poeitim and made peace with the C;erman Social-Demucratia 
leaders on the krms of l d r s ,  then there would haw 
been a united front. The trbub1e 4 it wouMnYt have been a 
mhl  front a g a i d  f- 
The t ravuq  of the whole batrage ia &dent from the experi- 
en- of France. When the united front arws d I i h d  in 
France, h n  huge movements against faecis3n began to 
develop on a united-front basis, the Tro* group joined tha 
Socialist Party, f d  with it, and ie fighting within the So- 
ur& Party against the united fronL 
l h  you have tbe Trobkyitei in action. 
But why did not the Commurht Party attempt an armed 
uprising in Germany in the early part of 1933 with its ~ 1 1 ~  
# o m ?  This qaestion is often asked by Trotskyites. 
The answer is given by k i n  who explains "the fundamental 
law of revolution". 
1 
"It is not ruWsat for rmolution that the mloited and op- 
- tmdcmtand the impcdt i l i~  of living in tha old 
, 
way md d-d -; for mlntion, it iu mcemary that tht 
exploit= &odd not be able to live md rule m of old OnlJ 
w b  tho 'lower U' do not rpotu the dd reghe, and wbm 
the 'qpu J-' m w b l c  to gwwn a of old, Lhsn only mn 
revolution succeed. Thh mth may Iw c x p d  in otber woxds: 
E l e w h k ~ n  i s  h p ~ i b k  d u t  an &&d W, MeELiAg 
both tha ~ c p b i ~ u d  wd the exploitera. [Our empbaab-MJ.0.I 
It fdIowa that for m111dor1 it in asaeatid, fitat, that a majority 
of the w o h  [or at h a t  a majority of the comcious, tbhk- 
ing, politicallp a m  d m )  should f a y  andemt~nd the n w  
Em 
dty for moIution, and ba d y  to eacrifica &sir Eves for it; 
semndly, that tho ruling h be in a state of governmental cr& 
which attraetm wen th4 maut backward m into politics . . . 
w d m  &a government and faeiIiuue its rapid ovenhrow by 
the rmroladPaathm (V. I. Lanin, Cdlcmd Works, R d a n  Edi- 
tion, VoL XXY, p m) 
In d i s c d g  the Garman sitnation of tbe time when Hitler 
came to power, 0. Piatnitsky, a leader of the Cpmmunbt Inter- 
national, quob the abwe Leninist dewtion of a revolutionary 
situation and draws the inevitable conclusion. He says : 
"5 dI thm con&tionn matured in Germmy in Januarp 
1933P No. The attho bmgmiaie, in tbe face of the menace 
of a proletarisn ramlutioa, i spite of ths eatiagaes of dbordm 
among Lhtm, ntmd u d t d  a@mt dm d n t i w m y  pmbdat. 
m8 o m h e h i n g  majodtg of the putty bonrgmimic followd the 
kmgeohb an mp& by Hidst, who pmmiasd them the 
rotm d dm 'grand1 old hnmny in which the pttty bonrgsoisie 
had Uved in more ox hm t o h d e  w d t l o a  Ths pdtbzht 
wan aph by tho w-D8mocrattic Party *& was mm followed 
by the majdtp d ths 1 * 0 h  So tba wctu able 
to lirs and administer, w m  6tlU able to exploit the working dam 
an of old, dtbeagb by nsw, fwint d."(0. R a e ,  
Thu Pratm -10 in Gma~ary, p. 27.1 
The M u m  of thet Executive Committee of the Comin- 
tem, evaluating; the Germaa dmtio11, came to the only eon- 
clusion which a responaib1e leaderdip could draw from tha 
exidng relationship of the d forces in Gemany. 
"Under time dmmutancas [up tba M i  mo1miDnl &a 
p ~ t w m 3 n a p o a i t i m i n w h k h J t ~ n o t ~ m d  
in fac t fddtomgmimanimmwl;nta .nd~~blowag&nt  
t h s ~ t a t e a p ~ v r h i r h , f o r t h s p n r p o s s a f Q h t i n g ~ t h s  
.pdM4lht, k b a d  tbn d t h ~  Of ths kscist 
~ ~ : t h s ~ T m a p a , t l t e S t d H a l m s b a n d t h s R e f ~  
':wdu. The bmgeohh waa abIe lrirhotlt d o n a  m h m a  to 
j h a n d c w m t h s p o w e r o f ~ t i t b s w u a t r f t o t h s ~ ~ n a l -  
~ S o c I ~ ~ a e t a @ m t b m r k h g ~ b ~ d p m * o -  
,cations, bloody tmror and plideal b d i t q .  
u & h p  the, cwdItioour for a b r h m  up* of the 
*prolemiah Lsmn m d  h a t  a W v m  battle can be m d k c d  ae 
f*; ma- 
... i j d l t h e ~ f o r o c e ~ C b m ~ t o ~ b * * s h  
aom s u w d y  cnbmgM, ham euW& came to H o q  h m  
s ~ y n w h s n s d ~ b y l r ~ w h i & t e h ~ d  
thdr evSngta If alI the r a a  hasr'tda& htsr. 
mtdiars dmnta,  i.e., tbe psrt~r bomgmMs, ~ b a m m i n  
W 
k m c r a c y  M dimhguished from thc bouxgmhk hayo s* 
hamdm to the people, have s u W &  tWmd 
themelm by tbdr pracded bankruptcy. I! amaag the proletariat 
maas sentiment has h g u q  and is rising smngly in favor of wp- 
p o w  the mcwt d&w, supremely bold and m I n t i o n q  action 
against the bonrgooiaie. Then the revolution has matured, and 
if we haw properly taken into account all of the cunditiona mern- 
tioned abovo . . . and hnm properly &td tho momtnb our 
victory i a  wud' 
T ~ s  -c fmtm of &a circumstauca at ths time of 
tho Hitler cow was that thts~ wnditions for a victoriou ridng 
had not yet managsd to matun at that moment. They only mistbd 
in an d w y o n h  mte, 
UAa for tbs vangaard of tha proletariat, the Commwiet P-, 
not \ r i e u  to slip iDto a h t r a i s m ,  ib of cutma, could not wm- 
pmamta for thLs missing factor by Tts own adom'' 
Trotsky's criticism of the Cornintern is the expression of the 
despair of a petty bourgeois frightened by fascism and dip 
believing in the revolutionary form of the proletariat. Trot- 
sky's propod policies, therefore, are policies of a frightened 
petty-bourgeois reformist. 
" b r a t i c  alopna and iHusiona [he mYa] cannot ba a h h M  
by dscree. It is neceasav t h ~ t  the ma- go ~hrough them and out- 
live them in the experience of battla . . . It ia l m e y  lo find 
the dpamie elements in tha p m t  M&va Pam- of dm 
working c l w ;  we mnst make tha mwea draw conchiom from 
hair d m t i c  logic; wa mmt widen a d  deepen the channeIa of 
Lha struggle." (Laon Trobky, #Our h n t  T&:' The M-L. 
December 9, 19S3.) 
In t h e  words ie cun&ed a whole program. It presupposes 
a v a t  political situation where black reaction is d e a W  
to reign supreme for a very long period and where them can 
be no thought of a determined proletarian fight for power. 
It presupposes a stabIe capitalist system. Tt assumes that the 
struggle of the workers for the improvement of their imme- 
diate conditions must newsadly p r d  in parliamentary 
channels. 1t therefore advanma the struggle for democratic 
reforms as the prime task of the workers. 
Like d l  such W-Democrat ic  creations it is both r e  
actionarv and nto~ian. 
It ia & & m a 6  became it gives up the proletarian struggle 
for power at a time when conditions are rapidly maturing for 
such a stmggIe. It is utopian because it is not possible for the 
1H 
workers at any time to conhe themeelm to Uhocratic alo- 
gans'' aIone if they are to defend heir right to live, 
I The workers are hungry. They are oppmmd. They must 
I fight for higher wag- mial insurance, against police brutal- 
ity, agabt  lynch laws. Whmmr they undertake a real fight 
they inevitably reach out beyond the limits of bourge,ois de- 
mocracy. They clash with the police. They defy the courts. 
They break injunctions. They forcibly annul evictions. They 
"riot". When capitalism is shaken and undermid as at present 
the # e k e  of pwuer becomes a task for the near fatare. Every 
fight is a step nearer to tbe aeiaure of power. Every battle givea 
the working dass new experience, t e a k  it the lessons of unity 
and o o n d  advance againat ihe bourgeoisie. Only such an 
advance can yield immediate improvement of the workers' 
l iva  today, can secure for them elementary rig& and better 
economic conditions. 
It is the c h s  straggle against c a p i t a h  tbat the Com- 
munists axe hwxib'mg on the banner of the working class- 
the c h i  struggle which in its sharpest fom is armed tip- 
rising, the hd battles for the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
It is c h s  coJhbor&'on on which Trotsky is building the 
flimsy structure of his "fourth international*' program, 
K i n  to a Tmtskpite "Bolshevik" exhorihg the world in the 
following pime of eonorous declamation: 
- 
"We, BoBheuiks, consider tbat the real salvation from fas- 
cism and war lim in the xdurionsry concpeot of power and 
the es-t of the p r o I e t h  dictatorship. [But o r  %&f 
is just a shadow, Wq Iifdese.-KJ.O.1 YOU, Socialist 
workers IRead : Sodd-Democratic bureau~~ata,--MJ.O.] do 
not agree to tlh ruad. Yon hope not only to mvw what harr 
been gained but a h  to move forward along tha mad of damoc- 
racy. [In 00Ilaboration with Rooam&, flidhrg and P&- 
AiJ.O.1 Gmdf An long as we haw not mdced yon and a t  
meted you ta our side we are redready to follow tbia road with you 
to the end, IIt ia ensier to W o w  you theP bothar with rank- 
aad-6le workera w p  may not agree to submit to 'democratic' 
edicts of chiefs of pblice-KJ.0.1 But we d m d  that you c m  
on the 8trude for democracy not in worda but in dseds [For in- 
~tance, lcr Norman Thomas pay a new * to the 'First Lady' 
of the I d -MJ.0 .1 .  . . . Makt your Party opm up a red x i n q -  
gle for a atmng democratic movement. IWhicb b to be even mom 
misIwfding than the Epic or IaFDllette mrrvernente which contain 
economie planks in their p r o p n u - W . 1  For this it is  necek 
1% 
m y  k t  of dl to s w e p  away dl the Pamnanta of ths feudal stata 
I t  is n- to give the suffrage to all men and woman who 
reached their 18th binhday, a h  to tht eoIdiem in the army IFor- 
gtt h u t  the hunger of t b  b y e  and girls. Give them the happi- 
nca of a d r a g a  that wiU ba a balm to their wound Incidentally 
it ooeb thn b lees than & ~ance . - -MJ .O.~  Full eon- 
m a t i o n  of l ~ t i v t  and mecutivn powsr in tha hands of 
ono c h m k l  Imt ywr Party open np a d o n a  campaign under 
thaw dogam! Lat it arouse milliom of mrkm let it conquer 
powerthmngbthudrh~ofthemawa [ H d f o r s a e w I b r t -  
N o b S c M d m m m a y  MeDodd go-t. - MJ.O.1 
Thb at an7 rats wodd bs a wrim at- of muq& @not 
fadam and war. IIn the  ma way ao Swarink Otto Bauer and 
Juliua Dcutsch fwgbt against h d e m  and war.-MJ.O.1 We, 
B o b h w i 4 w o n l d r s t r i t r t h a d g h t t o ~ h t o & e m & m t b s  
bu&enq of -tic -; we add not d o  q o n  ow- 
h the politid -- for ths sdd-Dsmoeratfe gm. 
ammmt; but wa rmdd honwtly hslp you in &a struggle far 
such a government [Wa would haIp you to dsccive tbt maws, 
-MJ.O.] Together with you we would repel all attach of bonr- 
gsoir reaction. [And help nhmt down wo&m and farmetm d o  
tnfW on 'democratic' lawn in their fight for bread.-WD.1 
Mom thaathat, we w o d d b i n d o d ~  b s f o m y o ~ n o t t o ~  
d m t a k e a n p r m o I ~ a ~ w h i c h g o h y o n d t h e l i m i t m 0 5  
daanocmcy (d democra~p) w long aa the maj* of h e  d* 
srs bas not w~~eioltsly placed iwIf on the aide of mludonary 
d I C r a ~ .  [It mill !m oar dewerati0 d a y  to b r d  'Ulhwror 
~ a n d t o ~ ' n n k w f d ' a m c m b l y J  Howdarst lmygo 
bspnd the limita of red bourgaie -craw!-bCJ.0.J" (Trot- 
sky, "Our P m  T&" The M-, December 9.1933.) 
It muat be made dear at the outset &at when Trotsky ad- 
- W f  to the "Socidist workers'', he means the S* 
chid hdzrs-th~~e who p m a t  the Saciah workera from 
engaging in the real elm struggle. It mnst be noted, ~ o u d l p ,  
that the program which he prop- in purely refoxmist Ha 
would Mp Social-Democracy to bccome the govenrment in a 
mptalbt State ('I~onestIy" help it); he wodd help S d -  
Damocracy improve h e  machinery of the capitdiet State; hs 
would bind W f  to rmdG& no actions that go beyond 
bomguois democracy (whm he twya -real democracy" lw ought 
to know &at such democracy exists only as the dictatomhip of 
the proletariat--and that everp bourgeois democracy, no matm 
how embellished, is a aham democrauy deaigsed ae a weapon 
of the exploiters against the exploid) ; in other w o r h  he 
undertab to help fasten upon the workers the rule of tha 
I!z4 
h 
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capitalists operating through the htnmmtality of bourgeoie 
fake democracy. It mnst be noted, third., that not in vain did 
Trotsky omit an& vital demands an higher wag- a shorter 
labor day, unemployment insurance, the right of the o p p d  
nati~nttlities. For, the moment the workers uudertake the fight 
for smh  demand^, bourgeois Iegality goes amash. Ths limib 
of bourgeois demooracy am overstepped+ Trot&y hpIieit2y 
promi= the ~ - D e m o c ~ a t i e  leaders not tu undertake saeh 
actions, not to countenance tham. Moreover, he h o w  well that 
when the Social-Democrats are in power they wiU we the Saate 
armed forces agaht  h a  workers if they undertake d acl- 
tion* Wben be appeala to tbe Sod-Democrats to i& with 
' him, be is forced to conhe himaelf to aach h o m o u s  de- 
mands as one chamber and b low+ of the voting age, 
It is only hem that the Mal-Democrats can me& bim half 
way. Aud it is on such a program that he k dllhg to bind 
up the fate of the Troiskyitee with the fate of ths Social-Deme 
matic l e a k  
Once more we have before tw tbe petty bourgeob who is 
paniestrictren. He h wm tbe advent of faacism. He believes 
that fascism has come to atay. He believes that the working clam 
is crushed. He calumniates the Communist Party of Germmy, 
saying that it ia dead when in reality it l h  and fighta He 
daes not wiab to we ths fo~ces making for a d i d  revolu- 
tion. IIe does not wi& to understand &a& onm the nmwx rise 
-and w h r w r  they &-they must fight for their Jivds, 
against hunger, against nnnihiIation at the h d a  of finance 
capital-and that meam 'fight against the capitaht State 
whether in its fasciet or in its democratic form. He dots not 
wish to m d h  that the w 0 r h s - h  maaaee of Phe workers, the 
majority of the workers-will join the bannw of stnrggle 
against the capitalists, which ia alwaya a smuggle rm&mhhg 
the capitalist Siate. He wanh to keep the mstssesl of workem 
from engaging in the struggle %aim& capidism rmder Com- 
munist leadership. He appeals to the S d - m a t i c  lead- 
ere for a mitad front on && program. No d r  he is 
against the d t e d  front a~ built by the C o d  Parti. 
Snch united front is directed o g a b  c a p i t a h  It d m  not 
build f o m  for capitalimn. It comes to &troy b. 
I 
i 
XlI ! 
The Trotskyites in the U.S.A. 
end of 1928 a group of Trorskyites was expel14 BYf2 t b  Communist Party of the U.S.A. %is group, 
headed by Cannon and Shachtman, had formed a faction with- 
in the Commdst Party and had begun to w r y  on an anti- 
P q  campaign. The Party at that time was divided into two 
factions: the Fosteritea and the Lovegtoneites-and t h e  fac- 
tions led an almost open existence. At any rate, they were 
hown both to the Party membership and to the Commnniat 
Intmnational to exist. Tbe Trotskyites, true to the tradition of 
their chief, kept the existen~e of their faction a aeeret. They 
had never undertaken to discuss Trotskyism witbia the Party 
~ m m i t k s .  They had never advanced any program different 
from the program of the exi&ng factions. In fw~ ,  they pre 
tended that they bad no differences of opinion that would dash 
with the opinions of one or the otber faction. NevertheIew, 
they banded together in a secret group hatchkg a conspiracy 
against the Party as a whole. 
They were a group of a dozen or two intellectuaIs without 
a mass base. Their nominal leader, Cannon, a former lawyer, 
had no background of either ideological or organizational 
work He. had been a member of the Central Committee in the 
days when Party life w a  abnormal, but he never bad any 
contact with broad masses of workers. Shachtman, who be- 
came the wtheor&an" of the Trotskyites, had been a minor 
functionary in the Party. They had no roots in tbe work'ig 
class Their "activities" in tbe U.S. consist in slandering the 
Soviet Union and the Comintern, and in vilifying the Com- 
1 
munist Party of the U.S.A. At times they inject themselves 
into an ecunomic stmggle of the workermnly to help the 
reactionary union bureauma-d the bosses. 
We shall conhe ourselves to a few charaderistic samples. 
On June 23, 1932, Stalin delivered a speech at a confer- 
ence 3 l e a h  of Soviet ind- on "New Conditions, New 
Tasks". In this speech Stalin enumerated six p o i n t d x  new 
I26 
conditions for the development of industry. The first three 
points dealt with the organization of work, the organization 
of wag- and the improvement of the conditions of the work- 
ers, the fourth point dealt with the tasIc of bringing forward 
and developing the k t  elements of the working clasa so that 
"the working clasli of the U.S.S.R has its own ind11stria1 and 
technical intelligentsia". "It is not any kind of highly t r 8 M  
personnel, of e n g k m  and technicians, that we need", S t a h  
said. "We need ~uch as are capable of understanding the 
policy of the working dam of our country, who are capable 
of absorbing that policy and are prepared to carry it out cron- 
scientiously. And what does that imply? I t  implies that our 
country has entered on a phase of its development where the 
working clam must create ita own technical and industrial in- 
telligentsia, ane that is capable of proMng ita intereste in 
production as the interests of the governing clam." Stalin 
then points out that the industrial and technical intelligentsia 
is to be recruited not d y  from people who have p a d  
through higher whmls of learning, ubut alw from the rank 
and file workers in our industries, from the skilled workers, 
from the working cIass cultural forcee in the mines, fac- 
tories, and workshops . . . We mwt not ignore a d  d o o k  
s h e  workers with initiative, brsd dvmx Am boldly lo corn- 
d i n g  positions, give them & oppriunity to display their 
copocity for orgmim&a and the opporttdy to elctelad h i r  
knowledge, d create suitable conditiow lor them to work in, 
and not spare any expense Jor this purpose." [Our emphasis 
-Wi.J.O.] 
The 6fth point dealt with the engineera and technicians of 
the old schoo1. Stalin said the Soviet Union must make gm&r 
use of these technical forces. There is a new mental attitude 
on the part of the old bourgeois intelligentah, says Stalin. 
Many of the old intellectuals who forxnerIy sympathized with 
the wreckers have now turned toward the Soviet "If, during 
the height of the wrecking movement", mys Stalin, "we adopted 
smashing tactics towards the old technical intellipmirt, now, 
when these intellectuals Ere turning towards the Soviet Power, 
our policy towards them must be one of conciliation and 
solicitude. It would be foolish and unwiae to regard almost 
every expert and engineer of the oId schools as an u n d d  
la? 
criminal and w ~ . "  The sixth point dealt with introdwing 
more efficient buainess accounting and wiih the n e  "tn 
increase the accumaIation of capital within industry itself' 
(Joseph Stalin, Leninism, Vol. 11, pp. 42M). 
The s p e d  had the effect of a vitalizing force &roughonL 
the Soviet Union. Here was a number of practical sug- 
@om which actllally &owed the way af improving work 
both in indmtry and 8griculttue. Here was a new vista 
openid, only confirming StaIin's previous statement that there 
were no fartrwaes the Bolsheviks wuld not take. A thrill of 
joy p m d  through the Soviet land hawse in thim speech mil 
Iions and dIiona d workers a d  engineere saw encourage 
mmt for their work and the deep wnvktion that the momen 
tow tsek of the Five-Year Plan mnld be achieved. 
But what did the American Trotdtyitw have to my about 
ShIi9's +? They mw in it+ step W. 'Tb 
is no doubt that the whole spirit of Stalin's 'new policy', the 
formal and o f f i d  adoption of which ia naturaIly a foregone 
mddn, marla a new step backward fmm the revolutionary 
pokim of Lain's timeH, says The M i l h a #  for July 11, 1931. 
Why this ie a step M w d ,  the Trot+m cannot explain. 
Wherein it Merg from the policim of h i n ,  except that it 
deab with new problem on a new stage of development, is 
equally W t  to detect 
But 10, thew Tram havs d k w c d  a hook on which 
to hang their calrrmniea "Sxialism," nays Th M P ~ u ,  "can- 
not be built up by bourgeois specialists. Not even the founda- 
tion for a socialist economy can be laid by them. Thq can 
be of great aid, but the main tat& requires the whoIe-hearted 
athasfasti4 calIactioe initiative, self-activity and participation 
of the pm~darian ma-'
It wodd aeem from the above that Stalin, the hitiator of 
d a l i s t  competitim, ia &IS& mllective initiative and self- 
actirity of the proletariat. The Trotskyite gentry aaeunm &at 
their readers did not read Stdin's speech. 
This ia about tha siae of all their attacks on the U.3.S.R 
Action that was intended to haaten socialist wna&on, adion 
that marked a decisive atep f o m d  in the completion of the 
Fiveyear Plan is p i d  an assarrender to the bourgeoisie, as 
a ~aep backward. 
1ZB 
I And so it goes on to this very day. Their attitude towards tbe Communist Internatid is ex- emplified by their attitude towards the Soviet Union. Wha the mrjd proletariat celebrated the new victory achieved by the 
dictatorship of the ~roletariat throd  the recognition of 
the Soviet government by ths government of the United Stat- 
the Trotskyites joined with the Social-Demwh of all stripes 
and with the bourgeoisie in pictaring the recognition ar a rur- ! render on the part of b Communist International. ~ b t  tarms 
of the agreement between Litvinov and Raosevelt, which fol- 
lowed exacdy the line laid down by hnin in 1919 for similar 
problems at that time, were interpreted to mean that the Soviaa 
government agrees to the abandonment of Communist activities 
in the United States. By &is the Trotskyites, &st, concurred 
in the bourgeois contention .that the Soviet governmeat and 
the Comintern are one and the same thing, secondly, they were 
trying to interpret a victory of the world proletariat as a defeat 
The rdles were divided, Tr&y hypocritically assured the 
American bourgeoisie through the Nsw R e f i l i a  that it had 
nothing to fear of Soviet recognition, while the Ammian Rot- 
+.dilated upon the "betrayal" of Communism by the 
Cornintern. 
Said Trotsky: 
'The more d d i v e l y  the Soviet barsan~ra~y has in& 
iteclf in ibs position an to national wciabm, tho mom the quea- 
tiom of inmmthd durim, and with them the Cornintarn, 
hare Imn relqatsd to tho background . . . The presoat h h t  
Government see4 with might md main, to insure ia intsraal 
murky a&er risk eonnscwd nor d y  with wam bat rmludona. 
Its httmational polhim hrvs bem &rmd frorn Warm- 
tiond-rewlutionary policim into t h e  which ars eonaonativs." 
{Leon T d ,  The New Republic, N-r 1, 1933.) 
Said The Mil- of October 21, 1933: 
"The Combtam L dead far tas m l u t i ~  . . . Tha p-t 
Cornintern ir an wp& appmm for dm d m h g  of the 
pdetarian vanguard. That % dl! I: S8 not mpdh of doing 
more. . . . Tha Cornintern, as the m w a l  agparatw, h a  b m a  
a brake on the rwlutionarg movment." 
The Trotskyites give their anpport to the lie of tbe bout- 
geoisie that the Comintern b an agency of the Soviet Govern- 
ment, that the Soviet Government L directly dictati3lg the 
las 
policies of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries. 
Tbis is one of their many waya of helping reaction. 
Their fulminations against the Cornintern must not be under- 
stood aa an e*pfession of their displeasure with the slow preg. 
ress of the world revolution. The fact is that the greater the 
achievements of tbe Soviet Union and the higher the rising 
wave of revolutionary movements the world over, the louder 
the Tr- shout that the Soviet Gnion ia in a siate of 
collapse and Conintern is "dead". 
The attitude of the Txotakyites towards the Communist Party 
of the U.S.A. is anituaily dictated by the same sentiments. 
JIM at ths time when the C-ania Party of the U.S.A., hav. 
ing rid itself of tbe counter-revolutionary splitters, had hgm 
to make headway, just at the time when it actually put itself 
at the baad of larga mamw of unemployed, formulating their 
demands and leading them in numerous stmggles for bread, for 
unemployment kurance, just at the time when it was i n m m  
ingly combeetiDg itself with mam strikes of workera in the 
basic irrdmirk, forming their moat militant and clasmmdous 
~ j l l a t a t t h e t i m e w h e a t h s P a r t p w a e b a g i n n i n g t o  
M o n  aa a xeal Commmbt Party which was inspiring even 
d m  of the petty bourgeoisie with oanfidence and the d i n g  
class with feur, the Trotskyites found h e  following to sap 
about it: 
l r a s ~ t P a r t p o f ~ U n i t e d S c l t m h s q i n ~  
o n I y s t a g m t b a o r ~ n t o d  . . . T h e l d d d p i m p d  
n p m t b m P a r t y b s h i n d i t s b m c k a t t h e h t h ~ t i o n b  
dmd a tragic b m h p t q  in dl fieldr. IThe Party Idemhip 
waa doIf dmtd u a m t h n  of duly dmd ddqmw afw 
a diacumlon k the rmita of the Party, in Saction and 
met codttoncm on the problew of the day, the program and 
twda d ths Gmmmist Party-M.J.0.I. The fir tha laad- 
d 3 i p o f t l i e C o m m r m t t P a r r g h a r d a 1 . ~ t c h a r -  
a c t m , b e * a r s i n g i n ~ b d h c t p r o p o r t i o n t a t h i a ~  
ingpdbWcgof-. [Ju~tuthardmatheIcadmhipof 
t b s P u t y w a a ~ t h s o o n f i d ~ o f t b e r o n k a n d & i n a  
- nsmr known m ite history. For rhe f i t  tims then WM 
baing mtablhhed real undmtmdiq a d  m ~ d  d a a n s  
~ a l d ~ d t b e b n l l r o f & e P ~ .  Th# 
i t d f i n a n e w ~ d h o p d ~ m d ~ t h ~ a m o a g h  
Party qkit trlricb i n b d  mn-Party madem- 
MJ.O.1. The Party m m k a  am rPlsd like pbid aafh the 
~ L I ~ ~ ; d l l i * s d f r a s ~ l i T s ,  
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all iniiiaLive, dI inwry and discuwion of vital problerna are 
$wed upon appemncs. [Thb waa the time when tbt weve 
of mass in.which the Puiy pdcipted, and the mow 
m a t  of the unemployed, which the Par@ initialed, organid and 
led, ntceeeitatd the broadest dimmaion of tbm new ta& con- 
fronting the Party, tbs new msrhods of work to ba applied, d 
the bidatim h m  M o w  t h ~ t  had to bs srim&ted It ia jllet 
atthattimsdla&newIi€eWampoarsdinto~Zowerunitsd~ 
Party, and for th h t  tima in many yeam hem was a red, 
rhmbbing vi- y h  many sectiom of t b m  PUQ-WJ.~.]. 
TBs hrp M taught a r e a d o n q  contmpt fox themtlaal 
coneideratione and i a  instilled inst& with a vulgar $racticalam'. 
lti~told,incflcct,todo theplrork1hEommandsd w do mdnot 
ta do any hhkhg or &wing &out it. [In the last few 7- 
wpmidy aimx the unification of tha Pw in 1W, the ode of lit- 
m ~ r s  i n d  tunfold. Fmdamaatal w o h  of M a q  Engeh, 
h u h  wem distributed among tho P m  mtmbero and &a mrkm 
~ d y b y t h s h ~ o f t h o s n d a I L i e a ~ o f p a m p b l c f a  
dwIing with e~ery phw d -can and internaiional Me wen 
pubMed. Party p r o b I ~  in the 6mt place the n d t y  of thaw 
r a t i d  study, am h g  diwussed not in c l o d  P w  units, 
b t u a l a o i n o p e 3 1 ~ p ~ e r i a g s t ~ w b i c h a r e p p . w ~ i s  
admitted. Nsr~lr ha ha P m  lad mmh an intsllls idmhghl 
life m it d w  at prarsllt--MJX).] It b ~~ ukm by aur. 
p ~ w i t h n s w ' t ~ ' , Q ~ t h s o l d ~ i f ~ ~ U # i e  
s*plainsd away M ths lww pofiep in jwtKd [If &a Pmy 
w 6 T e w a l d r p t i n e ~ t o a m c u a d i ~ d l e ~ t ~ l m n l d  
say ~ i r L & a g n a t h g ; w h i t ~ a d m p t I t e s a f t o ~ g  
condltionn hey CBU it 'SU~~CII tttnw'MJ.O.]" (Tk M d b u ,  
July 25, 1961. UThmia for P r s C o d m a ~  D i d o m . " )  
The unwary reader, upon seeing the Tr- deaomca 
what they call b'haucratim and "mpatim'', would naturally 
concI& that thwe people are Bolshevilrs who like nothing 
'6e#er than to advancu the muse of the mo1ution. Noehing 
of the kind. They Iet the cat out of the bag in the fol1owing 
"demand" to tbe Party: 
~ ~ P a a p m W t d i e c a r d I t s c r a d a a a l ~ o f t h s t e m p o  
o f d e t f s l a p m s n t d h ~ k h g ~ a d m ~ a d j m t i b ~  
t o t h e r s l l d a t i ~ p o f f o ~ i u ~ ~ ~ m d ~  
pa- of itr dwdopmsnt. Ths Pmty must finally rid its& of dm 
~ ~ d ~ ~ o f h 4 h 3 r d p s r i d ' a p d ~ .  
M y o f t h b ~ o f ' w ~ . "  (IU) 
Hem we have it. The Party, don'tyou u o n m h a t m  the 
tmpo of tba revoldonarg davelopmmt in the U.SA The 
Rot&yitea do not beIiem there is eaoh a develop- in 
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existence. In 1931, two years after the beginning of the crisis, 
they deny tbe possibility of a revolutionary upurge They 
still persist that there ia no such Wi as the third period. 
There is no radicalization, in their opinion, Abow all things 
tbey are wroth at the fact that the Communists call the Wald- 
mans, Solomons, Lees, Cahans, P d m s ,  and other d o n -  
ariee in the leadership of the Socialist Party social-famh. 
Mr. Cannon does not hiink that they are s o c i a l - f a s h  He 
thinks they are good Socialists, The Party ia doing them wrong. 
Eefora electione the Trobkyites sanctimoniously "end-" 
the Communist: Party. They write in their MBiimu: "Vote Com- 
man'ist." In b article itself they explain that the vote ia to 
show 'bow negatively have the wrong Stalinist policia and 
program repelled this M w a r d  shiftw. In other worda, they 
appeal to the votere to show that the Comuniats are wrong, 
How can t h y  ahow it? Naturally, by iefrahhg from v h g  
the Commmht ti& 
They oall this "strategyn. The 8trategy of mega& 
The practical activiti~ of the Tmtakyitea are limited mainly 
to intarlarence of tiny grouplets with the undertabgo of the 
w o r k  * C O - d  1-, be it a t r i k  the move- 
menb of b rmemplbyed, ~~ or hmgtr much. 
Here is an example: 
The Communist Party is organizihg a national hunger march 
for the end of November, 19s. The hunger m a d  ia a real 
unitad hont movenmt. The ddqates are electcd at me&ngs of 
l a k  d o n a ,  unemployed councils, maea meetings, mma work- 
ers' conferenw. The overwheIming majority of the deregatm 
arrr non-Party w o r k  b y  of them participate for the ht 
time in maes action The Trotskyit- who o&dbIy clamor 
for the nnited front, are here to pour aome of their venom in 
corndon with the m a d  What do they have to say? Simply 
thibthat  tbe leadership of the march d m  not advocate an. 
emp10pcmt iasurmce. "Immediate relief is to replace man- 
ployment mmance as the main mtrd slogan", a0 they in- 
terpret the movement. Their task is to show that the hunger 
march is not to h eapported. They call it 'a subordinated 
audiary Commnnist work9'-thereby implying tbat as sach it 
does not d m e  amat sapport (The M i i i w  Nov. 5, 1932). 
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Such are the tactics of the Trotskyites. That much is the 
value of their dec1amatioa about the united f r o n ~  
It cannot be mid that they were a factor in the strike mow 
ment of the laet yeam Only in isolated cases, by sderance of 
the Iaaders of the A, F. of L, did individual Trotskyites inject 
themseivee into a a& situatio-there to carry out the pol- 
ides of the reformists. In the Patemon textile strike of Sep- 
tember-Octohr, 1933, which was betrayed by the Lovestoneites, 
Kdlw and Ruben- the participation of the Trotskyites 
expressed itself mainly in cullaboration with the union bureau- 
mats. The Communists were called splitters and traitors where- 
as KeUer and Rubenstein were painted as the real lightere. 
h m e  instance they did ~ u d  in aeauming part of the 
leadership of a strike and that was in tbe truck drimm' strike 
in Mimmpoh in the summer of 1934. Three Trobkyites, I I i~mwn, ~ m n e  and stoglunti, were fie leadem of L ~ U ~ S T ~  
of the General Drivers' Union under whose auspicee the strike 
was conducted. These leaders gave the strike a typical re- 
formist tarn. 
The employers were trying to spread the red =are. The lead- 
ers of Local 57% ;&ad of explaining to the workers the 
meaning of such a mare, denid that they m e  Camm-, 
In a leallet kued during the strike we read: 
'Don't dlow tha red scare tp keep you from coming to thia 
meting. U we wem 'Rd aad 'Cmnmuniats', why hasen't we 
pulled tha petraIeum hdustry out on atrika whom a large part 
of our orgmimtion h?" 
This was subsequently lauded by The Miiitunt as "i&g 
the isue squarely". 
"In Trim, the cry of Communist tom a deep bole in b 
front. In Minnespolii, it m a d m t a  dud, The ldem f a d  
the issee sqnady.  Thby did not d M o  print denying thair 
accdms.  Nos did they b n t  their opdtlions to the wide world." 
(Tk M i Z h w ,  A u p ~ t  25, 1934.) 
There was the issue of martial law in connection with that 
strike. Governor Olson of MiDaesota declared martial law 
in 1Cltinneapolia The employers, org& in the Citizens' 
AUiance, fought the martial law becaw they did not want I 
Olson to have too much power and because they Mie* that 
the strike could be we11 taken care of by ld police. The 
133 
C i h '  AIliance~ applied in the cowb for an i n j n n c t i ~ ~  
against martial law. The gov&or s t o d  fu-m against the lift. 
ing of martial law. The T r o t a m  upheu h g-r* 
Brown, prcsidmt of Local 574, dee1ard: "We are naturally 
p l e a d  to M the governor'rr haad upheld in hia declaration 
of martial law and I Mieve that the decision contrlbatee to 
the development of conditione likely to end thh &." 
The Trotskyites p d e d  from the premise that Olson, 
being a Farmer-Laboriie, in really not represmting tbe capital- 
ists, that he is some kind of a n e d  person who can be swayed 
one way or the other. 
The mtinuation of martial law meant the defeat of the 
strike. Instead of fighting martial law by continuing mass 
picketing, by broadening the strike, by calling out other in- 
d d e g  for the support of the truck drivers' strike, the Trot- 
akyita put their hope in Olson. 
There was a great sentiment for a genera1 strike in Min- 
neapolis, The Communist Party advanced the idea of a united 
labor conference which should decide the quat iw of a en- 
erd strike "with the object to fight for the rights of the work- 
ers to join unions of their own choice, for the right to iicket, 
for freedom of speech and d l a g e ,  the release of our 
brothers in the stockal  and for the lifthg of all military 
replations, which threaten to break the strike''. The Corn- 
mamiats pointed to the experience of San Frau& where a 
general strike tied up nearly all economic activities for five 
days. They said: What was done in San F r a n c h  can be 
done in Minneapolis. Tbe Trotakyitee were f a d  with such 
an overwhelming mtiment of the workers in favor of the 
gmeral strike that h y  could not reject it point blank, They 
did it-by referring the quation to the leadera of the A. F. 
of L in Mimesoh.  
Says the Orgcwrizer, o h 1  strike organ, Augaet 18, 1934: 
"h view of ?ha con& athck on hd 574 by d the f o m  
of capital, in labor rmdy to brhg its own rmema into action 
[ic, call 4 g s n d  a-MJD.] P That b the question. The 
a n a m  m ~ ,  kt,with dm I d e n  of organid labor in Mbmmp 
olis, and w n d ,  d p h  tha rank d Us of the individual uniom 
with whom tha powm of dscidon wta," 
'ITfie leaders of organized laborH-those were the reformbta 
I of the Central Labor Union of Minneapolie who were o p p d  tooth and nail to &a gemeral The general strike was killed. The truck drivers' d a n d a  were not d e f i e d  although the d e n  had the power to force c o n d o n s  from the anplayer& 
What is the r6le of the ~r&tes? They cover hmd- 
with revolutionary phraaea They believe they are ter- 
ribly concerned over the p r o w  of ttaa world revoldon. In 
reality they hamper the revolntionarp mooement by their prop- 
aganda and their tach. This 4 1  band of disgnmtIed 
petty-bourgeois individuals has one aim-to dimedit revolu- 
tionary theory and revolutionary practice. 
The folIowing p m g e  from om of the Trotskyite ' ~ ' '  
fib the authors perfectly. Yi'he task of the b f t  Opposition", 
they say, '5s not ?he organbation of a new party oat of the 
d-reformist, semi-syndicalist, demoraliaed, passive, b d -  1 out e ~ a m t a  on the fringe of tbe ~ommuniat movementyy. ~b 
Trorskyites unconsciously gave an emllent p b  of them- 
ad- Thae people have nothing but b d - h d  for the 
living revoltltionary rnovmww of the hatred for an 
o r g d  Bolshevilr Party tbat heada the mvofutionary mow- 
ment, h m d  for democratic mtrdism which guarantees a 
rnaximlrm of force with a maximum initiative from below in 
a Bolhtwik Party, hmed for the prototype of B o l s h e d  
the Communist Party of dm U.S.S.R, hatred for the leadm 
of that Party, and htttred for the Communist International. 
In the name of 'Tommunjam" they s p a k  h a  sitma language 
as Hamilton Fbh, Matthenr WoH, William Randolph Haarst, 
and Abraham Cahan. ' 
Says T q  M i l i f m i  for Febrnary 10,1934: 
~ o f a ~ r ~ r h a t i f i t l t b a ~ f o r p w s r t h s f ~ h a r s  
b o r r o w e d ~ t I y f n w B o ~ ~ i n t h s ~ p s r i o d t h s  
S o v i e r b t r r s r u e r a e p ~ ~ ~ w i t h m a n y ~ o f  
v i c t o r i ( ~ 1 ~ f a & q b a t  of an bygetthsdd O f ~ e o n t m l  of ths 
Partp aad m t a b w g  the d t  of ths LmhA 
With an innocmt mien the T d y i t e a  ask: Why ia &em 
atiIl such a Uharah" dietatorship in the Soviet Union? We 
were told, they say, fhat M i s m  means the &lition of 
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claesea That being so, there must b no iaternal enmiea I& 
Why then a strong government? 
' T h h m h  chracmof tha&tat+ i B c a u d  b r b  need 
of sup- the miebnw of ths ovsrtbpown fuling e l m a  and 
to ~ C & M  th& a~~mmio motg But according M the o6cial 
t l m r p ~ ~  t a s l c o f t h n ~ ' ~ t a t e  b i n  themain aehiewd. 
The Second FimYear Plaa rvill merely bave to eomplsts it." 
still, 
"Tho Second FimYar Plm . . . doeri not foreate st all a 
mitigation of go-t m i o n ,  nor a dem- m the budget 
of the G.P.U. The d i n g  bureaumq d m  not prepare in the 
lo@ to &a np itu mmmmdhg positions, oa the contrary, i t  
auppIim thsm with e m  new and more mataid gmrmtcekU 
r rke M- F- 10,~934.) 
When tbese lines mra written did the Trobkyitea of M c a  
maintain a direct connection with the " w a d  Center" out 
of which came the assawination of Kirov, or were they only 
appraised of its exhtmce? We wonder. 
One thing seems clear: w h  these gentry complain againat 
tha %ling bmmucracy", against the G.P.U., a g a  what 
they &I 'bobrcion", wban they are d i d d i e d  with diacipIine 
that e x h ,  aa they say, "even within the formal framework of 
the Party*', when they exaggerate about the "harshnw" of 
the dictatomhip of the proletariat, sayhg that it never was eo 
emn ''during the g e m  of the civil war9'*-they speak for them 
selves, They w d d  like the d i c t a s d p  of the proletariat to 
be lax so as to allaw the Trotskyite disruptem to do thsir 4 
work m e w .  
When they receive a blow, when they we that Soviet justice 
can be memilem againat the class enemy, they put forward 
James P. Cannon to propose d o n ,  
#We contend [-yo Canaw] that ths present msthodn of rbn 
StaliD W p  . . .b aiming a mortal blow at Ruedm 
dabnW. T b s ~ g ~ o t l ~ w d d l c a d t h e S m i e t ~  
a8 it Ied ths k m a n  woxk€ng c h q  bhdfddud to amtropha 
Thshtamadonat~cIambtheonepollmrinthaworldtbu 
canprmmttbcnMHmph ~ m ~ t d o m b i t u o w n ~ a t c t w t ,  
a r ~ ~ i n t h s h ~ o f ~ R E l u w i o m ~ 1 ~  
% o ~ t h a l ~ d a u m m o o m s t o d l e d d o f t h e  
S o r i a c U n h a o r r a g a b t r h s ~ d a n g m w h i E h ~ ~ ~ ~ i t  
from w i t h h *  (The M w  l h d m  2& 1%) 
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Leaving aside all tbe protestations of friendship for the 
'LrevoXution" in the abstract, for the "working class" gemrally 
-what dam this oatponring mesa? It is an appe .  to d o n .  
It prepares the minds of the workers for the support of inter- 
vention in the Soviet Union. It makes the reader believe that 
anything is h r  than the rule of the Commlmist Party in the 
Soviet Union. 
F?m this to h a  decision of aome hdhed follower to kill 
the leadera of the revolution-ie d y  one step. 
Political gro~lps and parties shodd be judged not by their 
words, but by their deeda, we were toId by Lenin many times. 
The crown@ deed of the American trot sky it^ reveals them 
in full Jigk They fused w f i  the M w h k s  in the WorlEera 
P a f q  01 the U.S. 
Who i s  Muste? We shall quote the Trotskyite~ thenmlves. 
In The Mil- for July 4, 1931, they speak about "the in- 
herent reformist poaition of the Musk type of 'progressive'." 
After the formation by Mute of the Conference for Progressive 
Labox Action, The H W  had the following to 8ay editorially. 
First it enumerated a number of names, one of them a formsr 
Lovestoneite "who renounad wen that mild variety of Com- 
m u n h  in order to crawl into &a C.P.LA"; then another one 
who w u  expelled from the Commnni~t Party and had s h e  
been engaged in defending the Hillman regime of blackjacking 
the workers; then Muste himseif, %he leader of pseudo-prm 
@vee in the labor movementH, and them it continued: 
W am dsmenta without a poIitical bow the &mic ar- 
pmtR of centrlem who seek to repeat today the farcical e x g d  
meat medo a d d s  ago wit& tha formtion of a Two and a 
Iklf Znwmational'. Thu tha mponsom of the new Pe*tg ham 
~ e y m t n m d t o w a & t h s ~ ~ t s d e ~ t h T & '  
n;nPlaadmofthsBritiehInd t L a b o r P ~ t o b n i l d a  
mew Tntmnational' w o t  be XZS f o r a n h m a ~  I t i s  
B q o r d j l y s s ~ s t A B t s h c s ~ ~ d a d i r i o f f o j s h e T w o d a H d j Z ~  
t%tmtiolh4 bddk# A- 'stcth', la fok th8 PrsL 
b & ~ t k m n p o j S o & L h ~ ~ r o m w h k h t t a m ~ e d  
[Our -MJ.O.J. No 0 t h  fate i rr  mewed for &e psttg- 
b o ~ b ~ w h o ~ p t t o e k e o u t a ~ ~ ~  
~ o n ~ b e d s a b ? h e 1 * 0 ~ ' ~ ~ t i o a l ~ t l w  
S m S - ~ o c r . c y c y U  (Tk M- A m t  8, 193L) 
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Muste's Confemme for Pmgmdve Labor Action waa Iater 
tramformed into the h r i c a n  Workere Party. A d W  to it 
m s  a number of dbgmded individuals who &led t h d v s e  
Commnuh but whom Communism consieted d y  in &@- 
i n p l ~ ~  ideologically. Hera was Max Ea&man, 
the euthor of anti-Marxiat books; ham was Sidney Hook whm 
book on Marr is one groa distortion of Maraiam; h was 
V. F. Calverton who for numy years published an &-Mamian 
maghe ,  etc. 
Tha American Workera Party was formed by adding these 
individuals to the Conference for Pmgmmive h b o x  Accion. 
The moving spirit in the new "Party" remained the d d  pro- 
w i v e  r e f o w  Maste, whose role in b e  labor nnim con- 
sisted in co-operating with the worst labor buraaucrata and 
covering up their polidea with progressive phr-. 
By the end of 1934 the Trotskyite group joined the Amar- 
ican Workers Party. It f w d  with the Mwts group, forming 
the Workmi Party of the U.S. Csnnon bai t  tbie fusion. la 
The M i t W  for Novembar 17,1934 he expmsm c o & h  
that the formation of this *party" will bring about C o d  
unity. "The chaos and dhhtegration wi l l  give pIam to a dear 
line-up of partha: Social.Democratic, Stalinist (htrist) and 
the party of revoIationfq Mmxklm." 
The party of repolutioplay Marxism ia tbe one that camhb 
of b o a  plus MIS&, Eastman, Hook, Calvmktw and a nnmbw 
of other intellectuals who have never been M a m h k ~  
By ttwir action will political gronpe be r e c o p i d .  
The Trobkyh  felt too in- Like the lean cows of 
Pharaoh they "ate up" the Musteitee "and it could not be 
known that t h y  had eatGn them". They boast of having m- 
8oIidated "revolutimary M+': This is a clown's 
The m w  "partyn is no* but a typicsl tw0.and.a-half inter- 
national formation. That it will sooner or later sink into the 
lap of the Sneoad bmmtional is attested by the example of 
the T-ts group of France, which hae joined the Fraaeh 
sddist Party* 
* a *  
An example of TrWb macity. 
One of the firet ada of UWorkm Party of U.S." wes to 
g m t  tlae annivemary of Lmin'a bath with a ledat, k&'s 
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Testament. Tbia piece of Trotskyite calumny, which decries 
uStaliniam" as W e ,  &Loyal and bureaumatic", reprod- 
what is purported to be an authentic document wri- by 
Lenin in l923 and " s n p p d n  by the Commdst Psrty of 
the U.5.S.R The docmmt ia suppod  to state that Trotsky 
is more fitted to be general secretary of the C o m m W  Party 
than Stah, who is "too rude". 
Of t b  "Lenin'a wiIl" Trorsky, while still a member of the 
Communist Party, had the following to say ia an article en- 
titled, Trmh Trounces Em- pubIi&ed in the D d y  
Worker (Mew York) August 8,1925. 
"Aa for the 'dl, Xi n w m  left one, and the very nature of 
fiia relathno with the Party an d aa the nature of the Pa* 
itself made on& a 'wiil' &duDaly hqwaible. 
'La the g u h  of a 'wiIP ths smigre and fomign bmrgwb and 
Menshevik have all dong b m ~  quo* one of LBnin's let- 
ters (eompldy  mutilatwI) which contains a mmJIclr of a&- 
on questions of  organhtion. 
"All t e a  abut a d or hfringed 'will' is so much mis- 
chievous invention b t e d  against the d will d Lenin. and of 
the intereats of the Party craated by him" 
When it was in Trotsky's inmest to divorce himself from 
such a "disciple" as Max Eastma (whme bo* S k  L a i n  
D i d ,  was a stench in the nostrils of e w q  revoluti&) Trot- 
sky wrote a scathing article refuting the legend about Ldu's 
will and concluding with the wordhi: "Hirr (Eastman's) booklet 
can only render service to the worst enemies of Communism 
and revolution. It therefore objectively eonetitutes a weapon 
of counter-revolution" (Ibd.) .  When it was in Trotskf~ in- 
terest to make a show of far-flung intlnence, Eastman is made 
one of the pillars af the new "party of revolutionary Marxism'' 
and the "mischievous invention"' is peddled as h h ' s  will. 
Now Trotsky again publishes a pamphlet to show that the 
41 testament" was true. 
These eaunter-revolutionists have so much enZangIed them- 
selves in a network of lies and falsebmds that thev cannot 
make a single move without perfidy. 
Le~iin said: "Trotsky always lives on gossip." 'Trotsky 
deceives the workers in most ~ p t 1 1 0 ~  and ahamel- 
manner.'' 
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Discussing Leain's 'Testament'' at th- Plenary Session of 
the Central Committee and the Central Control Cornmiasion of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October, 1927, 
Stalin brought out the fact that the document was not a "testa* 
ment", that it was a letter addressed by Lenin to the Thirteenth 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that the 
letter had been read at the Thirteenth Congress, and that the 
Congress unanimonsly h i d e d  not to publish it, among other 
remom because Lenin himself did not wjsh or ask ,for ita 
publication. Such letters a d d r m d  by Lenin to individual 
Party functionaries and Party conferences were not uncommon. 
The letters were read by those to whom they were addressed- 
and there was no "co~cealment". This of k i n ' s  
T m e n t "  was dealt with repeatedly at the Plenary %&ms 
of the Central Committea and Central Control Cammidon, 
said Stah at the above &OII-d cries were heard from 
the floor: "Dozens of timd"' Surely the Party did not aver- 
Iook the letter in question. 
As to the eontents of tbe letter, Stalin pointed out that the 
Party hzd nu rmon to be h t i s 6 e d  with it or try to hide it, 
because it actually andilated three leaders of the opposition, 
w h m  about StaIin it only mentioned his "rudened but 
fd no rn- in hk poi&icad fine, Stalin quotes the fol- 
lowing p-ge from Lenin's lemer: 
"I m b d  not h c t &  any other members of rha Central 
Committee with regard to their political qualitita. I &odd Uke 
merely to remind you Pat the October episode [opposition to the 
&am of power-MJ.0.1 of Zboviev and Kamsnev was ao mcm 
ehPncs ommmca bur that it can jmt as little bc regarded M a 
pwsond fault a~ T&I Inon-Bold~evism'P ( I n p w r r ,  No. 6& 
I W ,  p* lm.1 
St& calls attention of the s&on to the fact that, 
Y . . not a single word, not a sin& allmion in the 'Tcmmmt' 
t o m b  on Stab's mhkes. Ody hia denma i 6  msnibnwl. Lmk 
of civility, h w m ,  b not 4 &ortmmiag in $&'a political atti- 
tude or p o H t i 4  p&on aad cannot ba m." {Ibid.) 
As to Lenin'~ suggeetion " b t  the aomrdes should h u m  
tha &on of dhmidng Comrade S t a h  from  hi^ post and 
appoinring for it an&r pemn who, in all ohm rapeat, is 
only distinguished from Stalin by one quality, i.r, that of being 
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more tolerant, loyal, civil, aud ooneiderate towards the corn- 
rades. less moody, e t ~ " ,  Stalk said: 
"k'm Comrades, I am rude towards those who are rudely and 
disloyally dwmyiug and disintegrating tha Party, I haw naver 
made a becret of it and shall not do so now. Evan at the first 
meeting of the PIenq  -on of &a Central Cammi- 11924) 
I hsnded in my mignation of tbe function of Gsllaral Secretary, 
asking the Pleaary W o n  to xelieva ma of this duty. Tha Party 
Congress itself M t  with thig question. Every singla delegation 
dealt with thii qudon, and a l l  the delegations, i d d w  Tmt. 
siq, Kameneu and Z i h  [Our emphaeie--MJ,O.) nnanimoualy 
w o l d  that Ssalin should d n  in Ma paat. What could I do? 
Relinquil my pont? It in not in my character to do so. 
''1 have never abandoned a post, whatever post it waa And I 
have no right to abandon it, becam that would be d d n  As 
1 have mid before: 1 am not a free man; when the Party binds 
me. I have to submit A year later, I woe mom handed in my 
resignation, but tho Party agaln obliged m to remain in py post. 
What elw could 1 do?" (IbCd.1 
The "fourth iniemationai" now preached by the Trotakyita 
is only a summing up of the main features of the vanguard 
of oormter-revolution. 
The Tmtskyib "ahw1d b$in open negotiations with the 
Left G a l i s t  orgedzations", mid Cannon in October, 1933, in 
fulfillment of the program of his master. The Trotekyitw were 
sucwasful in their negotiations. In France the Trotskyites 
joined the S&Ii& Party in order to strengthen it at the pres- 
ent epoch when massea of workera are moving to the Left, It 
b the aim of tb Trdskyib to make the Socialist Party of 
France more attrmtive to the w o r k  "If the Communists try 
to dhrganize the Socialist Party", writes their organ, the V& 
C o t d t e ,  No. 38, 1934, "then only our idem and our 
methods may inject a revolutionary k&l into the Socialint 
Party, enabling it to r&t complete crash". The Trobkyim 
desire to be that pink tint on the yellow oouDtenance of the 
Ieadmhip of the Second hternationa1 which wiU keep the 
workers from joining the r m h  of the revolutionary movemat. 
The merging; of the Trotsky group with the patty of tbe 
Second International is, in true Trotsky fashion, I m U  as 
a progmaive factor. 
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"We hrxbu leap h e  V o k  Commankk, NO. !W, 193ql 
must acknowledga that at the given ~noment the merging of the 
two partien d d  be pmpwdyc not in campariron with W s  
al- of 1914, not in oompdmi 6th the T o m  COB-, but 
in olwlpdmn nitk tbe p-t situation. Am 8x14 the merging 
of bth p& would eignify the p d b i l i t y  of mew. 
This is the -ce of the entire queetion." 
The  working dam mwemsnt ham besn driven into an hbtorical 
imparwe . . . and &a bsginning of tho impmw, the 'capitula- 
tion' io t n d  ioto a p-e factor!" (Both quotati- 
tukan iram The CommuAfa InwmwionaC No. 21, Novsmber 5, 
=I 
At the time when m m  of Socialist workers are becoming 
d b a W e d  with the policies of the Second International and 
are joining fhe united front of militant action with the Com- 
munists, the Trotskyitm are attempting to return to the pre- 
1914 era, to '!I+ anew". As if nothing happined in thm 
twenty yeam As if you can turn the wheels of history back- 
w a d  
Let us see now who's who in the "fourth internatioaaIg'. The - 
German Trottkyh group, which was never strong, liquidated 
itself in Jauaary, 1933. Tta paper, Di& Permmew Rcuolu- 
. tioh declared that the estimations of Troasky m regard tbe 
U.S.S.R., Germany, Spain, a11 proved wrong. There is hardly 
a Trotslrfite group now among the German c*bY not to 
qd of Germany proper. Tbre is a tiny group in Englad, 
entirely iaeignificant. There ia the French group which is 
united in legal wedlock with the Socialiet Party. There in tbe 
Anmican group which is d t e d  with Maete. They would like 
to take with them into tbs fourth international &a whole So- 
oialist Party of France. ' b y  will try to tab with them into 
the fourth international thc Workers Party of tIte U.S. Can my- 
body doubt that it will be an international of reaI "BolsHevik- 
Imhistd"' Perhaps the fourth international will be joined by 
an& ' ' Labgrad  Csnter" which, mder the slogan of Trot- 
tky-zinovim, i~ just now hatching new mnepiraciea against 
the Sovie4 laaders. 
A d  this hodppodge of reformist and Trdcy ib  awn- 
eratm, thia pack of dbpmtled intellwtua1a aching to be mtlsa, 
leaders, this medley of stnthmb, &, opinions, progrant, 
''ppIansm all earn thra* with h e ,  dl covering up re- 
fonniem with high-sounding "revolutionary" and -
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phraaes, all intended to convey something different from what 
the principal figures actually L l i e v A  concoction which 
is anly besmirching the name Communist, is ad-oed as that 
international body which is destined to win away the workers 
of the world from the Communist International. 
A historical analogy is not out of place here. Betwem~ 1912 
and 1914 Trotsky bad a dream of uniting+alI the factione of 
the R d a n  Mensheviks and some of the '%etterW Bolshdm 
(those whom he hoped to split away from Lenin) jnto one big 
party of which he, Troteky, would b the acknowledged leader. 
He had hen his own tiny faction, and published a paper in 
Vienna He joined the bloc of several factions of t&e Men- 
sbaviks known as the August Bloc. He then began to preach to 
the Bolbvika to desert b n i n  (whom he considered dm Ieader 
"oj bhG redonmy winf of the Xal-Democratic Party) 
a d  to jain the child of hb brain, His argumentation at that 
time very much re~emblea that explaining the fourth interna- 
tional today. He believed that he reprwmtud Ma* &as a 
whole". T&e BoMevih, in his opinion, were one-sided; the 
M e d m k  wem also owided He, Trobky, alone WWJ the 
conrmmm* Marxist. 
He formulated his concept in the following words: 
%bp&tiou wbichin h s d  on 4 dbhctid m d m t w n  . . d 
t b s ~ . n d ~ ~ ~ ~ o f ~ m o v a n s a t ~  
t o h b o r h  [ t o ! h e M ~ a n d B o ~ ]  t ~ b s ' m d b  
~ ' o t ' t h s g o b n m i d d b d .  H a t i n p r ~ ~  
h o p a r & t h a p ~ y f a i l t o ~ i t w h i t ~ ~  
s u n d i n g - b k k ~ s b o p s m a w h & ~  -Rw- 
B;an m p b  P* IT Tm&, No. 1,1914) 
Here. taa. we have Hths do& and the revolutionaw 
have an appeal to the M d w h  and 3 0 1 ~  not t i  be 
one-sided but to m& Trotsky aa the t ~ e  I ader of Marac- 
im. h i i n  found ni words &ng enough to m d p t e ,  this 
atand 
Wen liks TroPaky tbs wmteJ, ppith his idated p b  about 
&a R h  M - D o n t i e  Xaboa Party and with hio 
era* before tha Liquidatom [amma Right Tdcdurbl 
d m  ham no&& in c m m n  with tho RwIaa 
~ P . t t g , a r a n o ~ t k u ~ r I B i c t i o n d o ~ ~ ~ .  Thqmntm 
I d a .  mnsr on the chagp pmdmat ef 6cm&ation*-~ 
 my^,^^^ . . . . r a d i ~ t h s f a m ~ o f  
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mudaring Mort tht Liguidatorn who are building a Stolypin 
Labor Pacty [Stolypin wae &a Tsar's prim mhhutr]" (V. L 
M n ,  Collected Worka, Hllssian Edition, VoL XV, p. 191.) 
Tben as now a wave of revolutionary movement was ris- 
ing. The d a r b t  times that followed the Revatution of 1905 
were drawing to an end. It was felt that the w o r h  had 
recuperated and were ready to stwt a new round of rev01ution. 
The Bolsheda advanced the fmdamental d m &  of a repub- 
lic, codtlcation of the lauded mates in favor of the peasants, 
and the eight-hour day, ttar the most extreme demands of the 
impending bourgeois-democratic revolution. Trotsky then as 
now thought that tlte workma were not ready to fight for the 
extrame demaads of the impending revolution (which today 
is the proletarian Socialist revolution). He advanced the 
dogan of "freedom of awociation, aswnblage and strikean- 
and no more. He conceived thin as a step hwards the 8- 
gla for a republic. "In order that the stru%gle for a rep&- 
lic", he wrote ia his Vienna paper, Prmdu, November 29, 
1911, "may not be a naked slogan of a few select ones, it is 
mmmary that you, class.cmacious w o r k  &odd teach the 
- how to understand in their own practica the necessity 
of the freedom d walition and to &uggle for this vital c l w  
dem811d"-a fmmmmr of his p t  advice to make the 
masses draw conclusiom '%om heir demacraiic Iogic". LRnin, 
in commenting upon thie dogan, p&td out that "ihe revolu- 
tionary phrm serva here to Mwer up h d  juatify the f aluity 
of Liquidationism, to fill the &da of the workera with 
rubbish". 
Wmding up his cbaracterhtion of Trotsky, Lenin eaid: 
u X t i s i m ~ e t o ~ s r r i t h T r o t a k y a b o o L p ~ f o r  
h a h a s a o h a t a l L  I t b p o d b l w a n d ~ t o a r g u a  
with canvinead Liquidatom and O t a m h  [a gmup of 
dtmandbg the 4 h m  ths Dnma of tho Bolehwik dapu- 
tim]. With a man who only playa at m m h g  up she mlatakm 
of both of them, oua dom not argue: o m  him m a dip 
lomat of ths lowm order." W. I. b i n ,  C o k d  W o r k  Rua- 
sian Edition, VoL XV, pp. m.3 
Today one expow T* aa a counter-revolutionary ren- 
egade who i n q k  the m n r k  of revo~utionary leaders. 
Trotsky the Historian 
'Trotsky distorts Bolshevism, for Trotsky never has betn abb 
to p a  any detinits viem on thm $10 of ths proletariat in the Rus- 
sl;m bourgeois rew1utioa Mudi  worse, h ~ ,  is his & f o r t h  
of the histor). 01 that rd&n. ' '  1V. L Lanin, Collccwd W o r k  
R d a n  Edition, Vol. XV, p. 15.) (Our emphmirs.) 
T" make falsification of Bolshevism more effective, Trotsky has undertaken to falsify its history. Again we must confine 
onrselvea to a few examples. 
Hnw did the idea of an armed insurrection take shape in 
the October days of 1917? Thia is how Trotsky d h  the 
story : 
"h m n  M the mder for he  rmwd of the C ~ P R  [from 
P e b g d ]  waa commmhtsd by Hadquartere to tbb Ekm- 
tiw Committee of the Pebo~rad Sovier . . . it became clsar that this 
question in its further d&lopment would have decisive political 
signihame. Tha idea of an insumtion began to take form from 
that manmat. It wm no longar  to invent a M e t  body. 
Tba raaZ aim of &a fatam comrmttss wm unequivodly b&t 
out nbsn in the sma d o n  Rouky concluded hk m p r t  on tho 
withdrawal of the 8okhsoilm from ths PmParliamsnt [a m d t a -  
tiw M y  wnwkad by lkamkp.-MJ.O.I with the trclamadw: 
'brig Ihe the diract and o p  nVueFgla for a moIntionary pow- 
throughout tha country!' That wan a t~atlslatim into rhs lawnage 
of Soviet Iegalitg of tbs slogan: 'lang live the armed 
tion.'" (Leon Trotsky, History oJ tAe R d n  R d d n .  vd 
rrr, p. 92) 
Trotsky made an exclamation-and that started the armed 
uprimng. He says 40 himdf. 
Ha then continues in a modest way to tell h u t  his r8Ie in 
the revolution. 'Trotsky had formuIaied some brief general 
resolution . . . Trotsky continued to speak The multitude 
continued to hold their hands in the air. Trotsky &idled out 
each word: Let this vote of yours be your oath. . . . The multi- 
tude held tbeir hands high They agreed. They took the oath" 
(Trotdcy quotes here the Menshevik, Sukhanov). 'Trotsky 
145 
was called in to consider thi quwtion. . . . Trotsky waa then 
playing the decisive r5le. The adoice he gave ue was a prod- 
uct of his revolutionary intuition." (Tratsky quotes Antonov ). 
The draft of the practical plan "was e d i d  by Trotsky". 'The 
Pmideat, Trotsky, was also about to approach the automo- 
Me. . . ." 
Another man seems to have been in the  revolution^. 
But in comparison with Trotsky the magnificent he a p p m  in 
Trotiky'a writhga mmewbat puny. Stalin quotes two of his 
referencss to W n :  
90 Joa want to Laow how out Party decided thc w o n  ob 
the of the thsmdrnent M y ?  Liam to Comrads 
m: 
'Lain 4 d :  "Of conme, it is n m  to dism the Con- 
a- Aoeembly, but A t  afiout the Left Socialist-Rmlu- 
t i o m r h  t" 
'Howmm, we ware greatly c o w h d  by old man M a h n .  
He came to UQonmltt" us and right at tha start said: 
m It probably ba nacxsqary to disperse the Con- 
ssi- -17 by fwoca* 
'"Bravol" cnehimd lank *you cannot get away from !ka 
llw&lL Bm will pru psDpla c o m t  to it?" 
"'Some of OPX people am wavering, but I thi that in tha 
e d * l r i I I ~ m 4 i d N * . '  
' 
=That is tho rray so- pop& write history. 
% f ~ ~ ~ t o h h t h s ~ d o e i d s d t h e ~ l w o f  
tbeStlpramsWuCamdI? J m s t U B t e n t o C ~ ~ :  
' h r y  time after I ~ t s d  hcad~uanezs, I nssd to say to 
Vladymir IlyiEb: "Withoat @id lad exmsnred mil- 
~ w u ~ a o t k ~ m ~ o a t o f ~ ~ . "  
T h i s  apparently ia ma If they only do not bemy WP 
' *I& tu assign a a m m h r  to eaeh of t h a w  
bsttsr, two: mid Lh, Hand Iat them haw a 6rm 
gripat-  It~Lth*twddonothreCOmmmi~its~~ 
a hm grip." 
That k ths way &a *m Wtaq Council came to be 
G m e I W d  
~ i m h T m t & y U r i ~ ~ *  
What mud did &mu& Trotsky h of these Arabian-Night 
~ ~ ~ h i n ? R  U&Wn,XAeOnobtrRatff 
a T- or haWm Novsmbsr 26, 1% p 9S.I 
The m w e r  b @wm in the whole career of Trot+. 
In order to prove that he is dm author of the theory of the 
bourgeoisdem0~~8tic rev01utim p i n g  into the socialist 
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revolution be gives the following account of the Wory of 
Bolshevism: 
" ~ m m  the year 1905 the Bolshevik Party had waged a - 
gle agaht the autmacy under h a  dogan 'Demoeratic Diotator- 
ship of the Proletariat and the Peaeantry'. This slogan, an well 
aB its thewetical baekgrormd, derivee from Lenin. In opposition 
to the M- whwe theoretician, Plekhanov, s t u b b d p  
oppaead tha 'mimkm tdm of the p d b i l i ~  of momplishing a 
bouqgeob ~ l u r i o n  withom the bourgwiaie', tePin considered 
that tho R d m  b w g d s i e  war d c d y  incapabls of 1- its 
own rsvolmioa Only tbb prolamint and p- in dose d n  
~ o u l d ~ r h r o u g h a d ~ t i c r w P l r u i o n ~ ~ ~  
andthelandlo& T h e v i c t o r g d t h h u a h , ~ d h g t o L e n i n ,  
&odd hugmate a dcmQuatie dictatorehip, which - not ody 
not identical with the dicmrabip of the pmletariat, but wm in 
@harp contraat to it, for its pxoblam was not ths omation of a 
mialiat mu* aor o v a  &I -don of forme of M t i o n  to 
nu& a d e w ,  but m d y  a mthh dmdng of ths Augean 
seablss of medievatism 
' T h e ~ d ~ o f l i d a n y ~ i d s a O f t h o A e g -  
enww of the +&at in the dsmoeratlc.mlnttoa could not, 
commpmily, maan angthIns m m  than tht th workam* pnrty 
wutd M p  tba poasaam with a politid from fb arwnal, 
suggm~totbem h k t  m a a d  msthodsforI3qddadng~tJu 
f ~ d a t y , a n d a h o w t b e ~ h o n t m a p & ~ ~ s n d  
mthh h o a y ~ t o s p e u k o f t h ~ ~ o f t h e p m b  
~ i r r t h e B ~ ~ & d t w # ~ a U & n i ~ c R o r &  
p m k ~ d l l j e t h e ~ u p r h i n g k r ~ ~ h a m p  
~ r ~ ~ & C # ~ ~ t h d ~ ~ ~ f & ~ ~ ~ ~ & ~  
h , t h e & t ~ ~ ' t i o n t o a r a & i s t m & t y .  Thhsgsmonyaf 
tho proletmist in tbs M e  m I u d o n  wan &atply d i h -  
mbhd fmm the diatatmhip of tss p l e d a t ,  and p o I e d c d ~  
o a a ~ ~ t i r .  T h e B ~ P . w i y . h a d b e m a ~ i R  
cAus w eLpar bin03 the apring of 1905." [ow emphasis- 
MJ.O.1 (Imn Trotsky, History o! the R w h  R ~ R ,  Vd. 
I, PP. d14-3K) 
Trotsky would have as believe that before 1917 the B o k  
v i h  never taught the prohtariat that its hepmny in a bar.  
geaisdemocratia revolution must be rresd to place on dm order 
of the day the direct transition to a 8ociali~t revohtion. Corn- 
para with thiB what we quoted from XRnin a b o ~  the immediate 
tramition from a bourgeobdem~~~atic to a Soeialiet revoldon. 
Compare wpecially with tbt following: 
of tbs m d u n  and organized proletariat, to p w  wer to the 
Bocirlist molution. . . . We will. with all our pow-, help ths 
=tire pamutrg to a r r y  through the democratic moluhn,  in 
order fhPt we, t h ~  party of tho proletariat, may be tho ewkr 
enabled to paas, as quickly as powible, to a new, higher tauk-the 
nwial;a muIution." 
t n i n  was indefatigable in expressing his scorn for Trotsky's 
methods. He spoke of the "adventmist policy" of Trotsky's 
faction. He speaks about Trotsky's "subtle perfidy". He Bays 
that Trotsky is "committing plagiarism". tenin knew his 
Troisky. 
Trotsky falsifies the history of Leninism, the history of the 
greatest achievement of the world proletariat,-to serve the 
bourger~isie and to aggrandize Trotsky. 
'This scorntire1 Trotsky", as Manuilsky called him at the 
Tbirtenth Plennm of the Cornintern, and his amuciates d 
every e ipe ,  have made it their special task to slander and 
malign the greateat Iiving leader of the revolution, Stalin. 
But in vain. He is the embodiment of what is most abhorren~ 
to the bourpi&+&e proletarian revolution under Com- 
munist leadership, completion of the building o l  Social- in 
the U.S.S.R, BoIshevization of the Commrmist P& in the 
capital* countria, relentleas struggle for the correct Lninist 
lime, resumption of the offensive against capitatism by the 
proletarian forces on a world-wide front, inclueion in this 
front of the o p p r d  peoples in the colonial and acqi-colonial 
cooatria 
Ii anything is widely known about StaIin it is his iron will, 
his persistenoe iu carrying out a program, his colossal driving 
power which bas kindled with creative enthn~iam scores of 
millions of people. Listen how the falsifier of history 
deseriben S t a b  : 
"Whm f a d  by pear problems Stalin alwaya -+nor 
~ l s e l r o b ~ a a 4 n t h u c a m o f K a m t n a v ,  b a t h u g h  
narmmean of ho* and lack of cmtive imagination. His 
wwiciws a u k  aImast mganically wmpeln bim at moments 
o f p c a t d m h i o a a n d d ~ d l K ~ c e o f o p i n i o n m m t i m i n t o t h s  
shadow, to walk md if to b u m  h m d f  againrrr both 
outm-" ( tan  T d y ,  Hhmy of thu Russ30n R m W o n ,  
Vd. m, p, 164) 
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The iighter who, together with Lenin, steered the October 
rovolation, is one who ''always ~ e a t s " .  The great 8trat&Bt 
d the civil war, whose plan of mil i rq  d o n ,  quickly and 
decisively executed, brought about the &live victory on a 
front of severs1 hundred miles in South Rwia  over the Whib 
forces of General Denikin, is one who "at moments of graat 
decision" retires "into the ahadow". The author of the Five- 
Year Plan, a momeataua undertaking on am uuheard-of WAG 
setting one hundred and sixty million people to work on the 
task of remaking one-Gxth of the earth's amface according to 
a &in social design, is one plderlng from "lack of creativa 
imagination". The revolutionist who carried throagh the laat 
p t  class war in the Revolution--the liquidation of the 
kulaks as a class-is pictured as a man who lmea "to wait", 
to insure himself "against both out comes"^ The fearless leader 
who always 6ghta ideoIogiea1 battIes againat opportrmiam, who 
detects hidden opportnnism no matter how cleverly disguised, 
rvho in tbe very earIy strtgee of the Trotsky opposition pre- 
dicted with aatomding clarity that it is to k a m e  "the rally- 
ing point of son-proIetarian eZerm~nta which are trying to 
disintegrate the dictatorship of the proletariat", is character- 
i d  as one who cannot make dmiaions. The buildet of tha 
life of minority nationalities in the U.S.S.R., b mam who 
w o r l d  out the practical methods of the Leninist solution of 
the national problem and has directed the buiIding of S d -  
ism in a manner to create a rich, mTorful, many-sided &a1 
Iife among one hundred nationalities differing in economic 
development, l-, history, customs, tradition, but united 
in common work for a k u t i f u l  fuhrte, i~ one who is d i e d  
with %narrowness of horizon". The world leader whose 
advice to every Par9 of the Cornintern on every problem ia 
c o m t ,  dear, balanced, and points the way tu new, more 
decisive clam battle% is declared to be a man of "suspicious 
caution". 
ThiQ L how Tmtnky writes history. 
What is &e aim of all theare vilifications? Nikolaiev elm 
Kirov. Do the Trotskyh knowingly crate a peychologhl 
atmosphere that would fire some madman to attmpt the mur- 
der of Stalk? 
The Danger of Trotekyism 
"Nobody dam speak aloud in Rda" 
"Tbs Russian workere have bad dwellings, bad clotha, bad 
i d .  In consequence of maloutrition and bad hygienic condi- 
liona, epidsmim are aproadins among them." 
W d  of p d a h d  beautiful pmapsniven aad paniculatly 
boadcial p r i m  the trrorkers of hsavg industry have obtained 
lil &al dght-bar workday p h  two h o w  ovcrtimb-shock- 
bripdsr and ~tlpm&ock-brigndsr work under mnditiom w h  
them L a constant kck of marahla and hutrumetlte, where tbe 
meek and apparatas am continually out of order, the work 
room are not haatsd and -tilation is absent." 
"The aptam of ' d ~ ~ t i o n '  and largewale wliectivimtion 
bm tmd Rwia from a ~ounuy of bwmiag agrienlturt into a 
country of w m n d  tuio. Instead of the thevantapei prumiwd 
to follorr from call& Ematipbac#l and l s r g d e  applicalion 
of tho wtl ham rcmainsd srhautsd. Hard i d  
labor in ths c m l k i m  fama haa I d  to 4 situation where the p w  
ant cannot bo tha meator of the most necasary pdu~cs.''  
w HO am the aathore of these statements? Do they m a *  nate from the Trotskyite camp? They eound very much 
like Trotskyite declarations, R e m h  what Trot& wrote 
about u b & u c r a ~ ' '  in R h a ,  about democracy being 
sti&d, about dmence of elementary rigbts under the " S h h h t  
regime". DOH it not r d l e  the statement that "nobody 
dares s peak aloud in Rushn?  
And now about the economic situation. Remember what 
Trotsky wrote about the conditions of the workerg. 
" ~ o m i c  t d s  am bdag set without any account hdng takm 
of ths actual meam An incxe-y hh~man load b baing 
d d  on the ahoddem of tho wotJcam . . . Malnutrition plm 
forced d o n s .  The combination of Lhae two conditions ia 
wugh to & away with tho equipment and to arhaust the pm 
d w  thnarwhos. . . . Om  ann not belien one's eye& . . . Poor 
noddunme ad numono fatigue engender an apathy to the em- 
m d h g  ~ ~ t .  h a d t  not only the old f a c t o h  bat 
dm the new onm that have h Mt aooording to the I M ~  word 
ln tdmologg fall quickly into a moribund stat&" (Ison Tmb 
sky, Sovitt ECOMAIY in Danger, p. 21.) 
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And tbis is what Trotsky wrote h u t  the situation of the 
paautB: 
~ a ~ c b P w & ~ r o w r d r i n ~ ~  
withoar taking my acmm of tha oeommIe a d  cnlttiral PO- 
~ a f t h o ~ ~ , h s r l c d i n ~ ~ ~ e o l t i  
qne0cm I t h r u ~ t h s ~ l m u l l o f t h s d ~  
producar long Mm it ma sbls to s n p p l ~ t  hem bp 0 t h  d 
mueh h i g h  m m i c  Ths d i i h k m t i ~ ~  p- 
which mbausta i- -J in id-, soot to bs a b ~  
l u # l y ~ c w h t h s * o f m r s l ~ m y * . * . ~ h r t t ~  
drad par mt mhtkkdm has rasdtd in om h m d d  psr 
cent omgmrrth of w d n  on dm fie&' (1- p. B.1 
Is there any material difference h e m  the Iast two quota- 
tions aud the quotatiom at the beginning of this chapter? It 
iar =cult to detect any. 'h @it ie the same. The 
ia the same. Yet the &st four quotatiom are taken from a 
publication calIed The Rwkn Fascist appearing in the Uaitod 
Stater of America in the Runah la~gnag~s (b magash ia 
pubIished in Pnham, C d c u t ,  by a man n d  A
Vow*). 
The R d m  Fascists and the former leader of tbe &tobar 
Rewlution, Leon Trotsky, speak the same language. 
What in tha differam bdwwn them? Otle would b in- 
clined to think that the fadta  @ ia the name of the d b -  
torship of capital w h e r e ~  Trotsky p d n  in dm nama uf h a  
Russian workers and p w m t a  But tbs fa- too, p f e ~  
to speak in the nama of the  ma^^ They appear in thair 
pablicatiow aa the great champions of dm downtrodden snd 
e r p l o h d 4 ~  o p p m r s  and exploiters being, in their pns- 
entation, the B o ~ ~  with S t a h  at their bead, TIM fan- 
cists, too, appeal in the name of democracy. They evea wy 
they are not against the Soviets Thy only want &freedom 
of unhnmpered voting and the right to elcat non-pdaana 
into the Soviets"--a Tmhkyh demand 
Are the fadata fricmds of dm R w s h  ma-? We do not 
think any enlightened pereon would b e h e  that. Is Tree 
a friend d the Russian masses? Some people think m, bat 
the fact that his s t a m t n  EO clmly d l e  thorn of the 
faw5st.s should make them doubtful aa to Truteky'~ real ob- 
jective. 
The differenm between tha f& and ths Tr- h 
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tbie--that the fascist deception ia easily detected by every 
thinking person wherean the Trotskyite deception is not no d y  
detatd h n s e  it k covered with "revolutionary", "Marx- 
ian", even 'Zeniniert" phrases. 
Therein lies the danger of Trotskyism. 
One weat world-wide victory was achieved by the world 
proletariat in October, 1917: the Bolshevik Revolution which 
mtablished the dictatorahiy of the proletariat. For over 17 
years the dictatomhip of the proletariat has been ruling in a 
gigantic country. Succeaaes which could not have been 
h a m t  of under the old w e  have beem achieved in 
rhe comparativdy brief apan of time after the end of the 
civil war. Propeas of industry which made the U.S.S.R, 
aar far as heavy metallurgy is concerned, the first oountry 
in Europe and the m n d  in the world,  ha^ actually trans- 
figured the vast land, opening More it still greater and 
mom etuggering possibilities. Progreee of agriculture, which 
traaafonaed a country of twenty million mall  backward in- 
dividual paasant holdings into a country of the most modern 
larpscllle collectivid agriculture, put the U.S.S.R on a firm 
foundation regards the production of fooda,tda and raw 
materials and made it to a large extent independent of the 
oapri~ee of weather conditions. Heiahts of culture have been 
achieved wbich in m q  respecte pike the cormtry far ahead 
of anything hewn in the capitalist world. 
All this was accom'pliahed not without struggles. Strug- 
glea against the former owners of wealth. Struggle against 
the White forces of h e  landIords and capitalists. Stmgglear 
agaimt the imperialid armie~ of intervention. Struggles 
against the e n d m  that penetrated into every crevice of So- 
viet life in order to damage and wreck, Struggle againat the 
village -1oiterq the kulaks. Struggle against the intellec- 
tual sabo~uxs who oflered ewq p d l e  redance to the 
workere' rulk Struggle against the i n h i e m y ,  the lack of 
education, ?he lack of training on the part of the workers. 
S~uggle against tbe backwtudneaa of the paeantry. Struggle 
against old habits, centuri-Id cuetom prejudim supereti- 
tioas. Str~ggb agaimt a I h  elemmta wi;hii the themist 
Party who thrtatend to destroy its unity and impede there- 
fore the progress of the revolution. 
m 
Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, with Leuin and 
Stalin and then Stalin at its head, dl these diflimltit~ have 
bmn overcome, most of the battles won, the foundations of 
socialism laid, the edifioe of mialiwn nearly completed. The 
toilers of the Soviet Union are entering a new era, an era of 
abundance, of higher culture, of a more beautiful and color- 
ful life. 
For what is this economic progr- if not a foundation for 
more and better goods to satisfy the massea? What ia tbis 
cultural p r o p =  if not a means of raising Soviet humanity 
to a higher, more human level? Wbat is the entire system if 
noe the open road to stiIl greater, &lI more marvelous prog- 
r w ?  
Compare this with the downfaH of indwtry and agricultum 
in the =pitali& world, with faetoriea hut down, cottonfields 
and wheatfields ploughed under, wheat burnd, milk spilled 
into the rivers, teas of millions of workers throwm out into 
hunger and misery, thousands upon thowands dying, &I- 
dren destitute, young Boys and girls roaming the roads, schools 
and colleges curtailed, teachers and technicians, high special. 
b t a  and artists aweIling the ranks of the unemployed and un- 
able to ~rodum cdture. Compare the Soviet achievements 
with thkk huge waste of hlmtan-energy, human talent, human 
p m s i b i l i t i e ~ d  the importance of the Swiet Union will 
stand out in a harp  light. 
me Soviet Union ie a beacon light for all the o p p d  ma 
emloited of the world. The Soviet Union has done aww with 
thi exploitation of by man. It has done away Gth t h~  
o p p k o n  of minoritp+natidtiw), of coloniea and semi- 
colonies, It has made the formerly opp& seetiom of Rue- 
eia Wtd by non-Rwsiana into veritable gardens of national 
freedom where national cuhre blomo-1- that is na- 
tionaI in form and proletarian in content. It has developed 
the formerly backward regim to make them r e d  the level 
of the moat %My developed regions. 
The Soviet Union atands out as the example for the  ma^^ 
of the world. It &om how capitalist d&ery and d o n a 1  
oppreaaion can be abolished. The Commmias Party of the 
U.S.S.R. stands as the example of how the Parkha of the pro- 
Ietariat in every country muat be organized and how they mmt 
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eonduct their struggles in order to achieve the victory of the 
working dasu and the eBtabkhmnt of the dictatorehip of the 
proletariat. The Communist Intermtimal ier the organization 
I& mites all the Commdst Parties and makes them into 
o m  great Bolabik world party, leader of the world rev* 
lucion. 
There is not a ah& revdutionq goup among the workers 
and opp-d nationalities in the world that is not stimulated 
by the example of the Soviet Union There is not a single es- 
pmsion of revolt among the - that ia not bigkmed and 
made more conscioue and more decisive in consequence of the 
existence of the Communist Parties and the Communist hterna. 
tiona1. Remove the Soviet Union from the political 
deatroy the Commmriat Partp of the U.S.S.R., crush the Com- 
munist Internatiod-and you b* about the meat defeat 
of the exploited, and the peareat triumph for tbe exploitera 
1 
This is why world c a p i t a h  hates the Soviet Union. This 
is why the world imperialist powers are always conspiring 
against the Soviet Union. This is why they are assiduously 
preparing for war against the Soviet Union. They b o w  their 
I 
I 
enemy. They know tht danger that threatens their domina- 
tion and their very eltisteslce. They are bent on crushing, 
WT-, dwmying, wiping out the hated dictatorship of the 
p r o l ~ t .  
He who helps them is an enemy of the woxking class and of 
all the o p p d .  Trot+ and the Tro&yib belong to this 
-P. 
There are soft-- and "fair-minded" intellmtuab who 
think that Trotaky did not gat a square deal. Tho88 citampiom 
of "fair play" forget that it i. Trotakp who did not give dw 
Soviet Union a mpm deal. It ia he that never was fair to 
the R n d m  workers and to their Communist Party. It is 
L who never came with a fair and apuara attitude but always 
kept skeIetons in his elm& 1t.b Trotaky who, while a mem. 
ber of the Central Commi#es and of its Political B m u ,  
plotted ag- dm Party and therefore agaimt the Soviet 
Union, againat tb very d e  of the proletariat, Wben the 
Communist Partg finally was f o d  to expel him, it was 
because he turned traitor to ths ravolution. 
The stamp of renegade is bmaing on his forehead. 
M 
Thorn intellectuals who seem to b fascinated by tha f a h  
glitter of hie literary outpui should think a moment of what 
his activities actually amwnt to. He is - p o d  to be the 
champion of inner-Party democr111:y-b saym so himwlf-- 
bat when it came to the trade dona  of the U.5.S.R he wasted 
to change them into a purely bmemcratic apparahw which 
r l e a  from above, and for thie purpm he p r o p 4  to give 
them "a severe shakeup", to '*rub them atromgly with sandn. 
He was supposed to be the champion of rapid indnstriaIiaa. 
tion-for which he advanced unaormd a d  -tially deatmm 
ti= measures--bat when, under the leadership of the Corn- 
m h t  Party and Stalin, indue&rialhtion did make phtaom* 
enal progress, he demands a halt, he laments the "break-d" 
s+ He was supposed to lx~ the champion of coIleetivixdon 
of the paant hol&ga--if need be by form, which woald 
have ruined the mlationahip betwm the workere and the poor 
and middle peasants and d d  the revolution-hut when 
' collectivization finally did make rapid progrese, he dccriw it 
as ruining agriculture and d i n g  ths peasan&. He wan snp. 
posed to be 'Wtra revoIutionarp", a Left oppositionist--by 
which he mema a better Communist tban all the other Corn- 
munistgbut hia activities have one aim: to un&rmb, to 
shatter, to weaken and co-dy to b o y  the Commuuiat 
Party of the Soviet Union wi thut  whkh t k r e  cars & no so- 
c a t  construction and rn Soviet Union sither. Fie ia atlp- 
p o d  to be against "hucrat i sm" in the Party and in the 
State appar-a danger which the Party and tbe Soviet 
State themselves fight against and mitigate, and which he, 
Troisky, exaggerates a million -but what he is organ- 
izing b tiny cliques of disgruntled bureaucrab, renegades with 
small capabilities and tremendous ambitions, thwarted Individ- 
uals who could not achieve leadership in real Communist Par- 
tips, creatures poisoned by all the vim of capital& politkhs 
and having nothing to do with the m a w  He is supposed 
to be dissatisfied with. the policies of the Communist 
International and the Communist Parties in the various coun- 
ar ia  because--to him, he says-they ate not radical enough, 
but whenever his followers engage in any kind of activities 
among the workers they follow faithfully and obediently in the 
footsteps of the William Greens, Matthew Wolls, John Lewises 
and other mialeaders of labor. He is supposed to be the great 
advocate of h e  united front, accusing the Communist Interna- I 
tiond of having rained the b a n  revolution by not proposing 
a united front-which is an a d o n  b a d  on his own fab- 
ricatio-but when a united front is developing, like that in 
France and in the U W  Stat- his grouplets join with the 
reformi- agriraat the united front, thus tryjng to put a monkey 
wrench into the machinery of uniting the workers for com- 
mon struggla He is suppod to be displeased with the Com- 
munist International becartse, b says, it is not advancing the 
revolution rapidly enough, but he himself is creating that 
abortive contraption, the fourth international, which is meant 
to fight not for h e  socialist revoIution but for bourgeois 
democracy, ie., for the pqettmtim of exploitation and op- 
pression. He c o r n  himself with the name of Lenin-whom 
he fought m m  of hie life and with whom he never fully 
aped-he  b o w  of earryitlg foward the traditions of Lenin, 
but he doea it in order to abuse the great genina who is con- 
tinuing the work of h i n  at the present epoch and who is 
leading the Soviet maam from victory to victory, J w p h  
Stab. 
Let no one think that Trdcyism is mere disagreement with 
one or the other policy of the Soviet that it is 
mere propaganda. To be sure, Trotskyism uses the weapon 
of propaganda, the "arms of criticism", but only to pass to 
"criticism by amw", to the attempts at overthrowing the Soviet 
system by armed force. The murdering of Kirov is only an 
instance of what methods of struggle Trotskyim would like 
to dmlop, to amum gigantic propoxtions. 
It ia precisely for the purpose of bringing about such "de- 
velopmente" that the "Fourth International" is being attempted. 
"Is it possible to remove the bureaucracy 'peaoefnIlyY ?" & 
Trobky in The Swiet Uniwr Md the Fomh Inter&& 
(Pioneer Publishem N.Y., English dtion, 1934)--and the 
am- is wtive. Of m m e  Trotsky d m  not say that be 
wishes to destroy the Soviet Union. The Trotskpites qaak 
about the " h u c r a c y ' '  only, Le., about the Communist Party 
and tBa apparatus of the Soviet State. Bot it is pite  clear 
from the outset that when these are removed, the Soviet system 
is o ~ o w m .  Trotsky adv- the formation in the U.S.S.R. 
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' of a party to accomplish thb ta&. 'The fundamental historic 
task," he says, "ia to mate  the revolutionary party im the 
U.S.S.R. from among the healthy elements of the old party 
and from among the youth." (IW., p. 24.) This party, 
which Trotsky calls "revolutionary" and composed of "healthy 
e1ements3' iu the same way as Hitier calle kig party "revolu- 
tionarf' and "full of Germanic vigor", is to m e a t  power laot 
by the instrwne&isy of the d l k g  C v m r n d t  P w ~ y  or
tk Smsiet SW i ~ s t i t ~ o m .  "After the experiences of the last 
few years, it would be childieh to suppose that the Stalinist 
bureaucracy can be removed by means of a Party or Soviet 
congress," says Trotsky (p. 24). "No normal 'constitutional' 
ways remain to remove the ruling clique" (p. 25), i.e., to 
remove the organization of power of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Trot8ky advances his h i s  £rankly: 'Th bu- 
reancraq [State organization of the proletariat and the c o b  
tive p-try.-MJ.0.1 can be compelled to yield power into 
the hands of the proletarian van@ [the counter-revolution- 
ary plo- and murderers of the Nikdaiev type.-M.J.O.] 
only by force." (P. 25, emphash by Trotsky.) 
Does Trotsky envisage qvil. war? He pxefers to call it by 
another name. He p& to he his folloyp8m by p i c t h g  
a situation where they are so strong that "the Stalinist [ P q  
and State] apparatus will remain sua+ in mSdr1',4mt 
he is at the same time very explicit. "Should it (dw apparatus) 
stilI attempt to reeist, it wiIl nemaq to apply a g h  
it not the measure of civil war, but rather meesures of police 
character," ie., clnbs, gums, gas bombs. But do not think that 
Trotsky shrinks before an m a d  np- against the Soviet 
government He wys tbat an armed uprising is justified, "In 
m y  case what would be involved is not an d insurrection 
a g h  the dictatorship of the proletariat bltt the removal of 
a malignant grow& upon it" (p. 25). Trotsky wwld have 
us Mieve that an tiprising of counter-revolutio~whi& 
by the nature of things must be by the forms land- 
lords, manufacturers, kulaka and the of6uals of the bar's 
government-would not be an upriaing &4mt the &-tor- 
Bhip of the proletariat but the removal of what he chooses to 
ail  "a malignant growth" (he called LeniA "the leader of the 
reactionary wing" of the Social-Democratic Party). But nat 
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much acumen ia d d  to understand that an armed upriaina; 
against the Commnniat Party and the Soviet State would return 
the former exploiters to power. The Rwsian fascists in Amer- 
ica a h  say that they want to prmerve the Soviet system. 
They daserve aa much credence as Trotsky. 
A lurid light b thrown on Trotskyism by ita open admis- 
sion that it hopes for uur to faditate the overthrow of the 
Sooiet& Which is closer, a s h  Trotsky in a delirium of wish- 
fulfillment: the collapse of the Soviet system by itself, &hut 
the action of ths new party, or the emergam of auch a party? 
Neitbw, would a reas~nabIe human M q  say, because there 
is no b g w  of a ool lap of the Soviet apskm and no prospect 
of the copater-evolution e m  having a chance to build a mass 
party in the U.SS.R. But here Tr&y reveals another angle 
of his oatlook: "A major historical bt-whikh q be a rum 
-will M n e  tlw relation of f o r d '  (p. 26). So thia is it. 
Tbe Trdqitea hop for an hperiaiiat war to help the coun- 
tm-mlutim ov&w the SO* aptan.  They try to or- 
g h  b "Fourth h a t i o n d "  to "await a clear d l * '  for 
au attae% on the Soviet Union. War may be the d o n .  
N o h  have the Tmsky im revealad t b d v e s  to such 
am mt. 
TrotsLyism dws the aame work aa the open comter-m1u- 
t i e  Ia s* thera ia no diff-ee between Trotsky- 
h u  and Hearatism. Bmt Trohkyb qremnta that peculiar 
danger that it is claaked as 'Gft'' Commdsm and that it 
e t a  phr- about "oroxld reva1~od"' 
'Ws mpitdiats need variom claseee of agents to todelude the 
workera, to b o y  their unity, to dim tbem from the pltth 
of mlationq m g l ~  Tbe ca- have their Rooee- 
d t e  PPi& New-Dad phrraaeoIogy snd Uaacial-ity" dema- 
gogy. W h  dm workera are no more willing to accept the 
Rowwelt dmmgo%g, the c q h b b  have another agent, the 
~ o u b a r e a m r a q w h i c h ~ l t o r r p s a l t i n t b e n a m e o f  
h h  wtrile &livering dm w o h  to b i r  expIoitere. Where 
the w h  have advanced dl1 )arther, t h e  are the S- 
~~ who, in the name of "demcmcf ( b g d t d ~ m o o -  
rw, exploiters' kwp the workers from joining 
the Commdet Party and eng- in revolutionary e e s  
4- eapitaliam for Sovid Power. WheneVBr the w o r k  are 
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so radicalized that even the d i s t  dmption can no more 
keep them chained to the chariot of capitalism, the has 
another agent-Trotsky and the T&tee. h come in the 
name of "Left" C o m t n u n h  They come as the "true M h " .  
BUS the eEmt of their activitie~ ie- the -id to c a p i t a h  
by undermining all that k really r e ~ o l t l t i ~ ~  by dhhmrhn- 
ing  the workers, by spreading among them a paaic in relation 
to the Soviet Union, by making them join the Mwteites and 
similar elements--under the ban- of the counter-molu- 
tionary ''fourth internationai". 
Trotakyiem does not sink roots into the anashlee of the prole- 
tariat, but its danger for the Communist Party, and partidarly 
for those pe#p-bowpis intelIeetuals who are moving towards 
the Commnnist Party in the capitalia comtriea, must not be 
underestimated. It is the petty bonrgwisie that is, through 
Trotakpinm, tryiag to d i s o r g s h  and demorab the revolu- 
tionary f m  that are m o b i l ~  against c~pitdism The 
petty-bourgeois elements, MY k i n ,  "surround the prolariat 
on all Bides . . . they saturate it . . . t e  demodm it, 
continually tnake it relapse into petty-bourgeois spinel-w, 
disruption, individualism, M t i m  h enthnsiamn to di~. 
mayn. This is true about the capitalist conntriea no lese than 
it was true about the Soviet Republic in 1920. TbR petty bour- 
geoisie is surrounding the proletariat on every side, and Trot- 
skyism is b e i i  continually regenerated am the e x p d m  of 
this particular brand of counter-revolution. It ia mly natural 
that the intellectuals, hailiw from the petty b o w p i e ,  &odd 
be particularly exposed to the danger of Trotskyism. The 
lot of dm intellectuals in the pmmt & is far from en- 
viable. Hundreda of thowands HaPe been thrown out of 
work Men&% educational and d t m a l  activities have h e n  
crippled The intelectual yonth hae almm no hope of get- 
ting work that would enable it to develop its talentm and to 
laad a dortabIe e x h m a  The i a t e l l d  are homing 
radicalid. But, being petty-bourgeois, many of them have an 
aversion for the Communist Party* for its theory and practice, 
Here Trotskyism coma in handy. It gim tbe i n t e l l d  of 
thia kind a out". It rnakea it p d l e  far them to pose 
as Communists withoat patticipating in the elam -re. It 
gives them the opportunity to pose as "critics" of the Commu- 
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aiet Party "from the Left" and thus satisfy their deeire to ap- 
pear ura&d"' It gives them a platform from which to hk the 
Communist Party and thus satisfy their petty-bourgeois in- 
clinationewithoat at the same time appearing reactionary. 
It snpplh them with material for the mouthing of phrases 
about h i n  and Stalin, the Communist Internatianal and the 
world revolution while sticking deeply in the petty-bourgeois 
mud It makes &em hlieve they are "Commlmietsn while it 
atera to all their pettybourgeoits hatred for proletarian dia- 
cipline and proletarian straightfornard revolutionary action. 
And this is precisely the mamn why Tr~tskyiim must Ix 
branded as the aawny of the working class, why Trotskyism 
ahodd b8 shunned by anybody who has rympathy for the 
revolutionarg movement of the exploited and o p p r d  the 
world o m .  
It must be the eupma taak of the toilers in every country 
to build the Co '3 Party, ab d o n  of the Corn& 
I n ~ ~ m a t i ~ n ~ l ,  a d to follow ite line of atruggle against capital- 
ism and for the Soviet System. 
FOR THE STRUGGLE AGAXNST 


